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There is growing evidence that the number and severity of natural disasters and their cascading events 
such as power blackouts are increasing. These extreme events threaten human lives, displace hundreds 
of thousands of people and cause huge financial losses. Therefore, it is important to understand better 
how socio-economic systems can best respond to these disasters and how they can recover quickly, 
build back better and become more resilient. 
This thesis comprises five separate studies of four different types of disasters. The overall objective is 
to improve the understanding of how society copes with and makes decisions in crisis and emergency 
situations, and how disaster affected areas recover, particularly in terms of speed and quality. This is a 
huge subject and rather than focusing on just one event or a single type of disaster, the objective is to 
look at different types of disaster events by studying people’s risk perception and their (real or expected) 
disaster behaviour in the context of different phases of the disaster cycle from immediate response to 
longer-term recovery and resilience building. 
The five studies featured in this thesis are: 1. Behaviour during a long-lasting blackout in France and 
Germany, investigated through role-playing scenario exercises to study how society would cope. The 
aim is provide information to emergency managers and policy makers about community needs and 
people’s likely behaviour in future blackouts, 2. Analyses of people’s preparedness, perception and 
behaviour during floods in the UK and Germany and their attitude to public authorities, investigated 
through face-to-face interview surveys with people living and working in the flood prone areas, 3. 
Analyses of flood evacuation compliance, from both decision-theoretic and game-theoretic 
perspectives, using the Warning Compliance Model, which incorporates a Bayesian information system 
that formalizes the statistical effects of a warning forecast based on the harmonious structure of a 
Hidden Markov Model, 4. Examining recovery after two major comparable floods in UK and Germany 
in terms of the impacts, levels of preparedness and government response, investigated with face-to-face 
interview surveys with residents and businesses and online surveys with experts, 5. Tourist destination 
recovery in the Philippines after earthquake and typhoon, investigated through interviews with tourist 
managers and stakeholders. 
The key areas for future research revolve around identifying in more detail and with greater precision 
those factors that predispose a society to respond effectively to a disaster, to recover as quickly as 
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1.  Motivation  
The number and severity of natural disasters and their cascading effects, such as power blackouts, are 
increasing and pose an increasing threat to human life and the economy. Therefore, the factors that can 
make societies more resilient in the face of this increasing risk need to be studied in order to reduce 
these risks for the future. The goal of this doctoral thesis, which includes five separate studies, is to 
address different types of disasters and understand how society behaves and makes decisions in crisis 
and emergency contexts, and how disaster affected areas can recover in terms of speed and quality after 
the events and which factors can be considered to call an area recovered.  
2.  Introduction 
There is a growing body of scientific evidence pointing to the long-term trend in global warming and 
climate change, which has led to an increase in the magnitude and frequency of natural hazard events 
and increasing casualties, displacement and economic loss an understanding of the seriousness of threat 
of global warming has developed over the last few decades (Flohn 1980; Leggett 1990; Parry et al. 
2007; Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2018). One of the effects of changes in climatological patterns is the 
increasing frequency and intensity of storms and precipitation events, which lead to increased risk of 
river and coastal flooding, changing the return period of 100-year flood to 50-years or less (Dankers 
and Feyen 2008). Many scientific articles show an increase in number of affected people and number 
of disasters (Alfieri et al. 2016; Bruine de Bruin et al. 2014). 
Climate change will influence the nature of the climatic hazards people and ecosystems are exposed to 
and also contribute to deterioration or improvement of coping and adaptive capacities of those exposed 
to these changes. The risk of climate change to human systems (e.g., agriculture and water supply) is 
increased by the loss of ecosystem services that are supported by biodiversity (e.g., water purification, 
protection from extreme weather events, preservation of soils, recycling of nutrients, and pollination of 
crops) (Oppenheimer 2015). Consequently, many studies (Blaikie et al. 2014; Verner 2010; Birkmann 
et al. 2011) focus on the vulnerability of humans and societies, rather than solely on the level of climatic 
change and respective hazards (Oppenheimer 2015). Major natural disasters pose immense problems 
for the people, societies and economies affected and for agencies and national governments attempting 
to rectify the damage, disruption and injury (Platt et al. 2016). This dissertation reports research on two 
types of disaster, first hypothetical, then real case. For the first type, a hypothetical power blackout in 
France and Germany is studied where the research focuses on the response phase of the disaster 
management cycle (DMC). The second type embraces a real pair of flood events in the UK and 
Germany and the case for recovery from typhoon and earthquake in the Philippines as back-to-back 
events, where the research covers the response, recovery and mitigation phases of DMC. A brief 
introduction to each study will be given in the end of this chapter. 
With such a complex research topic, that spans a number of hazards, events and regions, and has wide 
spread ramifications across the politico-socio-economic system, it is prudent to be begin by defining 
terms. The first part of this chapter, provides the basic definitions and key notions to provide the 
background of disaster management and disaster policy measures.  
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3.  Definitions and background of disaster management  
3.1 Hazard and disaster  
Hazards may be defined as "a threat to people and the things they value" such as a natural or man-made 
hazard (Cutter 2001) which may or may not turn into a disaster. Based on systems theory, disasters 
occur when a misfit occurs between physical hazards, the built environment, and human culture (Mileti 
1999) and the situation goes beyond the abilities of the local population to recover. There are three types 
of hazards including natural, man-made, and technological (Phillips 2015). 
Hazards from the natural environment causing significant losses include convective and tropical storms, 
coastal and riverine floods, floods, mudslides, earthquakes and volcanoes, which could negatively 
impact residents, homes, businesses, bridges, ports, and roads (Mileti 1999). In many cases, people, 
businesses, and infrastructure can resist or rebound well from disaster impacts. However, not all 
disasters are 'equal opportunity events' for the affected people (Phillips 2015). 
Flooding results from various sources and represents one of the most common disaster types worldwide 
which can be the result of fast melting snow, breaking dams, water drainage systems, thunderstorm and 
storm. In these situations, people may need to evacuate these areas to survive. Storms cause even more 
economic losses than floods and displace more people. Cyclonic storms vary in impact and intensity 
and are typically feared more than tropical storms or depressions (Phillips 2015). However, there are 
more deaths and greater economic losses worldwide from earthquakes than either storms or floods (EM-
DAT 2020).  
Disasters occur when a social system’s normal functioning has been critically interrupted by the levels 
of damage and impact (Alexander 1993; Birkmann et al. 2013). They can be technological, financial or 
natural, while natural disasters include, storms, floods, earthquake, tsunami and volcano (UNDRR 
2019; Carter 2008). This thesis addresses three natural hazards: riverine floods, storms and earthquakes 
and one technological (man-made) hazard, a major electricity blackout.  
Disasters are the product of a complex relationship between the physical environment (both the natural 
and built environment) and society (its behaviour, function, organization and development, including 
human perception) (Quarantelli 1999). The term is used colloqually by the general public and the media 
and is used more or less rigorously by scientists, government agencies and insurance companies (al-
Madhari and Keller 1996). Carter (2008) defines disaster as a “disruption to normal patterns of life … 
including destruction of or damage to government systems, buildings, communications, and essential 
services”. The United Nations definition of disaster is a "serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, 
and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental 
losses and impacts”. Cisin and Clark also define disaster as one or a series of events that disrupt normal 
activities. Barkun (1974) writes, “we shall take disaster to be a severe, relatively sudden, and frequently 
unexpected disruption of normal structural arrangements within a social system or subsystem resulting 
from a force, 'natural' or 'social', 'internal' to a system or 'external' to it, over which the system has no 
firm 'control' (al-Madhari and Keller 1996)". 
Some authors consider that there is no such thing as a 'natural' disaster since damage and loss are caused 
by human action putting life and property in harm's way (UNDRR 2019). Based on Paragraph 15 of the 
Sendai Framework, disasters can be small or large, frequent or not, sudden or slow onset and caused by 
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natural, man-made, technological, biological, or even environmental hazard. Therefore, strictly 
speaking, there is no such thing as a natural disaster, but only natural hazards (UNDRR 2019). Krimgold 
(1974) addresses the issue of scale and suggests that disasters can be local (which may exceed the 
capacity of local resources), national (which need help from other nations) or international (al-Madhari 
and Keller 1996).  
 It is clear that the same size of event will cause different levels of damage in different parts of the world 
depending on the level of preparedness of the society, the quality of its planning processes, building 
construction and infrastructure resilience. Disasters occur when the coping capacities of socio-
ecological systems are overwhelmed (ISDR 2004). This can be due to lack of resources and information, 
the result of institutional failures, and/or as a result of the speed of development and application of 
appropriate technological innovations (Pelling 2011). 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (1984) defines disaster as an event leading to fatalities, 
injuries, and property damage that cannot be managed through the regular procedures and resources of 
government. Its unexpected and sudden development requires immediate, coordinated, and effective 
response by government and private sector organizations to meet human needs and speed recovery (al-
Madhari and Keller 1996). The World Bank (1989) puts an economic slant on its definition of disaster 
as, "an extraordinary event of limited duration (such as war or civil disturbance) or a natural disaster 
(such as an earthquake, flood, or hurricane) that seriously dislocates a country's economy". McCaughey 
BC (1985) emphasises the psychological damage that disaster events cause, defining a disaster as "an 
event that occurs suddenly, unexpectedly, and uncontrollably, that … often results in adverse 
psychological consequences for the survivors" (al-Madhari and Keller 1996). The Red Cross (1983) 
defines disaster in its Disaster Relief Handbook as "a catastrophic situation in which the day-to-day 
patterns of life are in many instances suddenly disrupted and, as a result, people need protection, food, 
clothing, shelter, medical and social care, and other necessities of life" (al-Madhari and Keller 1996). 
Disasters will, to varying degrees, disrupt the physical, environmental, psychological, social and 
economic functioning of communities. This can have significant health effects (The Australian Institute 
for Disaster Resilience 2019). 
What all these definitions have in common is that disasters cause a disruption to normal life leading to 
loss of life and property and the need for relief and recovery and surpass the capacity to manage locally 
and hence require external assistance. 
Al-Madhari and Keller (1996) define a disaster as an event with ≥10 fatalities, or/and economic loss 
over ≥1 US$ million, or/and a need to evacuate ≥ 50 people.  
The impacts of disasters generally refer to impacts on lives, livelihoods, health, ecosystems, economies, 
societies, cultures, services, and infrastructure due to hazardous climate change events and the 
vulnerability of an exposed society or system. Floods, droughts, and sea level rise are subsets of the 
impacts of climate change on geophysical systems (Oppenheimer 2015). Oppenheimer (2015) provides 





Figure 1 Risk and disaster impacts (Oppenheimer 2015) 
3.2 Disaster risk management (DRM) and Disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
ISO 31000 defines Disaster Risk Management (DRM) as “coordinated activities to direct and control 
an organisation with regard to risk” (Risk Management Basic). The United Nation office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UNDRR) describes disaster management as focusing on "the organization and 
management of resources and responsibilities to address all aspects of emergencies and disasters" (UN-
SPIDER). Figure 2 illustrates the risk management process as defined in ISO 31000. 
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DRM is therefore a structured method to decrease and control risks, through risk assessment procedures, 
developing strategies and taking specific actions which lead to managing uncertainty and potential 
losses (Reliefweb Glossary of Humanitarian Terms). It focuses on the organization and management of 
resources and responsibilities to cover all aspects of preparedness, response and initial recovery steps 
(UN-SPIDER). To be effective, disaster management should not be implemented reactively, but rather 
needs to be implemented in a comprehensive and continuous way (Carter 2008). 
Ideas change over time. Initially, disaster management focused on response and relief efforts following 
disaster events (ISDR 2004; Lewis et al. 1976; Twigg 2004)  
The shift in focus from the hazard to the impact on communities has been a key development in disaster 
risk management and risk reduction (The Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience 2019). Also known 
as Emergency Risk Management, DRM is an organized process that supports the wellbeing of 
communities and the environment (LEMC and LRCC 2015). It focuses on the management of risk 
rather than the management of hazards (The Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience 2019). 
DRM approaches include risk prevention, mitigating negative impacts, insurance, and dealing with the 
consequences of a particular risk. In some key sectors affected by natural hazards, such as water supply, 
energy, agriculture and transportation, risk management may form a core element of business activity 
owing to the potential for high losses (Reliefweb Glossary of Humanitarian Terms; ISDR 2004). 
Risk governance is highly related to the decisions and implementation of actions by governments and 
governmental institutions (Renn 2008; Birkmann et al. 2013). It is related to the concept of meta 
decision-making, encompassing the trade-offs between opposing strategies that need to be made by the 
authorities in charge of managing recovery.  
On the other hand, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) aims at preventing new and reducing existing 
disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience and therefore 
to the achievement of sustainable development (UNDRR 2017). Risk is reduced by analysing and 
managing the causes of disasters, through reducing social and economic vulnerability to hazards, and 
improving preparedness for harmful events (Reliefweb Glossary of Humanitarian Terms).  
3.3 Disaster management cycle 
Regardless of the nature or even the size of the disaster, emergency management covers three main 
phases: (1) Impact, (2) Response and (3) Prevention (mitigation and preparedness). The response phase 
can usefully be sub-divided into immediate relief and longer-term recovery.  
An understanding of the phases of disaster management goes back 100 years, to 1920 when Samuel 
Henry Prince (1920) defined the three different phases of societal response to disaster: emergency, 
transition and rehabilitation. Coetzee and van Niekerk (2012) consider this as the basis of traditional 
disaster studies. Prince for the first time described the societal response after a disaster into different 
phases. The first phase of an emergency involved confusion and uncertainty among the disaster affected 
people. The transition period is when organized groups, such as the army, respond to the impact of a 
disaster and provide rescue and relief services. The final phase was when the society and economy 
began to recover and things returned to normal (Coetzee and van Niekerk 2012; Prince 1920). 
Various disciplines have been influenced by Prince's ideas, including sociology, geography, 
psychology, civil defence, public administration and development studies (Quarantelli 1986; Tierney 
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1998; Coetzee and van Niekerk 2012; Quarantelli 1997). Some of the key thinkers who built on Prince's 
model and developed the concepts of the disaster management cycle further were Carr (1932), Powell 
J (1954), Chapman (1962) and Stoddard (1968). Prince’s work was extremely influential as can be seen 
in a subsequent comparative study by Carr (1932). Carr identified four phases: preliminary, dislocation, 
readjustment and delay. Powell (1954) identified eight distinct stages: predisaster, warning, threat, 
impact, inventory, rescue, remedy and finally recovery when attempts are made to resume normal 
operations following a disaster (Table 1). Chapman (1962) developed Powell's ideas and reduced the 
number of stages to six by eliminating the first and the last stages in table 1.  
 
Table 1 Eight Socio-Temporal Stages of Disaster (Palen et al. 2007) 
 
A study by Stoddard (1968) anticipated later disaster management cycles by identifying three over-
arching phases – pre-emergency, emergency and post-emergency phases. He describes warning, threat 
and evacuation, dislocation and relocation for the pre-emergency phase as key activities. The post-
emergency phase includes short and long-term rehabilitation activities (Stoddard 1968; Neal 1997; 
Coetzee and van Niekerk 2012). 
The concepts developed by these authors have an underlying similarity to the work of Prince in that 
they consider distinct disaster time periods. However, it is important to note that these early stage studies 
considered the different phases in a linear fashion (Coetzee and van Niekerk 2012). This traditional 
linear approach started to change during the 1970s, following a dramatic increase in the impact of 
disaster events causing more deaths and greater economic losses than in previous decades (Wisner et 
al. 2004; Coetzee and van Niekerk 2012).  
Stage 0: Pre-disaster
State of social system preceding point of impact
Stage 1: Warning
Precautionary activity includes consultation with members of own social 
network
Stage 2: Threat
Perception of change of conditions that prompts survival action
Stage 3: Impact
Stage of “holding on” where recognition shifts from individual to 
community affect and involvement
Stage 4: Inventory
Individual takes stock, and begins to move into a collective inventory of 
what happened
Stage 5: Rescue
Spontaneous, local, unorganized extrication and first aid; some 
preventive measures
Stage 6: Remedy
Organized and professional relief arrive; medical care, preventive and 
security measures present
Stage 7: Recovery
Individual rehabilitation and readjustment; community restoration of 




The earliest disaster management cycle (DMC) was drawn by Baird et al. (1975) (Figure 3). This DMC 
includes six different phases: mitigation and prediction, preparedness for relief, warning, relief, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
 
Figure 3 Disaster occurrence with an activity system over time (Baird et al. 1975) 
This diagram, which they labelled "Disaster occurrence with an activity system over time", mapped the 
ongoing process of disaster management that requires society, government and businesses to be 
involved in all phases of disaster to reduce the impacts of disaster and to recover effectively (Ullah and 
Gungor 2014; Coetzee and van Niekerk 2012). It demonstrated graphically for the first time how short-
term rehabilitation and longer-term recovery are linked to mitigation and prevention (Baird et al. 1975).  
Figure 4 illustrates the author's approach to the DMC, with the three main phases in the outer ring and 
overlapping activities in the inner ring. 
 
 
Figure 4 Disaster Management Cycle (as proposed by the author) 
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3.3.1 Phase 1 – Pre-disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation and Preparedness 
Prevention includes actions designed to impede the occurrence of a disaster and/or prevent this 
occurrence from causing harmful effects on people or key installations (Basumi and Abdul Nifa 2017). 
It is also defined as reducing or eliminating the danger of natural events which threaten people’s life 
and their property, social resources and their environment (Reliefweb Glossary of Humanitarian 
Terms). Mitigation applies when the prevention effects persist but still can be reduced (Carter 2008). In 
fact mitigation can include structural and nonstructural measures undertaken to limit the adverse impact 
of natural hazards, environmental degradation, and technological hazards (Todd and Todd 2011). 
Preparedness comprises measures that enable governments, organizations, communities, and 
individuals to respond quickly and effectively (Carter 2008). For this purpose, population and relevant 
institutions need education and training to facilitate evacuation, rescue, and relief operations (Reliefweb 
Glossary of Humanitarian Terms).  
The pre-disaster phase can reduce the difficulties of disaster response by developing the capacity of 
disaster management if the activities in this phase have appropriately being conducted. In fact, this 
phase is considered as the most important phase, and different measures should be taken in the areas of 
risk assessment, prevention/ mitigation, disaster preparedness, and risk reduction (Brundiers and Eakin 
2018; Todd and Todd 2011; Phillips 2015). These measures are proposed in Hyogo Framework for 
Action 2005-2015 (UN ISDR 2005; Todd and Todd 2011).  
3.3.2 Phase 2 – Disaster Impact/Response 
Disaster Impact represents the phase during which the disaster strikes and causes deaths, injuries and 
destruction. It will take a time after the impact of a disaster for a community to realize the severity of 
the situation and the steps they need to take to deal with the impact (Coetzee and van Niekerk 2012).  
Warning is the time when a hazard has been identified but is not yet threatening a particular area (Carter 
2008), and in many disasters there is some advance warning. However, this early warning may be 
announced too late, or be inaccurate (Mahdavian et al. 2015). Early warning by definition is the 
provision of timely and effective information through an official recognizable institution to people in a 
hazardous situation to give them time to take action and to reduce their risk (Reliefweb Glossary of 
Humanitarian Terms).  
The primary focus of this phase is rehabilitation. Planning for actions in this phase need to be realistic 
with quick delivery, and be considered and assessed in terms of their post disaster capacity. In the 
response phase, it is essential to not only include public stakeholders and the private sector, but also 
poor and vulnerable groups. The benefits of local participation need to be balanced against the need for 
fast action. Therefore each particular situation will require its own trade-off (Todd and Todd 2011). 
3.3.3 Phase 3 – Post-disaster 
The third part of DMC is the post-disaster phase which includes response, rehabilitation and recovery. 
The period after disasters provides the context for the next disaster and opportunities to improve 
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resilience and introduce sustainability objectives (Halldin et al. 2011; UNDP 2016; Berke and 
Campanella 2006) 
 Each of these phases can overlap with the preceding and following phases. 
The measures taken immediately are called “response” when the main aim is to reduce fatality and 
economic losses and to manage the immediate disruptions caused by disaster. The decisions and actions 
taken during and soon after disaster including immediate relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction, 
belong to the response phase (Carter 2008). 
Recovery is the process of returning to proper level of functioning communities and the nation after a 
disaster (Carter 2008). The concept of recovery will be explained in more detail later in this chapter. 
The factors that need to be considered in the post disaster phase are creating strong institutions and 
using local capacity for recovery and reconstruction. Transparency and flexibility to modify targets are 
important. Adequate and speedy funding, as well as monitoring and evaluating progress are necessary 
tasks (Todd and Todd 2011). 
 
Figure 5 Disaster cycle based on work by Ian Davis Cranfield (Todd and Todd 2011) 
 
The three main phases of the DRM Cycle — pre-disaster, disaster response, and post-disaster – lack 
clear boundaries and overlap chronologically, as well as in terms of the ongoing activities (Todd and 
Todd 2011). Todd and Todd 2011 also identified various key lessons from each phase of the DRM 




Risk is a neutral term that describes the potential for deviation from an expected outcome which can be 
subdivided into threats and opportunities (Risk Management Basic). However, in its everyday meaning 
and in the context of safety science and risk management risk is associated with negative consequences. 
Risk is the potential for physical, social, economic, environmental, cultural or institutional adverse 
consequences or losses, in a particular area and time period (Birkmann et al. 2013, p. 201; United 
Nations 2004). In its most simplistic form, risk is defined as the product of the severity of a hazard and 
its vulnerability (UNDRO 1980; Alexander 1997).  
Risk = hazard x vulnerability (Manyena 2006)  
To reduce risk, the nature of the hazard and the vulnerability of the people and activities exposed to the 
hazard need to be identified, analyzed and evaluated. Different disciplines, for example seismology or 
insurance, have conceptualized risk, hazard and vulnerability in different ways. To estimate risk on a 
multidisciplinary basis, awareness of physical damage and injuries and fatalities, as well as economic 
losses, and social, organizational, business and institutional damage are necessary (Manyena 2006). 
3.5 Resilience, adaptation and coping 
Resilience is derived from the Latin word resilio, meaning ‘to jump back’ (Manyena 2006; Klein et al. 
2003). Resilience encompasses a society's capacity to bounce back after a disaster, its level of 
preparedness to confront or deal with a disaster and its ability to recover quickly and successfully 
(Alexander 2013). Resilience is the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to 
resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely 
and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures 
and functions through risk management (The Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience 2019; UNDRR 
2017). In simple terms resilience is a measure of a person's or a community's ability to cope with or 
adapt to hazard stress (Pelling 2003). All of the following definitions describe this aspect of a system 
coping with extraordinary circumstances. 
Paton et al. (2000) emphasizes the psychological aspects of resilience, suggesting that resilience 
describes an active process of self-righting, learned resourcefulness and growth — the ability to 
function psychologically at a level far greater than expected given the individual’s capabilities and 
previous experiences (Manyena 2006; Paton et al. 2000). Research shows that people affected by 
disaster often demonstrate greater psychological resilience than assumed (Brundiers and Eakin 2018; 
Bonanno 2004). Research has also shown that the shared experience of disaster can bring the best out 
of people, increasing solidarity, helpfulness, and facilitating bonding among people, which, in another 
situation, would not have happened (Brundiers and Eakin 2018). Systems with limited capacities to 
cope or to recover in the face of adverse consequences lack resilience, while systems that can cope and 
adapt are described as resilient (Birkmann et al. 2013). Disaster resilience can be viewed as the intrinsic 
capacity of a system, community or society predisposed to a shock or stress to adapt and survive by 
changing its nonessential attributes and rebuilding itself.  
Windle (2011) has a slightly different take on resilience, describing it as a dynamic process 
encompassing positive adaptation within the context of significant adversity or following threats. The 
World Health Organisation also views resilience as positive adaptation, including protective behaviour 
that reduces the impact of risk outcomes (Windle 2011). This way resilience can be seen as the adaptive 
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capacity of a system to evolve and to accommodate environmental hazards or policy change and to 
expand the range of variability with which it can cope (Adger 2006). Adaptation is a continuous 
property of society with levels of adaptive capacity changing over time. Such changes can be a result 
of disaster events but also daily processes of development. Adaptation is distinct from coping. Coping 
implies conservation and protection of the current system and institutional settings, whereas adaptation 
implies a longer-term and constantly unfolding process of learning, experimentation and change that 
modifies vulnerability (Pelling and Dill 2010; Birkmann et al. 2013). Efficient adaptation depends on 
financial resources, technology transfer and cultural, educational, managerial, institutional, legal and 
regulatory practices, both domestic and international (Pelling 2011). This implies that it is often easier 
for advanced societies and wealthier individuals to adapt to risk.  
The fundamental social attributes that shape adaptive capacity also influence the potential for local 
mitigation (Pelling 2011; Betsill and Bulkeley 2003). The distinction made by the UNFCCC between 
mitigation and adaptation may aid policy formulation but is intellectually problematic. Mitigation can 
most logically be viewed as a subset of adaptation where adaptation is targeted to support mitigation. 
Pelling (2011) explains that vulnerability and adaptation interact and influence each other over time, 
shaped by flows of power, information and assets between actors, yet their relationship depends on the 
scale and type of the hazard risk and socio-ecological systems.  
Understanding resilience is important because it helps to guide post-disaster decision-making (Tierney 
1997; Webb et al. 2000; Rose and Liao 2005; Platt and So Senior 2017). Resilience may be quantified 
in terms of probability of failure, consequences of failure, and time to recovery. It may also be 
conceptualised as comprising four distinct dimensions: technical, organizational, social and economic 
(Platt et al. 2015). 
3.6 Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is a multidimensional concept that helps to identify those characteristics and experiences 
of communities (and individuals) that enable them to respond to and recover from environmental 
hazards (Cutter et al. 2003). Vulnerability is defined as the propensity or predisposition to be adversely 
affected and it encompasses a variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to 
harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt. (United Nations 2016) A broad set of factors such as 
wealth, social status, and gender determine vulnerability and exposure to natural hazards, including 
climate-related risk (Oppenheimer 2015). Alexander (1993) defines vulnerability as a function of the 
costs and benefits of inhabiting areas at risk of natural disaster. Disasters often hit the poor and the 
marginalised more severely. For the marginally employed, disaster can lead to prolonged loss of 
occupation or income by destroying the means of production or commerce (Alexander 1997).  
In a sense, vulnerability is the flipside of resilience and resilience and vulnerability are related concepts 
in various scientific disciplines (Klein et al. 1998; Manyena 2006). This linkage between resilience and 
vulnerability is mainly credited to Peter Timmerman in 1981 in a monograph called Vulnerability, 
Resilience and the Collapse of Society. The impetus for his work came from a concern that some of the 
concepts coming to the fore in the growing subject of climate impact assessment were under-examined. 
In particular, Timmerman was concerned that the vulnerability of complex modern societies was under-
estimated and required building 'buffering capacity' or resilience into our socioeconomic systems.  
The vulnerability of socioeconomic systems to hazards includes deficient information, communications 
and knowledge among social actors, the lack of institutional and community organisation, weaknesses 
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in emergency preparedness, political instability, poor economic health, poor or dangerous building 
stock, inadequate infrastructure and lack of sensible urban planning. These are all factors that increase 
vulnerability to a hazard and therefore increase risk (Manyena 2006). 
Three main branches of vulnerability research are: exploring the reasons that make community or places 
vulnerable, measuring social resistance to hazard, and finally the combination of potential exposure and 
societal resilience in particulate places (Adger 2006). 
An elaboration of the principles underlying vulnerability emerged from the physical hazards tradition, 
which led to a study of the vulnerability of physical assets – building stock and infrastructure (Coburn 
and Spence 2003; Adger 2006). There is considerable research on physical vulnerability and less on 
social vulnerability, perhaps because of the difficulties of measurement. Social losses are therefore 
usually missing in after-disaster cost/loss estimation reports (Cutter et al. 2003). Some of the positive 
and negative social factors affecting vulnerability are socioeconomic status, gender, race and ethnicity, 
age, development, employment loss, infrastructure, education, social dependence, special needs 
populations (Cutter et al. 2003) 
As with resilience, there has been a shift in the discourse from vulnerability to adaption (Schipper 2006; 
Orlove 2009). Adaptation has become as essential component of international climate action (Dovers 
2009) and it is described for people to enable them to reduce vulnerability to face climate stress (Orlove 
2009; Agrawal 2010; Ribot 2011). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
conceptualises vulnerability as the outcome of susceptibility, exposure and adaptive capacity for any 
given hazard and describes vulnerability as the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable 
to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes (Pelling 
2011; IPCC 2008). Nevertheless, the predominant understanding of adaptation is that while it is distinct 
it is part of the wider concept of vulnerability. In 2001, the IPCC defined adaptation to climate change 
as "adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their 
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities" (IPCC 2007; Ribot 2011). 
Vulnerability analysis is the first step in any adaptation or intervention that can help move from 
affirmative to transformative climate action (Ribot 2011). Adaptation includes both adaptive capacity 
and adaptive action as subcategories (Pelling 2011). Perceptions and cognitive constructs about risks 
and adaptation options as well as cultural contexts influence adaptive capacities and thus vulnerability 
(Oppenheimer 2015). 
In terms of adapting to climate change, (Pelling 2011) writes, "individuals and socio-ecological systems 
have always responded to external pressures. However, climate change brings a particular challenge. 
There are many uncertainties about speed and impact of climate change in daily life and its visibilities 
and the challenges for sustainability of socio ecological systems. Pelling (2011) attempts to capture the 
complex relationship between hazard and risk on the one hand and resilience and development on the 
other, suggesting that adaptation can provide the "bridge" (Figure 6). Development processes of a 





Figure 6 Adaptation as the bridge between risk and development (Pelling 2011) 
As resilience can be seen as the adaptive capacity of a system to accommodate to hazards (Adger 2006) 
adaptive capacity can be conceptualised both as a component of vulnerability and as its inverse, 
declining as vulnerability increases (Cutter et al. 2008). Knowing the cause of vulnerability can help 
identify the multiple social, economic and political areas of intervention. In fact, adaptive actions should 
be based on a deep understanding of vulnerability. Of course, not all causes identified through 
vulnerability analysis are treatable, and many causes can best be identified by analyzing acts of 
adjustment that are now being called adaptation. Adaptation makes the link between risk and 
vulnerability, one focusing on generation of risk and the other on the response to risk (Ribot 2011).  
3.7 Recovery 
Recovery is defined as “the act or process of returning to a normal state after a period of difficulty” 
(Merriam-Webster). This begs the question of what is “normal” (Mansfield et al. 2010). Although most 
people identify recovery with a return to the status before the event, this may not be sensible if a place 
remains excessively vulnerable to risk and a better strategy may be to improve resilience through change 
(Platt et al. 2016). Other terms that are used somewhat interchangeably with recovery, but with less 
precision, include reconstruction, restoration and rehabilitation. Reconstruction implies rebuilding 
physical infrastructure, restoration implies a return to pre-disaster conditions and rehabilitation seems 
to suggest an improvement on pre-disaster conditions. None are as broad, all encompassing and precise 
as the term recovery.  
The response and rehabilitation phase are actions for days and weeks after the onset of a disaster, while 
the recovery phase continues for months and even years after an event, and covers reconstruction and 
restoration of infrastructures and livelihoods (UN-SPIDER). Although recovery is often viewed as the 
last stage in the disaster management cycle it may be the longest and most expensive of the various 
phases (Phillips 2015). 
The recovery process is therefore a complex, multidimensional nonlinear process (Chang 2010; Hettige 
et al. 2018). An emerging perspective claims that disaster recovery has no clear endpoint; moreover, it 
does not necessarily entail a return to pre-disaster conditions. Some researchers assert that for recovery 
to be considered successful, post­disaster activities should increase a community’s disaster resilience 
rather than restore pre-disaster levels of vulnerability (Mileti 1999; Wisner et al. 2004; Chang 2010). It 














changed circumstances (Chang 2010; Alesch et al. 2001; Alesch et al. 2009). For example, a place may 
regain its pre-disaster population, but the new residents may be entirely different from the old (Chang 
2010). Even if the place recovers, the characteristics of the place may change. Rarely do places return 
to exactly the same pre-disaster conditions, rather they reach a new stable state of 'normality'. Structural 
change and long-term losses occur in major disasters, often accelerating pre-disaster trends and recovery 
planning needs to anticipate and plan for a post disaster 'new normal'. The close relation between 
disaster recovery and the resilience of affected communities are a common aspect of disaster risk 
reduction programs since the adoption of The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015. The capacity 
of disaster affected communities to build back better or to recover with little or no external support 
following a disaster has become a center of attention, which emphasizes the importance of resilience 
rather than just vulnerability (Manyena 2006). 
Recovery involves restoring or improving livelihoods and health, as well as economic, physical, social, 
cultural and environmental assets, systems and activities, of a disaster-affected community or society, 
aligning with the principles of sustainable development and ‘build back better’, to avoid or reduce future 
disaster risk (OCHA 2017). Recovery proceeds through formal channels (governmental interventions) 
and informal mechanisms (individuals and communties), in some cases spontaneously, in indirect ways, 
or through deliberate action (Brundiers and Eakin 2018). In addition to these change processes, disasters 
can create the opportunity of a "reset button" to improve building infrastructure and institutions 
(Agrawal 2011). Disasters can present opportunities for communities and society to critically review 
established ways of thinking and doing (Oliver-Smith 1996). Disasters can provide leverage and finance 
for projects and agendas, which may not be a priority in normal times (Lakoff 2010). The window of 
opportunity is the opportune moment, when the time is right because not only the problems are seen 
and solutions are found, but also political support is available and constraints do not constrain action 
(Brundiers and Eakin 2018; Kingdon 1995). The ‘window of opportunity’ is narrow if the 
improvements of post-disaster is completing, and could last for about 18–36 months after an event (Platt 
and So Senior 2017). This window of opportunity differs from one country to another, partly due to the 
country’s political climate (Kingdon 1995).  
Building back better is linked to the concept of sustainable development. Crisis and disaster can be seen 
as “symptoms of underlying persistent system unsustainability” (Patterson et al. 2017). As it was 
explained earlier, the pre-disaster is the period before disasters, which requires prevention and 
mitigation measures to lower the risk of upcoming disaster (Halldin et al. 2011). To link disaster risk 
reduction and sustainable development, Spangle (1986) supports pre-event planning for post-event 
recovery and planning for sustainability in advance of any disaster event (Brundiers and Eakin 2018; 
Berke et al. 1993). Although building back better means reducing risk and increasing sustainability, 
people put value on other aspects of housing, livelihoods and the environment and are willing to live 
with risk. The corresponding phase in sustainability transition is the predevelopment phase, and to be 
prepared for this transition, a network of actors are involved, who gather around a sustainability 
challenge, deliberating pathways of change, while trying to integrate diverse interests, to advance 
sustainability collectively. This process is called building a “transition arena” (LOORBACH 2010) and 
mobilising latent system resources which some identified as a “shadow network” (Brundiers and Eakin 
2018; Olsson et al. 2006). 
Various studies have focused on housing or business recovery; very few studies have used published 
statistical time series data to examine how societies recover (Chang 2010). Nor has there been research 
to systematically compare recovery processes between different hazards and different events in different 
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countries. There is no inclusive and well accepted method of measuring recovery and various authors 
have suggested that all the qualitative and quantitative indicators needed to be used for better 
understanding of recovery path, outcomes, and procedures (Hettige et al. 2018). Recently, however, the 
author of this thesis has been involved in a research project at the Centre for Risk Studies at the Judge 
Business School in the University of Cambridge, funded by AXA Insurance, aimed at measuring the 
speed and quality of recovery after over 100 natural hazard events (storms, floods, earthquakes and 
tsunami) and investigating what factors might have been causal. To date, six individual case studies 
have been published (Carpenter et al. 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2020a, 2020b) and a report of all 
100 cases will published in the future. 
Although developed countries economically loose more in disasters, the poorest countries are more 
vulnerable, particularly in their poor neighborhoods where people suffer higher fatalities and over-
proportionately higher economic loss. They also have the greatest difficulty in organizing recovery and 
therefore take longer to recover (Platt et al. 2015). 
In the last few decades the average estimated annual damage to property and economic activity caused 
by natural disasters increased dramatically from less than US$10bn to US$100bn (Platt et al. 2016). 
Moreover, there is a growing trend in both hydrological disasters (for example flood) and technological 
disaster (for example power blackout) as is shown below in figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 Worldwide disasters 1960-2019. Source: EM-DAT: The Emergency Events Database - Universite 
catholique de Louvain (UCL) - CRED, D. Guha-Sapir - www.emdat.be, Brussels, Belgium, Created on: 








































Figure 8 shows the relationship between the discussed material and the structure of the thesis. The study 
numbers in this figure and the following text refer to the five journal papers of this cumulative 
dissertation published by the author.  
This thesis comprises five separate studies of four different types of disasters – power blackout, flood, 
earthquake and tropical cyclone, and four different phases of the disaster management cycle – from 
impact through response, recovery and resilience building. The aim is to provide a broad overview of 
all phases of the disaster cycle for a limited range of different types of disasters to better understand the 
factors that improve successful outcomes and thus inform policy decisions. Each study is representative 
for one paper. These five papers are listed in publication section.  
Study 1, describes a scenario exercise of a 72-hour hypothetical power outage using role playing with 
university students in Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in Germany and Paris Dauphine University in 
France. The scenario is designed to explore how society would cope with a power failure over 
successive time periods. The aim is to provide information to emergency managers and policy makers 
about community needs and people's likely behaviour in future blackouts. The study starts with its 
impact and continues till the post disaster response phase. It identifies which groups of people are most 
vulnerable, how people make their decisions, how they cope with the problems such as lack of food, 
water, and information and how resilient they are. 
Study 2, 3, and 4 are flood related. Unlike blackouts, which are fairly infrequent in Europe, flooding is 
becoming increasingly common. 
Study 2, describes people's response to floods in Germany 2013 and the UK 2007. The findings are 
based on interviews with residents and businesses in flood prone areas. The studies explain how people 
responded in both the short and medium term, and how prepared they consider themselves for the future 
floods. 
Study 3, describes a model designed to analyze the cost of issuing or not issuing an evacuation order in 
different scenarios under conditions of uncertainty. 
Study 4, describes the process of recovery after the Germany 2013 and the UK 2007 floods. Together 
with interview surveys with residents and businesses the findings are also based on an internet survey 
with flood experts in Germany and the UK. The study provides information about prevention and 
mitigation measures taken after the two events and how residents and governments are adapting, and 
preparing for future floods. 
Study 5, describes post-disaster recovery of the tourist sector in the Philippines after back-to-back 
disasters in Philippine where an earthquake occurred in mid-October and three weeks later a typhoon 
hit the same area. The research uses three sets of indicators (business, safety and physical) to measure 
recovery. 
A short explanation of each study is provided below. 
4.1 Study 1: Communication blackouts in power outages: findings from scenario 
exercises in Germany and France  
Study 1 reports findings from scenario exercises held with University students in France and Germany 
that were designed to explore reactions to an extended electricity blackout. The demand for electricity 
has dramatically increased and daily life is now totally dependent on electricity. Although the event of 
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a power blackout is uncommon, particularly in developed and industrialized countries, the increasing 
severity of natural hazards due to climate change, the complexity of the power grid, technical failures 
and human errors, the increasing risk of cyber-attacks, and a combination of these factors has increased 
the chance of power failure globally (Bruch et al. 2011; Klein et al. 2018). Some recent examples of 
large worldwide blackout, with the number of affected people into the millions, include Ontario and NE 
US in 2003, Italy 2003, Spain 2004, Brazil 2009, India 2012, Pakistan 2015, Turkey 2015, Argentina, 
Paraguay and Uruguay 2019 and Venezuela 2019 (Bruch et al. 2011; Wikipedia 2004).  
Electricity power is part of modern critical infrastructure and it is necessary to increase the resilience 
and maintain the stability of systems to avoid blackout. Pescaroli and Alexander describe the 
vulnerability of critical infrastructure to the cascading effects of disasters (PESCAROLI and Alexander 
2015). A disruption of the electricity network would be followed by large cascading events and impact 
communication and social interaction. Planning and preparing for electricity power outage is one of the 
important functions of government (Caldwell 2014; Panteli and Mancarella 2015). The way different 
countries deal with and prepare for extended blackouts varies and coping with crises is easier if people 
have the capacity to forecast and anticipate disasters such as blackout (Aldrich 2012). Nigeria, Iraq and 
Pakistan have experienced frequent major blackouts, whereas in Germany only a minority of the 
population has experienced a power outage longer than a few hours.  
Although an infrequent occurrence in developed countries, a blackout in 2019 in Berlin lasted 30 hours 
and left 30,000 households and 2,000 businesses without electricity (Knight 2019). In 2012 in Munich 
a blackout affected 450,000 people for 10 minutes to over 3 hours. A blackout in Hanover in 2011 
affected 600,000 people (Nicola 2012) and in 2006 a European blackout affected people in Germany 
and France. Because of the relative infrequency of blackouts in Europe, it is unclear how the crisis 
would proceed in a real situation, and, in order to be able to manage an extended blackout, it is important 
for authorities to anticipate the potential reaction and perception of society as well as their expectations 
in terms of government communication and action.  
One of the ideas about reactions to disaster and disruption is that people and organizations try to 
maintain the continuity of behaviour (Rogers and Nehnevajsa 1984). They also become more united 
and connected rather than panicking and looting. Nevertheless, a typical human response to disasters is 
to deny or reinterpret a warning, to downplay or eliminate the possible threat (Dynes 1994; Quarantelli 
2001; Drabek 2016). The immediate response to a disaster, according to Rogers and Nehnevajsa (1984), 
is a self-protecting reaction and peer support, meaning people react firstly by protecting themselves and 
their loved ones, secondly seeking information and confirmation about the hazard, and finally they 
‘follow the crowd’ and respond as a group. 
Hiete et al. (2010) provide an overview of how the legal regulations relevant to power failure crisis 
management vary with duration. The thresholds are a blackout up to 8 hours, between 8 to 24 hours, 
and in the worst case, for a blackout over 24 hours. These time periods were adopted in role-playing 
scenario exercises with university students in Germany and France. The four workshops aimed to 
investigate emotional reactions, reactive behaviour, personal decision-making and expectations of 
government during a hypothetical 3-day blackout. Students were asked to imagine a blackout in the city 
where they live and to play a particular role they were allocated. The scenario game exercise collapsed 
real time to highlight significant issues and to focus on people's decision-making, responses and 
imagined actions. The use of scenario planning allows us to explore how professionals and the public 





Figure 9 Blackout cascading effects over four time periods (developed by the author of this thesis and Miriam 
Klein) 
The methodology for scenario design, data collection and result analysis are described in detail in the 
paper “Communication blackouts in power outages: findings from scenario exercises in Germany and 
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France” in study 2 (Mahdavian et al. 2020a). Figure 9 illustrates some of the potential cascading effects 
in different time periods after the onset of a blackout. 
4.2 Study 2: Risk behaviour and people’s attitude towards public authorities – a 
survey of 2007 UK and 2013 German floods 
Study 2 focuses on flood events in the UK and Germany and explores pre-disaster mitigation and 
preparedness and post-disaster response. 
As mentioned earlier, hydrological disasters, which include avalanche, flash flood, coastal flood, 
riverine flood and mudslide, are increasing with global warming and climate change and present major 
problems worldwide which many scientists have been addressing and proposing solutions. One of the 
key issues is the erosion of flood plains and the increasing risk this poses. 
In Europe, North America and Japan, there are few remaining dynamic flood plains and the current 
situation for European flood plains is critical (Tockner et al. 2008). Some 95% of the original floodplain 
area has been converted to other uses and over 40 European countries, nearly 90% of alluvial forests 
have vanished from their potential range (UNEP– WCMC 2004). Among the remaining flood plains in 
Europe, many of them are far from pristine and have lost most of their natural functions. For example, 
about 20,000 km2 of the former 26,000 km2 of floodplain area along the Danube and its major tributaries 
are isolated by levees (Nachtnebel 2000; Busnita 1967). However, major flood events have highlighted 
the vast extent of plains still subject to flooding. Worldwide, 60–99% of the entire riparian corridor has 
been transformed into cropland and/or is urbanized, the latter particularly so in Europe (Tockner et al. 
2008). 
To give an indication of the frequency of flooding, a review of major worldwide hydrological events 
occurring 2018-19 was derived from news items published in online German newspapers. 
On 4th February 2019, in Queensland Australia, 20,000 houses were threatened by the flood and 16,000 
people were temporarily without electricity (ZON 2019a). On 9th July 2019 in Washington U.S.A, 
streets, parking garages and subways were flooded by heavy rain (SPON 2019). South Carolina ordered 
the evacuation of its entire coastline on 2nd September 2019 because of risk of hurricane Dorian (Korge 
2019a).  
According to the UN Emergency Aid Office (OCHA), in November 2019 more than 908,000 citizens 
of Sudan in the East African were affected by flood, many people had to evacuate their homes and some 
got cut off from the outside world (ZON 2019b). 
In Asia, on 3rd July 2019 in Japan more than a million citizens were ordered to leave their homes due 
to the risk of landslide and flood (Optensteinen 2019). On 10th August 2019 "Lekima" storm, classified 
as a super typhoon, reached China's east coast killing 18 people and more than a million people had to 
evacuate their homes (Midasch 2019). On 26th of August, Schneider reported that the capital city of 
Indonesia was sinking due to natural hazards such as coastal flood and earthquake, and the government 
is planning to move the capital from Jakarta to a newly build city because of rising flood risk due to 
global warming (Schneider 2019).  
In Europe, on 10th August 2019 in Luxembourg a tornado injured several people and up to a hundred 
houses were destroyed and 180 buildings were damaged in the villages of Pétange and Käerjeng 
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(Diekmann 2019). Venice declared an emergency due to extreme flooding on the 13th November 2019 
and the Mayor of Venice claimed flooding was more frequent due to climate change (Korge 2019b).  
There were also a number of floods in the UK and Germany – the respective study region – since 2018. 
In England, in November 2019, “a woman died and many homes were evacuated as widespread flooding 
left a trail of devastation across swathes of the Midlands and northern England” (Parveen and Murphy 
2019). In UK more than a thousand people had to evacuate their homes, and numerous roads and 
railways were closed in February 2020 (Duhm 2020). 
In Wuppertal in May 2018 numerous streets were flooded, and several trees fell over and the extent of 
the damage is considerable (Bredow 2018). 
Western and southern Germany in June.2018 entire streets became rivers and rivers burst their banks. 
Several communities were trapped and 300 fire-brigade personnel were on duty all night (Ziegler 2018). 
On 20 May 2019 large parts of south-east Germany were expected to experience constant rain for a few 
days and there was a risk of flooding, exacerbated by melting Alpine snow (Lingenhöhl 2019). On 20th 
May 2019 Storm Axel caused a flood warning level 3 of 4 in Bavaria during the night and on 21st May, 
in Helmstedt, Lower Saxony, a hospital had to be evacuated (Langer 2019) and there were reports of 
“the heaviest rainfall ever recorded on Germany's southern border with Austria“ (Silk 2019). 
In February 2020, on Wangerooge island in Germany flood and storm almost completely destroyed a 
beach (Maxwill 2020). Also in February 2020 in Koblenz (SPON 2020) there were warnings of the 
rising water levels on the Moselle and Rhine after heavy rain, and the difficulty of building a retaining 
wall if the river rose over 5 meters (SWR 2020). 
These are only some of the examples of flooding around the world, but climate change is a slow onset 
event, which is causing a rising trend both in terms of frequency and economic losses of flood (EM-
DAT; Alfieri et al. 2016). Therefore, it is essential to increase resilience with respect to flood risk and 
flood impacts. Mitigating the immediate and direct impacts of flooding, such as saving life and reducing 
property damage, and reducing the long-term impact by increasing resilience is possible by advance 
planning, educational effort, and preparedness.  
In study 2 of this thesis, people's preparedness and the factors that affect people’s responses during a 
flood are studied. The interviews and survey were conducted among the residents of two places: 
Catcliffe, near Sheffield in the United Kingdom, which was badly flooded in 2007, and Passau in 
Bavaria, Germany, which was hit by floods in 2013. Both places have been flooded numerous times. 
Sheffield was flooded most recently in 2000 and 2007, while Passau, at the confluence of the rivers Inn, 
Ilz and Danube, was flooded in 2002 and 2013. 106 people were interviewed in total; 74 people from 
Passau and 32 people from Catcliffe, of whom 45% and 56% in Passau and Catcliffe respectively were 
directly affected by previous floods.  
In total, 17 hypotheses were developed, divided in two parts. Part 1 focusses on perception and flood 
preparedness, and part 2 analyses the hypothetical evacuation behaviour and the influence of trust in 
government with respect to risk perception and preparedness (Mahdavian et al. 2020b).  
Study 1 and 2 analyzed people’s behaviour, risk perception, preparedness, reaction, decisions, and role 
of trust in government in different crisis. However, if it comes to the question how people get the 
instruction about the best time to react and what to do, or how to deal with the situation, a decision-
making approach was adapted in study 3.  
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4.3 Study 3: Optimal Evacuation-Decisions Facing the Trade-Off between Early-
Warning Precision, Evacuation-Cost and Trust – the Warning Compliance Model 
(WCM) 
Study 3 explains how decision-making is critical for government, authorities and emergency managers 
during the uncertainty of natural disasters. The particular focus is on decisions regarding evacuations 
during flood. 
In addition to heavy rains and overflowing the rivers, flooding is also caused by dam failure, urban 
drainage basins, storm surges, deforestation and melting snow. Different emergency plans are necessary 
for each flood scenario.  
Emergency Managers have the critical task of alerting the public to the threat of natural disasters in 
order to save their lives (Baumgart et al. 2008). The primary aim of emergency management is to 
minimise loss of life and economic damage for society (Kolen and van Gelder 2018). Carpender et al 
explain the importance of consistence and accurate public warning prior to and during the emergency 
situation (Carpender et al. 2006).Therefore, forecasting flood is an essential part of flood risk 
management because the scale, scope and timing of a flood is a necessary information the authorities 
need to estimate the threat of flood and plan emergency response (Kolen and van Gelder 2018) . For 
example, the European Flood Awareness System (EFAS) is used in addition to national flood forecasts 
in European countries and provides probabilistic flood forecast information 10 days prior to the flood 
event for national authorities within Europe (Pappenberger et al. 2015). 
The problem is, despite having advanced weather forecasting, there is a chance that authorities receive 
a false alarm. A false alarm is defined as an event which was forecasted to occur, but did not, due to 
imperfect forecasts. In an ideal world, the false alarm rate (FAR) would be zero but due to many 
uncertainties in technology and the dynamics of the flood situation the forecasts are prone to errors 
(Barnes et al. 2007). After authorities receive the forecast they have to decide whether to order an 
evacuation or not, and what warning and alarm they should give to the public, taking into consideration 
the many uncertainties and limitations of the forecast. 
Kolen defines evacuation as a process starting with alerting, warning, deciding, preparing, and 
temporarily leaving an unsafe location with people, animals, and belonging and going to a safer place 
(Kolen 2013).  
 
Figure 10 Evacuation timeline representation (Lovreglio 2016) 
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Evacuation time is considered as the period between the first evacuee or vehicle leaving until the last 
evacuee gets to safety. The mode of evacuation would depend on the particular circumstances of a flood 
and on the physical ability of those at risk (Baou et al. 2018). Figure 10 is the timeline for evacuation 
Lovreglio (2016). 
It can be seen that the process of evacuation can be divided into distinct phases, such as the time needed 
for forecasting or detection, issuing alarm, recognizing and then reacting to an alarm, and finally time 
needed to evacuate to a safe location. All these steps proceed with many uncertainties. For example, the 
government, because of time constraints, may need to issue an alarm or evacuation order before they 
receive a completely accurate and reliable forecast. 
A government evacuation order can either be mandatory or recommended, but in both cases, there are 
risks, some of which can be anticipated, others not. For example in Hurricane Floyd after a mandatory 
evacuation, people spent 10 times more than usual in traffic jam in the road to get to the safe place 
(Dow and Cutter 2002). In the mandatory situation, the best scenario or outcome is when everyone at 
risk gets to a safe place in time, as happened with Hurricane Floyd. However, there might be two further 
scenarios. The first possibility is that due to heavy traffic jam and a late start for evacuation or a 
changing severity of disaster, people get trapped by the flood during the evacuation. This happened in 
Japan tsunami 2011 when government first announced the height of tsunami as three meters, then to six 
meters and finally to nine meters. By the time people realised the scale of the impending disaster and 
started to move to a safer location when was already too late (Mahdavian et al. 2012). The second 
possibility for the government is to issue a wrong evacuation order because they over-estimated the 
scale of the disaster, told people to evacuate, but nothing serious happened. This false alarm from 
authorities could lead to a loss of trust and faith among the people (this effect is called "crying wolf" in 
many articles). However Dow and Cutter (1998) argue that despite receiving a false evacuation alarm 
people still follow government advice when a subsequent hurricane happens and again the government 
asks them to evacuate. Although “crying wolf” may not apply in hurricane, it might happen in floods, 
because floods are more likely to be underestimated in many countries if they have not been severely 
affected in the past. This might mean that people are more intolerant of repeated false alarms. Earle 
(2010) and others refer to different types of trust. With respect to the time-line there is trust based on 
past behaviour and another type of trust which refers to future behaviour, which is called calculative 
trust. Trust in government would be the second, calculative type of trust and could change in the future 
if previous behaviour was untrustworthy.  
Study 3 of this dissertation deals with the decision-theoretical perspective on the flood evacuation 
problem and examines the aspect of flood-evacuation compliance in more detail. The following 
simplified decision situation is considered. In a potentially flood-prone city, two risk groups can be 
distinguished: a smaller group, e.g. one that lives very close to the coast and is therefore exposed to a 
high risk (group A) and a second larger group (group B) that lives in the hinterland and would only be 
affected by an extreme flood. The warning compliance model comprises a probabilistic and a decision-
theoretical or game-theoretical part. For the first, the random events are modeled using a Hidden 
Markov chain depicting both the escalation and de-escalation phase of a hypothetical severe flood event. 
At the same time, the performance of the early warning system (information system) can be taken into 
account in the model by determining the Likelihood Matrix accordingly. The warnings emanating from 
the early warning system are observable for both the affected population and the local government. 
However, with respect to the impact of a possible severe flood, there is an information asymmetry 
between government and population, i.e. we assume that the government is better informed than the 
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population about the actual impact of an approaching flood. The decision-theoretical or game-
theoretical part covers the interaction between the local government and the two groups. The local 
government can send a (non-binding) evacuation request to each of the two groups and they then have 
to decide whether to follow it. The population will only believe the government's announced threat if it 
has a high level of trust in the government's competence. This trust variable is a decisive factor for the 
population's compliance. In addition to the information system, the decision also includes damage costs, 
which include both the danger to life and limb and the complications that an evacuation entails. The 
government can also weight the extent to which it takes into account the evacuation difficulties of the 
population and the economic consequences. The setting, which formally corresponds to a Stackelberg 
game between government and population, can then be solved for all conditions and the respective 
influence or scope of compliance can be calculated for each constellation in generic form.  
4.4 Study 4: Were the floods in the UK 2007 and Germany 2013 game-changers? 
Disaster response and disaster preparedness phases of the disaster cycle were covered in Studies 1, 2, 
and 3. The next two studies are studies about recovery and mitigation.  
As it was defined earlier, recovery is returning to a normal or acceptable state after a disaster, 
specifically, when 90% of displaced people, disrupted businesses, and affected working population have 
returned to home or work (Platt et al. 2020). In many cases the aftermath of the disaster presents an 
opportunity to create a more resilient environment by applying new resources and adopting better 
solutions to mitigate the risk for future events, a process that has come to be known as 'building back 
better'. 
The two case studies in study 4 refer to the same study region as in study 3 – the 2007 flood in Catcliffe 
UK, and 2013 flood in Passau Germany. This research reported on surveys of residents and businesses 
in each place as well as on surveys of national flood experts in both countries. Despite some differences 
in the characteristic of the two areas, the flood events were comparable in terms of their impacts, levels 
of preparedness and government response. In study 5, the cases are compared in terms of patterns of 
recovery. The number of residents’ interviewees in Catcliffe was 32 and in Passau 74. They were asked 
the following three main questions.  
1. How many months after a flood they thought they got back to almost normal (if ever).  
2. Whether they felt that their home was safer and better prepared to cope with another flood, less 
prepared or about the same?  
3. Has the local area been made safer and more resilient, or is the state of the area about the same or 
even worse? 
The survey of flood experts in each country asked more questions and was therefore more detailed. A 
total of 150 experts in UK and 110 experts in Germany were contacted and 27 in UK and 21 in Germany 
responded to the survey (a response rate of 18% and 19% respectively).  
The main questions to experts was directed to establishing the impact of flood, speed and quality of 
recovery in different sectors of housing, economy, employment, population, infrastructure, and non-
domestic buildings1. The expert survey also investigated the roles of the state and the insurance sector. 
                                                            
1 Non-domestic = buildings such as hospital, schools and local government, and excluding houses, industry and commerce 
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Experts were asked what went well and what went badly during the flood emergency and recovery in 
both countries. Finally, the study discusses the key reforms, initiatives and improvements in flood 
resilience and management in each country. Table 2 compares the different aspects of these two floods 
and flood impacts in Germany and UK. 
Table 2 Comparison of floods in UK and Germany 
 Catcliffe, Sheffield/Rotherham Dreiflüsse-Eck (Altstadt), Passau 
Character  low density commuter village  high density, historic city centre 
Location 2.5 miles from Rotherham and 4 miles 
from Sheffield city centre 
historic centre of Passau at confluence 
of Danube, Inn and Ilz 
Date flood 25-Jun-07 03-Jun-13 
Population 2011 2,108 2,990 
Population year of flood 1,971 2,981 
Population 18-64 64% 66% 
Area 30 ha 37 ha 
Flooded area 16 ha 26 ha 
Flooded area % 52% 70% 
Properties total/flooded 372/195 800/560 
Evacuation Forcible evacuation due to fears dam 
failure 
Water supply failure meant 60 inmates 
of Passau prison had to be transferred  
Comparison of the impact of flooding in UK and Germany 
Extent 6 out of 9 Regions 8 out of 16 States 
Fatalities 13 14 
People Displaced 38,000 80,000 
GDP, PPP (event year) USD 2.2 tn USD 3.6 tn 
Economic Loss USD 3.3 – 4.9 bn USD 6.7 – 9.1 bn 
Insurance Loss USD 2.6 bn USD 1.8 bn 
Average cost per house USD 32,000 USD 56,000 
Insurance Households 75% 32% 
Government Aid USD 180 mn USD 8.9 bn 
Flood risk homes 2018 5.5 mn 3 mn 
 
(Environment Agency 2007; Thieken et al. 2006; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017; British Geological Survey; DLR 




4.5 Study 5: Tourism Recovery Scorecard (TOURS) – Benchmarking and 
monitoring progress on disaster recovery in tourism destinations  
This last study describes recovery from a pair of natural disasters in the central Visayas region of the 
Philippines. The Philippines is listed among the top five countries in the world in terms of the annual 
number in natural disaster events, as well as being in the third most at risk country in terms of natural 
disaster (Guha-Sapir et al. 2014; UNU-EHS) 
The aim of this study is to measure the recovery of three tourism destinations affected by two back-to-
back disasters: a magnitude 7.2 earthquake (Bohol earthquake) and a super typhoon (Haiyan) on 15 
October 2013 and 8 November 2013, respectively. The Bohol earthquake left 222 people dead, 8 
missing, 976 injured and more than 73,000 damaged buildings, while three weeks later typhoon Haiyan 
left 6,300 dead and 550,000 destroyed homes according to official reports by the National Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC 2013a, 2013b).  
This study reports a set of indicators which aim to measure recovery of the three destinations and their 
readiness to welcome tourists again (Khazai et al. 2018). The Central Visayas region experienced huge 
economic impact after these two disasters and hundreds of tourists were stranded for days after the 
storms, according to the World Bank survey (GFDRR 2014). The storm was in the headlines of 
international news for a week and frightened away tourists from this region, causing massive 
cancellation in the tourism sector (Sidel 2014).  
Damage to business, including the tourist industry, after disasters occurs globally. Australia after the 
Katherine flood in 1998, countries around the Indian Ocean after the 2004 tsunami, and Japan after the 
Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, all suffered economic damages that escalated with negative media 
coverage. Recovery to restore normal services took longer than it might had without this negative 
reports (Faulkner and Vikulov 2001; Sönmez et al. 1999; Faulkner 2001). In fact, after a disaster, media 
reports have a potential devastating impact on tourist destinations and pose severe challenges to 
marketing of the area and neighboring destinations (Beirman 2016; Weir 2005). Yet, reliable, up-to-
date information about the reinstatement of tourist attractions, transport, accommodation, facilities and 
safety can greatly reassure tourists and speed of return to normal operation. This research developed a 
framework with a set of indicators to measure recovery in a way that is useful for communication with 
prospective tourists. This framework was applied to three tourist destinations in the Philippines and was 
used to benchmark the key impacts of the disaster and monitor the progress of recovery. The framework 
is called the “Tourism Recovery Scorecard” (TOURS), and it is designed to be used by tourism 
stakeholders, including tour operators, government and public sector and visitors to tourism 
destinations. In the TOURS framework, there are three main dimensions: safety, physical recovery, and 
business recovery, corresponding with how the concept of resilience is divided into psychological, 
physical, economic dimensions and with the three dimensions of sustainability: social, environmental 
and economic. Each of the three dimensions mentioned earlier were measured by five to six different 
indicators (Table 3).  
The stakeholder survey was conducted by a research team from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology 
(including the author) in August 2016. The respondents were selected from people in the tourism 
industry who had personal experience of the disaster event and had witnessed the recovery process in 
their industry and the whole area.  
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Table 3 Indicators used in the survey in the Philippines 
Safety To what extent: 
Reputation was the destination reported as safe on: TV, Radio, Print Media; Social Media; Word of Mouth 
Hazard did you feel safe in relation to secondary or natural hazards triggered by the main event? 
Health was health and spread of disease controlled? 
Security was the destination safe in terms of crime/ terrorism? 
Stability was the destination politically stable? 
Overview did the destination feel safe for tourists? 
Physical Recovery To what extent: 
Roads was debris cleared where tourists go? 
Electricity was electricity restored? 
Water was drinking water restored? 
Attractions have attractions been restored? 
Transport have transport systems been restored for: Flights; Ferries; Public Transport; Private Car? 
Housing have people been rehoused? 
Overview does the destination look recovered? 
Business Recovery To what extent: 
Foreign has foreign tourism recovered?  
Local has local tourism recovered? 
Occupancy have hotel bookings recovered? 
Services have restaurants, shopping, tourism agencies/services; ATM recovered 
Telecomes have mobile phone networks recovered has the tourism economy recovered? 
Overview has the tourism economy recovered? 
 
A total of 40 people from the tourism sector were surveyed in three disaster affected areas: Cebu, Bohol, 
and Bantayan. Respondents included experts in Philippines governmental organizations, tour operators, 
hoteliers and resort sector operators. They were asked to answer the same set of questions for two 
different time periods: Right after the disaster and at New Year. New Year in the Philippines was 2.5 
months after the event. New Year was selected to help the respondents fix the time in their memory as 
New Year was the first tourist season after the event and was a transition period between short- and 
medium-term recovery. Two different types of scaling were used – binary, in which respondents could 
indicate either the place was recovered or not, and a 10-point Likert scale, where respondents could be 




Table 4 Key informants interviewed 
 Rating Scale Binary Scale 
Cebu 12 3 
Bohol 6 11 
Bantayan 2 6 
Total 20 20 
 
4.6 Methodology overview of all mentioned studies and their relevancy 
 
Table 5 The relevancy and methods overview of included papers in dissertation  















Scenario planning ✔     
Face to face survey/study ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ 
Online survey  ✔  ✔  
Focused group  ✔  ✔ ✔ 
Stakeholders and experts    ✔ ✔ 
Disaster response ✔ ✔ ✔   
Disaster recovery    ✔ ✔ 
Disaster prevention and mitigation ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  
Disaster preparedness ✔ ✔    
Recommendation for the policy makers ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Quantitative analyses ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Qualitative content analyses ✔   ✔  





5.  Summary and conclusion 
This chapter comprises first a summary conclusion of each study, and then a brief discussion of the 
implications with respect to the disaster cycle will be given. 
Study one: Scenario planning blackout  
Scenario planning and role-playing have been used in various scientific disciplines to investigate 
possible outcomes of hypothetical situations. This study is unique in the way it used a role-playing 
scenario to study people’s potential behaviour during an imagined blackout in Germany and France, 
and to compare possible emergency reactions in these two countries. The study also aimed to inform 
policymaking and to raise the awareness amongst policy makers regarding societal needs, thoughts and 
expectations in such an event. Moreover, using scenario game in this study also played an important 
role in understanding how people’s emotions might change over the time and how these changes might 
influence their strategies and reactions during blackout. To the best knowledge of the authors, similar 
studies have not been done before. 
Blackouts are rare events, particularly in highly industrialized countries such as Germany and France; 
therefore, this infrequency of occurrence poses problems and limitations for research. To understand 
what would be the primary needs that authorities and emergency managers are expected to provide for 
society a hypothetical 3-day blackout scenario was designed using both inductive and incremental 
approaches to answer three main research questions: 
1. What are the potential cascading effects of a 3-day blackout and the implications for different types 
of people? 
2. How might people react and feel during a long-lasting power blackout? 
3. What would be the level of societal resilience, preparedness and potential response to a possible 
crisis of a 3-day blackout? 
The role-playing scenario, which was conducted among the university students in Germany and France, 
provided important insights into these research questions. This study demonstrated clearly how quickly 
and unexpected the chain of cascading effects develops during a blackout, and how unprepared societies 
are to face this disaster.  
Qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data illustrated the results which policy makers need to 
consider for future events and they are how people’s emotions and reactions change drastically during 
the 72 hours of power outage, from calm and safe, to desperation and frustration. Furthermore, in both 
study areas, participants had a great deal of hope and trust in the authorities in the first 24 hours, but 
after not getting any information about the electricity outage nor any advice about how to cope or what 
to do, their trust dropped dramatically and they start to coordinate things on their own way. In the open 
discussion participants argued that even if the reason for blackout had been a cyber-attack, although 
they would have been scared, they would have preferred to know.  
In the blackout scenarios, coping strategies and adaptive behaviour of people were clearly identified. 
For example, people organized their community to support the elderly, children and disabled, 
meanwhile searching for food, water and information. As might be expected, negative emotions and 
concerns increased in all groups of participants over the 72 hours, and after the first day, moves to 
evacuate began (figure 11). 
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Uncertainty about what is happening and how long it will continue caused most concern and lack of 
communication aggravated anxiety and caused considerable distress. Table 6 shows the expectations of 
participants from the authorities.  
 
Figure 11 The relationship between trust and evacuation 
 
Table 6 Expectations from authorities over time 
30 Mins 8 Hours 24 Hours 72 Hours 
- Information 
expected 
- The problem 
fixed soon 
- Short blackout 





- Traffic police 
manage the 
traffic 
- Information expected 
from police, Red 
Cross, government, 
city hall (Find the way 
to inform people 
considering people 
have no access to 
internet and TV) 
- Water distribution 
- Nursing care for 
elderly 
- Advice from 
government about 
how to behave and 
what to do if it 
continued  
- Provide water 
 
- Information and guidance 
- Government provide food and water and other initial needs  
- Shelter provision for people in need 
- Help from other regions or other countries 
- Evacuation 
- Government visit old people at home  
- Employers to not expect their employees to go to work 
- Security force (police, army) provide security 
- Local government officials in the area 
- Local and central government implement emergency 
measures  
- University provides information  
- Community organizations step in 
- Foreign authorities support foreigners 
- Provide portable toilets 
- Calm down people 
- All points from 
previous time 









The findings from this study suggest people are neither familiar or prepared for this type of crisis, and 
authorities need contingency plans not only to keep critical services supplied with power, but also how 
to communicate and advise citizens in a major extended power outage. Government late or 
uncoordinated reactions would increase frustration and self-planning, which could escalate the 




Study two: Flood response in Germany and the UK  
There are many studies about people’s risk behaviour during disasters in different countries, but what 
particularly make this research rare are firstly, comparing the risk behaviour, flood awareness and flood 
preparedness of two different countries together, and secondly comparing the attitudes towards public 
authorities in case studies of the German flood 2013, and the UK flood 2007. This research was designed 
to investigate two broad research questions.  
1. Firstly, what is the level of risk perception and flood preparedness in the two selected areas in 
Germany and the UK, and what influences them?  
2. Secondly, attitudes toward government and reaction to government advice during the flood?  
To address these research questions, a survey with forty-four questions was designed, over 130 
statistical tests using SPSS software were conducted, and seventeen key hypotheses were analysed. The 
survey data were collected during the field study in the flood-affected area in the UK and Germany, 
among the people who personally experienced the flood and those who would potentially be affected 
in a future flood. 
For respondents without flood experience, the most frequent constellation is the combination of low 
perception and low preparedness (40%). It can be concluded that lack of perception of flood risk causes 
a lack of preparedness. A further 32% perceive themselves to be at medium or high risk but are still 
unprepared (table 7). People’s flood risk preparedness could be improved by technical guidance and 
financial support. 
 
Table 7 Constellations of perception and preparedness 
 No flood experience (N=53) Flood experience (N=50) 
 Perception Perception 
 Low 1, 2 Med 3 High 4, 5 Low 1, 2 Med 3 High 4, 5 
Preparedness       
Low 1,2 40% 15% 17% 19% 2% 20% 
Med. 3 9% 9% 2% 5% 8% 14% 
High 4,5 2% 4% 2% 10% 8% 14% 
 
Table 8 shows the hypotheses developed and tested for both countries of the UK and Germany. The 
results also showed that risk perception and preparedness is higher among older people. In both study 
areas, trust in government was fairly low. However, during the emergency, people stated that if the 
government asked them to evacuate immediately, about 70% in Catcliffe and 80% of respondents in 
Passau would take immediate action to evacuate. Furthermore, despite the high trust in family and low 
trust in government, if the government asked them to evacuate and their family said it was unnecessary, 
nearly 70% of respondents in Passau and Catcliffe would follow the government advice. The decision 
to evacuate is significantly higher amongst women than men. Reaction analyses of flood experienced 
people during the emergency showed 78% of them acted self-protectively in Catcliffe compared to 42% 
in Germany, which could be due to the lower trust in government in the Catcliffe area of the UK 
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compared to Passau in Germany. Flood experienced people in both areas were dissatisfied with early 
warning and the poor response of emergency managers in the first phase.  
Table 8 Hypotheses generated from literature review (HC: hypothesis confirmed, HR: hypothesis rejected) 
Hypotheses Test results 
PART 1 Perception and flood preparedness  
H1a Perception of flood risk is higher amongst people with experience of flooding HC 
H1b People with flood experience see themselves better prepared for floods HC 
H2 Perception of flood risk is higher in Passau-Germany than Catcliffe-UK because the flood was more recent. HC 
H3 People with higher risk perception see themselves better prepared for flood HC 
H4a Perception of flood risk is higher among older people than among younger people HR 
H4b Older people see themselves better prepared for flood than younger HC 
H5a Perception of flood risk is higher among women than among men HR 
H5b Women see themselves better prepared for flood than men HR 
H6a Perception of flood risk is higher among people with high risk aversion than among people with low risk aversion HR 
H6b Risk averse people see themselves better prepared for flood HR 
PART 2 Attitude toward government and reaction to government advice  
H7 Flood experienced people see themselves more responsible for preparedness HR 
H8 People who see citizen more responsible for preparedness should also see themselves better prepared HR 
H9 Respondents in UK see citizens instead of government more responsible for flood preparedness compared to 
Germany  
HR 
H10 Trust in government is higher among German respondents compared to UK respondents HC 
H11 People who see citizen more responsible for preparedness are less likely to follow government evacuation order HR 
H12 People with low trust in government are less likely to follow government order to evacuate HC 
H13 People with low trust in government chose to listen to family rather the government HR 
H14 Older people are more likely to evacuate immediately than younger ones HR 
H15 Women are more likely to evacuate immediately than men HC 
H16 Risk averse people are more likely to evacuate immediately HR 
H17 Age does not influence trust in government HC 
 
Table 8 shows the hypotheses developed and tested for both countries of the UK and Germany. The 
results also showed that risk perception and preparedness is higher among older people. In both study 
areas, trust in government was fairly low. However, during the emergency, people stated that if the 
government asked them to evacuate immediately, about 70% in Catcliffe and 80% of respondents in 
Passau would take immediate action to evacuate. Furthermore, despite the high trust in family and low 
trust in government, if the government asked them to evacuate and their family said it was unnecessary, 
nearly 70% of respondents in Passau and Catcliffe would follow the government advice. The decision 
to evacuate is significantly higher amongst women than men. Reaction analyses of flood experienced 
people during the emergency showed 78% of them acted self-protectively in Catcliffe compared to 42% 
in Germany, which could be due to the lower trust in government in the Catcliffe area of the UK 
compared to Passau in Germany. Flood experienced people in both areas were dissatisfied with early 






Study three: Calculating Optimal Evacuation-Decisions cost 
The most important outcomes and insights of this study are as follows: 
• Scope for compliance: The model identifies the scope for compliance, i.e. the parameter 
constellations where the communication between government and people really matters. 
Compliance is necessary when the interests of the population and the state diverge, but it is effective 
if the trust-level of the population exceeds a minimum level. 
• Zone of Compliance: In the model, people are willing to follow a request if the probability-point 
(which reflects the discrete probability distribution of the expected flood events) lies within an area 
where people trust the impact which is announced by the government. This area is called “zone of 
compliance”. For high trust-levels, this zone of compliance can be wide indicating a high 
willingness of the citizens to follow the government’s orders over a high range of parameters. 
However, for low trust-levels this zone can be very narrow; in this case the citizens ignore the state’s 
announcements and make the evacuation decision on their own. 
• Communicative responsibility of the government: If the interests of citizens and authority are 
aligned and trust is sufficiently high (compliance without conflict of interest), the authority has 
influence on the citizens decisions and must take this responsibility into consideration. In particular, 
affirmative communication is necessary to avoid misunderstandings. 
• Applying empirical data to the escalation-phase we see that the population in region A would 
already evacuate on its own but that the state would also order this evacuation, which hints at 
responsibility of affirmative orders. 
• Applying empirical data to a (hypothetical) announced Black Swan flood we find that the 
inhabitants of region B would not react to an S2 warning and that the authority would not order 
evacuation either. However, the authority’s decision is sensitive to its preference parameters: Only 
if the state gives the highest priority to saving lives it would order evacuation. Nevertheless, this 
order would lack compliance due to the very low probability. 
• The insights of the model show that it is a necessary next step to combine the decision-theoretic 
framework with elements of risk perception. 
Study Four: Flood Recovery in Germany and the UK 
Monitoring recovery after major floods is an important topic that various researchers from around the 
world have investigated. What makes this study different and innovative is the comparison of highly 
comparable floods in the UK and Germany that involved a survey of both residents and experts in each 
country. 
The results of experts and residents’ survey analyses in Germany and the UK for recovery of these areas 
can be summarised as follows: 
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• The flood impact on different sectors as well as speed and quality of the recovery were similar in 
both countries (in Germany few months faster) 
• In Germany more than 60% of recovery funding came from federal aid, whereas in the UK more 
than 90% came from household insurance  
• The economy of both countries took between one to one and a half year to recover. 
• In both Germany and the UK residents believe that most homes and businesses in the flooded areas 
were no, more resilient after they recovered. However, in the UK neighbourhood areas are thought 
to be safer than they were prior to the flood due improved flood defences and better systems of 
early warning. There was no similar improvement in area wide safety in Germany. 
• This finding from the survey of local people in the affected areas contrast with the view of experts 
in each country. In Germany, experts believe that all sectors improved after the flood in 2013, 
whereas experts in the UK believe infrastructure was the only sector that showed significant 
improvement after the 2007 flood. 
Figure 12 shows how after each flood, experts believe that different aspects of society and the economy 
changed compared to the pre-flood state.  
 
 
Figure 12 Experts’ assessments about change in socio-economic sectors 
In addition to the detailed questions about flood damage and recovery in different sectors, experts 
highlighted things that went well or badly during and after the flood (table 9). Positive notes were 
referring to the forecast and warning in comparison to the previous floods, better coordination and 
collaboration among agencies and emergency management services, more resilient communities and 
faster recovery in comparison to the past, and also initiation of flood resilience improvements. On the 
other hand, highlighting things that went bad explains the scale of the disasters in both countries were 
overwhelming. The states and task forces were not well resourced and prepared, and coordination had 
difficulties. Meanwhile inadequacy of flood defences and vulnerability of critical infrastructure were 
clearly seen. In both Germany and the UK, some flood affected people suffered psychologically for 
long term after the events. 
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Table 9 Experts idea about what went well and bad after flood 
Germany (21 Experts) UK (27 Experts) 
THINGS THAT WENT WELL 
− Forecast and warning much better than in 2002 
− Cooperation among authorities, and authorities with 
rescue team 
− Long term volunteers support 
− Coordination between volunteers and the city 
− Better preparedness than 2002 
− Awareness and preparation have increased a lot since 
2002 
− 2013 flood damage was 1/3 of 2002 due to better 
preparation 
− Tipping point in disaster preparedness and 
prevention in regard to flooding and storm surge 
− Warning and evacuation better than in 1953 
− Swift response of Fire service and Environment 
Agency  
− Improved management of communications, better 
collaboration, better reporting from media 
− Coordination private and public /charity sector 
− Local authority wardens worked to build community 
resilience 
− Community support and response via social media 
− Insurance company's initial response rapid 
− Home insurance helped no end 
− Floods set in motion a number of important 
improvements to warning and informing capabilities 
and more resilient infrastructure 
THINGS THAT WENT BADLY 
− Task forces unprepared for scale of flood 
− State aid for uninsured injured parties undermines 
incentive for personal provision 
− Wrong warning of flood height and flood 
characteristic surprised residents at night 
− Some coordination problem in the field due to 
differences in mentality 
− Better communication is needed with public, disaster 
financing and insurance 
− Getting flood help is too bureaucratic during disaster 
− Dike defence is not always successful 
− Slow dyke constructions along the Danube 
− Long term psychological effects 
− State not resourced to deal with severity of flooding 
across multiple river basins 
− Local authority almost invisible 
− Lack of infrastructure preparedness to floods and 
importance of recovery as an issue to be considered 
− Co-ordination and preparation poor, few had signed 
up to flood warnings, few understood division of 
responsibilities  
− Water infrastructure inadequate and response of the 
water company was defensive 
− Delay to visit and repair all flooded properties, meant 
people were displaced for a long time 
− Blocked drains caused flooding 
− Government grants poorly administered and few 
people benefitted from available money  
− Lack of understanding of resilient construction 
− Inappropriate responses to the recovery and repair of 
traditionally constructed buildings 
− Long term psychological issues  
 
A recent report of over 100 natural disasters by the Centre for Risks Studies, Cambridge for AXA 
Insurance cited the 2013 German Floods as a "stand-out" event in terms of the speed of recovery. 
(Carpenter et al 2020) Despite displacing over 80,000 people and causing economic losses of $13 Bn 
the German economy experienced negligible impact and the flood affected regions recovered to near 
normal life within 12 months. In general, whereas earthquakes and tsunami are immensely destructive 
of property, infrastructure and capital, floods disrupt productivity through business interruption and 
loss of economic output.  
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In general, several factors lead to the faster recovery after disasters such as floods, including notably 
adequate and speedy funding, better preparedness, better disaster risk management decision making, 
and places with higher insurance penetration. In contrast the frequency of disasters seems to have 
little effect on the speed and quality of recovery. Extensive community participation slows recovery 
but has an effect on improving the quality of recovery in terms of increased levels of safety and 
improvements in amenity and the local economy. (Carpenter et al 2020) 
Study Five: Tourist destinations recovery in Philippines 
Many disaster-affected places suffer economically after a disaster due to the slow recovery of the 
tourism sector. Despite the physical recovery of the area, the reputation of affected places can be badly 
affected due to inaccurate or outdated media coverage, which causes tourists to cancel their bookings 
and change their destination. How the tourism destination prepares for and adjusts to disaster situations 
has not received a great deal of attention in tourism management research so far.  
Reporting the level of readiness of the destination to welcome tourists back after a major natural disaster 
is an extremely pressing topic, yet it is hardly discussed in academic literatures. This study developed 
a new approach using scorecards to monitoring and measuring recovery of tourist destinations in the 
Philippines that were hit by twin severe natural disasters. The approach aimed to provide objective 
evidence that the authorities and tourism providers could be used to report the progress of recovery and 
encourage tourists to return, and could also be applied after other types of disaster, including the current 
global pandemic.  
The methodological framework in this study was designed to be used as a crisis communication standard 
in order to monitor and measure the recovery progress in tourist destinations. It was devised by 
conducting a survey with 40 carefully chosen expert stakeholders from the Philippines tourism sector. 
The comparison of three case study areas in the Philippines was carried out for two snapshots: right 
after the event and at New Year, 2-3 months after the events. Figure 13 shows the overall comparison 
of three dimensions of safety, business and physical recovery (each of the corners of the triangles 




Figure 13 Comparison of recovery Right After disaster with New Year 
The city of Cebu had the least damage compared to the other two cities. At New Year, Bohol was almost 
as recovered as Cebu, while Bantayan was less recovered and less ready to welcome tourists. In figure 





Figure 14 Comparison of speed of recovery after disaster for physical recovery sub-indicators in three cities 
By comparing the three heavily affected cities in the Philippines, it can be argued that the severity of 
the damage is one of the reasons influencing the speed of recovery. Other factors such as the size of the 
settlement are also influential since larger cities recovered faster, which could be due to the higher 
mobilisation of expertise and resources. 
This approach could be operationalised by the tourism authority selecting a small panel of key 
informants, who regularly and systematically report recovery metrics. Reports of real recovery, rather 
than ill-informed negative media reports would help tourism and the economy get back to normal faster.  
Overall conclusion 
The implications and conclusions from the five discussed studies are summarised according to disaster 
cycle phases. 
Pre-disaster: 
The number and severity of natural disasters is growing and it is hard to predict how severely and 
destructively the next disaster will strike any corner of the world. This is largely driven by the increase 
in climate related hazards, notably floods and storms. In the past 40 years over 80% of natural hazard 
events were weather related and the global occurrence of floods is three times higher in the last decade 
than in the 80s. (EM-DAT and CRED). Cascading effects, including technical failures, such as 
blackouts, can happen any time due to natural hazards, power grid failure, human error or cyber-attack. 
In most cases, neither society nor the relevant authorities are adequately prepared.  
One of the stand-out conclusions from the recent AXA report on over 100 cases of natural disaster is 
that better prepared countries with better DRM recover much faster than ill-prepared counties with little 
or poor disaster risk management. (Carpenter et al 2020) To improve preparedness and facilitate crisis 
management, the interaction of communities and government is required in advance of disaster. Using 
scenario planning is one way to increase awareness and preparedness of communities. In addition, the 
field studies in flood affected areas suggested that regular drills in schools, public lectures by experts, 
newspaper or magazine article, and educational program on TV or Radio are also important ways of 
raising awareness and provoking preventive and mitigating behaviour.  
Role playing scenario exercise not only increase societal awareness of unexperienced disasters, but also 
help decision makers better understand people’s likely emotional response and subsequent actions and 
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how these could change over the time, especially if they do not receive clear information and instruction 
from the authorities.  
Few people in disaster prone areas take personal responsibility to limit the damage from future event. 
For example, in Germany and the UK, where flood risk is increasing due to climate change, it is 
becoming more difficult to get property in flood prone areas, and in Germany the states are planning to 
withdraw disaster recovery aid. Therefore, progress is needed to turn awareness into effective action. 
Post-disaster: 
The two key factors in improving both the speed and quality of disaster recovery are the adequacy and 
speed of funding and the quality of DRM decision-making. (Carpenter et al 2020). This broad 
conclusion from this study of over 100 disasters is exemplified in the UK and German flood case studies 
reported in this thesis. The national economies of both the UK and Germany were barely affected by 
the severe floods, and the flood affected areas recovered within 1 year to 18 months. This largely due 
to adequate funds being provided in a timely manner, largely by insurance in the UK and from Federal 
funds in Germany. In both countries, immediate response flood risk management post disaster was 
good, in terms of decision making and effective action to reduce future risk. 
In the UK and Germany houses have been and are still being built in river basins. Meanwhile, in many 
large catchments risk reduction measures have proved to be ineffective. Yet, despite awareness and 
familiarity with the flood history of the location, households living in flood prone areas are not installing 
mitigation measures and living and working without flood insurance.  
It is important to stress that in the UK, respondents believe that flood preparedness is both the 
responsibility of both themselves and the authorities, whereas in Germany, flood preparedness is seen 
solely as the responsibility of government. Policy makers in both countries should be aware of this fact 
and need to take this level of expectation into account in flood preparedness measures such as 
communications, educational material, flood mitigation measures, budgeting and programming. 
In general, trust in government is not high. Nevertheless, during all types of emergency, government 
advice and instruction is normally trusted and followed. However, if government reacts too slowly, if 
advice is delayed and do guidance is not provided in time, societal trust falls dramatically and people 
start to take control and plan the situation for themselves. In some circumstances this could worsen the 
disaster and increase chaos. 
In all the studied disasters, people who had direct experience of a past event had a higher level of risk 
perception and preparedness compared to those who had no previous experience. This applies both to 
natural and technological disasters. Yet the frequently of disaster occurrence is not proven to influence 
the speed of post disaster recovery. (Carpenter et al 2020) 
6.  Methodological inferences and lessons 
The research for the foregoing case studies suggest that to better understand how fast and sufficient an 
area recovers from a disaster, one of the most reliable and low-cost monitoring solution is interviewing 
key informants. They represent diverse, well-informed, reliable and representative groups of 
stakeholders who increase the validity and credibility of the results. A survey based on a relatively small 
group of stakeholders is timely, cost-efficient as provides reliable and valid results. Furthermore, 
residents and tourists can follow the real information resulting from a knowledgeable group, rather than 
negative media coverage.  
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It is clear that a survey needs to be well designed, to be clear and understandable to respondents and to 
allow straightforward analysis and interpretation of the results. A survey needs to be validated and 
piloted thoroughly prior to data collection. If the survey is going to be conducted in different languages, 
cross language translations with native speakers of both countries is highly recommended.  
In all the studied countries, when respondents were asked questions about scale, speed and quality of 
recovery, or the level of damage after the disaster, discrepancies were observed. However, these 
discrepancies may result from different interpretations of the question and reliability can be improved 
through clear question phrasing and additional explanation as it was done in study. 
Conducting a survey a few months or years after a disaster need care and attention to achieve accurate 
and reliable answers. Anchoring the question to a particular time, such as an important holiday, helps 
jog the respondents’ memory to think back better. Moreover, when experts are being interviewed, it is 
important for them to be able to give more detailed assessments. Oversimplifying the choices in the 
survey increases the tendency to get pessimistic answers. Finally, if someone is being interviewed in 
person, respondents welcomed asking the questions in more detailed way because it helps them to focus 
on a specific issue. Finally, to encourage the participant to answer fully, it is highly recommended to 
design a survey that takes no longer than ten to fifteen minutes and to state this clearly at the outset.  
For more results and discussion about each study, please refer to part B of this dissertation or the 
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Article 1: Communication blackouts in power outages: Findings from 
scenario exercises in Germany and France 
Abstract 
Although infrequent, power outages can cause major disruption and incur huge costs. The increasing 
demand for electricity, more extreme weather events and the possibility of cyber-attack are increasing 
the risk of blackouts. This paper reports using scenario planning and role-playing exercises with 
German and French university students to investigate people’s possible reactions and their expectations 
of government during a hypothetical 3-day blackout. The scenario is designed to explore how society 
would cope with a power failure over successive time periods. The aim is provide information to 
emergency managers and policy makers about community needs and people’s likely behaviour in future 
blackouts. 
1. Introduction 
The chance of a long lasting power blackout is low especially in the highly industrialized societies like 
Europe, but in today’s strongly interconnected world even a small disruption in a power network can 
escalate to a large disruption and systemic failure of critical infrastructure [1]. In the US and Europe 
the likelihood of large-area failures seems to be greater than might be expected on the basis of 
extrapolation from small failures [2]. The risk of power blackout is increasing due to technical failure; 
natural events, cyber-attacks, human failure during maintenance work or a combination of factors [3,4]. 
Power outages in Italy in 2003, southwest Europe in 2006 and Turkey in 2015 are the examples of 
blackouts in Europe that caused serious disruptions, despite lasting less than 24 h [5]. Operational 
reliability of the power system is closely linked to the security of telecommunication networks, 
including its ability to withstand cyber-attacks [6]. Improving operational reliability is currently a major 
concern of governments of many countries, including Germany and France. Although infrequent, 
extensive power outages can cause major disruption and incur huge costs. European power networks 
extend across country borders and cross border blackouts pose particular problems for inter-agency 
communication and cooperation. The aim of this research is to explore the potential risks and impacts 
of a major blackout and to make recommendations for any changes to current policies and procedures. 
A role-play scenario planning with university students is used to explore societal resilience to a 
hypothetical 72 h power failure in Germany and France. The objective was to examine how people’s 
behaviour, emotions and reactions change over the 3 days and to see to what extent they are likely to 
cooperate with family, friends and neighbors and fend for themselves and how their faith and trust in 
the authorities and agencies fluctuates. 
1.1. Human response to emergencies 
There has been extensive research into people’s reactions in crisis situations going back to Prince’s [7] 
study of a ship collision in 1917. Drabek and Evans [8] summarised the major contributions of American 
sociologists to an understanding of human responses to disaster. The first issue relates to labelling panic, 
looting and other anti-social behaviour as myths [9–15]. Quarantelli [16] suggested that people as a 
whole do not panic and rather than reacting in an anti-social manner, people typically become more 
cohesive and unified during situations of collective stress. Tierney [17] writes that the incidence of 
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panic behaviour is vanishingly rare in crisis situations and despite fear and the entirely reasonable desire 
to flee, people in severe danger try to make rational decisions and work collectively. In an analysis of 
the World Trade Centre disaster 2001 extreme behavioural action, including panic, was noted in less 
than 1% of cases [18]. [19] suggest that anti-social behaviours during disaster scenarios, is, at best, 
over-exaggerated and that human behaviour in disaster scenarios can only frequently be described as 
“pro-social”. In contrast to panic behaviour, the typical human response to disaster warnings is disbelief, 
denial, and reinterpretation to reduce or eliminate the threat potential [20]. 
On the other hand, there are examples of looting and crime in a small minority of disasters such as New 
York blackout 1977 [21,22], Hurricane Katrina [23]. Despite widespread fears of looting during the 
Kista blackout in a suburb of Stockholm, Sweden there was slightly more criminal activity than usual 
[24]. 
The second issue of relevance is that of emergent behaviour – emergent groups of people working 
together in pursuit of collective goals relevant to the disaster but whose organization has yet to become 
institutionalized. Emergent phenomena have been a prevalent feature in disasters [25] and may on 
occasion lead to conflict with formal emergency management [26]. This is one aspect of the extensive 
literature on social resilience and adaptive behaviour. Hutter et al. [27]; introducing a special edition on 
resilience, conclude that there are a multiplicity of perspectives on resilience and the lack of a clear 
definition poses a challenge to operationalising its use in disaster management. This is perhaps not 
surprising since resilience is a multi-dimensional concept encompassing social, economic, physical, 
technological and natural dimensions [28]. In social science, resilience is considered as a complex web 
of social connections and capacities that enable a community to cope with hazards [29,30]. Obrist [31] 
says resilience is a dynamic process, not as a static state, and social resilience enables people not only 
to cope with adverse conditions but also to create options and responds proactively to adversity. Keck 
and Sakdapolrak [32] also suggest that resilience goes beyond coping and encompasses adaptive and 
transformation processes. 
Rogers and Nehnevajsa [33] report on behaviour and attitudes under crisis conditions and suggest that 
people respond to crises in remarkably similar ways. The disruption created by disasters creates stress, 
yet individuals and organizations seek to maintain the continuity of behaviour. The first response to 
impending danger reflects a strong commitment to protecting themselves, their loved ones and even 
others with whom they may become associated. The second type of response is information seeking. 
As people become alerted to the potential for danger they tend to seek information about the hazard, 
from their own senses and to get confirmation from others, particularly family and friends. Finally, 
there is a propensity to respond in groups, particularly families, by consolidating resources. These three 
basic behaviour patterns were observed in the scenario workshops reported in this paper. 
1.2. Power outages 
Electricity is an enabling technology for a host of quotidian activities [34], so its disruption affects 
normal daily life and has a cascading effect on other infrastructure, for example water supply [35]. 
Electric power systems are part of the critical infrastructure of modern societies, therefore is essential 
to boost their resilience [36]. Electricity infrastructure is necessary to sustain human and economic 
wellbeing [37]. Many countries have, therefore, introduced mandatory requirements for operators to 
maintain high reliability and stability of supply, for example, The U.S. Department of Energy, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) [38] is working with power system operators to ensure 
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reliability of the U.S. power system. In Germany, the transition from fossil fuels to renewables is 
pushing the industry towards greater flexibility and resilience through various innovations in market 
design and pricing mechanisms [39]. In France, RTE, the electricity transmission operator, introduced 
emergency response arrangements in the wake of the storms in December 1999. It is tackling current 
reliability challenges by leveraging power generation flexibility, stronger cooperation between 
transmission system operators and coordination centers and adherence to European grid codes [6]. 
However, power systems are highly nonlinear and it is challenging and uneconomical to make power 
systems totally resilient [40]. 
Drawing on examples from around the world, Wood et al. [41] argue that a crucial factor in people 
ability to cope with adversity is social capital: the extent to which social networks are able to support 
collective action, and promote psychological wellbeing. One of the earliest detailed accounts of 
people’s reactions comes from the blackout across the eastern seaboard of the United States on 9 
November 1965, affecting 25 million people. Six days after the breakdown, the National Opinion 
Research Centre (NORC) interviewed over a thousand people about how their reactions to the blackout. 
They found that most people were not in the least alarmed, there was no panic and the majority of 
people reported that strangers were unusually helpful and friendly to each other. Above all, they found 
that the blackout affected rhythms of communication and social interaction. For example, the New York 
Telephone Company reported most calls were to relatives and instead of turning for information to City 
Hall or formal organizations, people turned to neighbors and to local leaders in the neighborhood [42]. 
On August 14, 2003 a massive power outage caused blackouts throughout most of Ontario, along with 
parts of the US. This power failure was the largest in North American history, spanning 24,086 square 
kilometres and costing the Canadian economy $1–2 billion [43]. Brenda Murphy [44] conducted a 
survey of 1200 Ontario residents six months after the outage to discover how they had managed to deal 
with the emergency. She found that families relied on networks of family, friends, neighbors and 
community associations to help them get through a crisis. 89% of respondents stated that their neighbors 
would provide assistance and 37% said they provided assistance during the blackout. 
Although rare, Europe has experienced major power failures and maintaining stability of power supply 
is especially challenging during natural catastrophes [45]. In France and Germany storms and floods 
are the natural hazards cause the biggest problems. On September 23, 2003, nearly four million 
customers lost power in eastern Denmark and southern Sweden following a cascading outage that struck 
Scandinavia [46]. Days later, a cascading outage between Italy and the rest of central Europe left most 
of Italy in darkness on September 28 [47]. In France and Germany, there have been 10 serious examples 
of storms causing temporary power outages in the past 10 years (Table 1). 
Electricity outages can be both an effect and a cause of cascading effects [58]. For example, the 2013 
Germany floods caused widespread disruptions in power supply, which in turn affected water treatment 
plants and public transport amongst other services and activities [59]. In February 2014 several storms 
again affected UK and 80,000 homes were left without power for several days. The impacts of power 
outages on households, the description of the challenges faced and the strategies adopted by them are 
described by Ghanem et al. [60]. The capacity of households to deal with power outages depends not 
only on the household itself, but also on the social resilience of the whole community. Cascading effects 
are common in disaster events and a chain of interaction can amplify the impact on society where the 
initial power failure can lead to fires, an increase in accidents and fatalities, stresses to the health sector, 
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water shortages and hygiene issues, disruption of refrigeration and food shortages, environmental 
contamination, carbon monoxide poisoning from disruption of underground ventilation, traffic 
disruption, disruption to temperature control, people becoming trapped, increased crime, stress on 
police and emergency services, business continuity and logistics failure and last, but not least 
communications system and telecoms failure [61]. 
Table 1 Power outages in France and Germany following storm events 
Storm Date Impacts of power outage Reference 
Lothar and 
Martin 
Dec 1999 Extensive damage to the French and German national power grids [48] 
Dagmar Dec 2004 
Northern France, including Paris, affected leaving thousands of 
homes without power. 
[49] 
Renate Oct 2006 
SW coast of France battered leaving many homes without power 
for many hours 
[50] 
Klaus Jan 2009 Over a million homes in southwest France lost power.  [51] 
Katia Sep 2011 
Hurricane caused widespread power outages throughout Europe, 
including in France and Germany 
[52] 
Joachin Dec 2011 Power outages in France and Germany [53] 
Niklas Mar 2015 Power outages in Germany [54] 
Fabien Dec 2019 
Wind and storms cut power supply to 220,000 homes in 
southwestern France 
[55] 
Ciara Feb 2020 Power cut to 130,000 homes in northern France [56] 
Sabine Feb 2020 60,000 homes were left without electricity in Bavaria [57] 
 
The 2011 Tohoku earthquake, in particular to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, was a wake-up 
call to the risk of “cascading disasters” [62]. A paper by Pescaroli and Alexander [63] addresses the 
vulnerability of critical infrastructure to cascading effects of disasters. They suggest a shift attention 
from risk scenarios based on hazard to vulnerability scenarios based on potential cascading effects in 
which they identify nodes that are capable of generating secondary events. Early warning, the behaviour 
of operators, communication failures and bureaucratic conflicts are, they suggest, the areas in which 
further research could improve understanding of how cascading disasters propagate in critical 
infrastructure, and how their progress can be arrested. This approach to systemic risk is being actively 
pursued by the Centre for Risk Studies in Cambridge University [64]. 
1.3. Scenario planning 
Four scenario role-playing exercise workshops were held with university students in Germany and 
France. These involved getting the students to dynamically ‘play’ through an imagined future. The 
game collapsed real time to highlight significant issues and to focus on people’s decision-making, 
emotional responses and imagined actions [65]. The scenario exercises were designed with input from 
5 international experts with experience of using scenario planning in risk management, social science, 




Various authors have suggested the use of scenario planning as a way of exploring the critical role of 
decision-making and spontaneous behaviour in the stressful time of an emergency like a blackout [66–
68]. Moats et al. [69] describe how, after major disasters, people have to make high consequence 
decisions with incomplete or inaccurate information under time pressure and suggest scenario planning 
as a way to prepare. Alexander [70] described how scenarios are used in emergency management 
training and how outcomes are used as the basis of crisis planning. Bradfield et al. [71] say public policy 
makers are increasingly using scenarios to involve agencies and stakeholders in policy decisions. 
In the disaster management field, the scenario approach has been applied in ‘ShakeOut’ drills to raise 
public awareness [72,73] and various authors describe how they are used in emergency management 
[67,71,74–78]. In Germany, scenario planning was used to explore the impact of a blackout on health 
care [79]. An article by Envision Tomorrow [80] suggested scenarios could be of two basic types – 
‘normative’, which describe a preferred outcome, and ‘exploratory’, which describe unknown futures. 
The scenario could be timed for pre, during or post-disaster. The blackout scenario in this research was 
an exploratory scenario timed for during the event. 
In summary, in terms of a conceptual framework to guide the research, this brief literature review points 
to the following issues. How do people imagine events might cascade after a major blackout and 
produce a chain of consequences? How do people’s feelings change over the 72-h scenario? Are their 
signs of emergent groupings, coping strategies and adaptive behaviour? How might communication 
failure impact on individual and communities? 
2. Methodology 
The aims of the scenario were: 
1. To explore the potential cascading effects of a 3-day blackout and the implications for different types 
of people 
2. To learn how people might behave, react and feel in a blackout 
3. To gauge societal resilience to a relatively long power outage, and in the process to learn about 
preparedness and response to a possible crisis of a 3-day blackout in Europe 
The 54 participants at the workshops were university masters students who had no advanced knowledge 
of the nature or content of the scenario. Between 10 and 16 students attended each of the four 
workshops: two in Karlsruhe, Germany and two in Paris, France. To encourage more lively discussions 
the participants were divided into tables of 4 students playing the 4 roles: an elderly 80 year-old person 
in a wheelchair, a parent with 2 children, a single university student and a 12 year-old child, which to 
cover a range of age differences, different responsibilities, different concerns, different health 
conditions, and different flexibilities. The roles were assigned, as much as possible, according to the 
students’ background and experience. They were asked if they had experience of living with elderly or 
disabled people or if they had looked after younger siblings or were married or lived with a partner and 
the roles were assigned accordingly. The remaining students were asked to play themselves as 
university students. A mentor was assigned to each group to provide support during the scenario. In 
order to reduce the possibility of bias, the mentors were instructed that their task was to motivate and 
encourage the participants to think for themselves and to imagine how they would feel and react in their 
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assigned role, but not to lead the group or provide suggestions or ideas. The mentors kept a note of the 
participants’ emotional reactions, their discussion and imagined actions during each time period. 
The workshop lasted about 3 h and was divided into 4 half hour time periods representing different 
intervals during the blackout: the first 30 min; the next 8 h; 24 h and 3 days. There was a short break 
between second and third interval. With the addition of the first 30 min, these time periods were similar 
to those used in the scenarios in the Crisis Management Handbook about power outages in Baden-
Württemberg by the Ministry of the Interior, Digitisation and Migration and Federal Office of Civil 
Protection and Disaster Assistance in Germany [81].  
The participants were told that they were living in either Paris or Karlsruhe and “it is a warm day in the 
middle of summer in the middle of the week. It is 12:30 lunchtime and the electricity goes off”. They 
were told the reason of the blackout was unknown, that it was unclear when the electricity would come 
back or how widely the problem extended. Cascading impacts, largely drawn from the Crisis 
Management Handbook mentioned earlier [81], were pinned on the board: no traffic lights, no subway 
or tram, no telephone landline, no payment by bank cards, no ATM cash, no fuel at petrol stations and, 
in most cases, no tap water or toilet flush. In groups they brainstormed what would happen and began 
to create a picture of their feelings and reactions, the decisions they would make, and their expectations 
of the authorities and local community. The participants were required to make notes about their 
feelings and behaviour on their individual worksheets. In time period 2 new cascading events were 
pinned up: shops and supermarkets closed, no mobile network, no Internet, flight cancellations and no 
trains between cities. After a break, time periods 3–4 continued. No information about the cause or 
extent of the blackout was given at any time, just a reassurance from the authorities that they were doing 
their best to fix the problem as soon as possible. 
All the participants, without exception, too their roles seriously and were able to imagine the expanding 
crisis through group discussion. During each time period mentors completed forms documenting their 
perceptions of the participants understanding and their expectations of help from the authorities, family, 
friends and neighbors. The roleplaying scenario was followed by an open discussion to share the main 
lessons and key factors. 
3. Results 
The data from the 4 workshops included individual students’ note, mentors’ note and semantic questions 
for each time period, plus feedback from the end of workshop discussions. The worksheets were 
analysed for their semantic content and provide the main data source for this results section. Both 
qualitative and quantitative content analyses were used to code the data [82,83]. A detailed content 
analysis was made of the words and phrases used by the participants to describe their feelings and 
reactions, their expectations of and opinions about the emergency services and government, authorities 
and their imagined behaviour and interaction with others. 
3.1. Emotional response 
As explained in the methodology section, the participants recorded their feelings, thoughts, reactions 
and expectations on individual worksheets. This allows us to trace changes in their emotions and 
behaviour over the four time periods. At the start of the game all the participants were happy and 
laughing, and many of them did not take the blackout seriously. However, by the start of the second 8 
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h period no one was laughing, but they still did not expect scenario to continue much longer. By the 
third period, after 24 h of blackout, the students were heavily into their roles and were frustrated and 
beginning to get scared. The way they argued and discussed within their group changed completely 
from the first time period. By the fourth period, after 72 h of blackout, they were very anxious and 
afraid. 
The mentors’ notes show that in the first 30-min period most participants (71%) expected the electricity 
to come back on any second and the remainder (29%) estimated a maximum outage of 2 h. Even after 
8 h, over 75% were still hopeful that the power would be back within an hour. By the fourth period (72 
h of blackout) the majority of participants had given up any hope that electricity could come back at all 
and were prepared for the worst. There were some differences between the workshops in France and 
Germany. Less than 10% of French participants imagined that the electricity could come back, while in 
Germany 33% still had hope at 72 h. 
Table 2 shows the emotionally charged words that the students used to describe their feelings in each 
time period grouped by role. These words were identified through content analysis of the students’ and 
mentors’ notes by noting any instance any word that might describe an emotion was used and were not 
pre-defined in any way. Interestingly, there was little difference in emotional self-descriptions between 
French and German participants. The most appropriate or differentiating single word to describe the 
emotion of each group, has been highlighted in bold. A number of things are striking about this table. 
• For all participants there is an escalation of emotional response over the 72 h, from calm 
puzzlement to worry or fear 
 
• The third period (24 h of blackout) shows the largest range of emotions in terms of the number 
of words used 
 
• Participants in the child’s role used less words to describe their emotions than participants in 
other roles 
 
• As one might expect, students playing parents with young children showed greater control and 
emotional endurance than participants in other roles; the elderly quickly went from calm 
acceptance, when they imagine the blackout to be of short duration, to fear and feelings of being 




Table 2 Emotional reaction (most repeated words with emotional content in 4 workshops) 
 
30 Mins 8 Hours 24 Hours 72 Hours 
Child Happy, Calm Bored, Puzzled, Worried Afraid, Scared, Worried Afraid, Scared, Worried 




Afraid, Scared, Angry 
Parents Puzzled, Worried 
Annoyed, Worried, 
Anxious, In control 
Scared, Worried, 
Anxious, Hopeless, In 
control, Brave 




Weak, In danger 
Afraid, Scared, Worried, 
Overwhelmed, Stressed, 
Hopeful 
Scared, In danger, 
Weak, Afraid 
 
The emotional pattern recorded by the participants accords with the behaviour observed by mentors. 
The participants’ self-descriptions started to appear distressed and confused after a blackout duration of 
24 h. In the subsequent period, some gave up waiting for help from the authorities and began to think 
for themselves, organize with others or take responsibility and initiate action. Others who were unable 
to fend for themselves – children, elderly and disabled – settled into a state of fear. 
To explore emotional response in greater depth, for the workshops in Paris, a modified form of semantic 
differential was developed comprising 20 pairs of words in French and English. Table 3 shows the 
English version of this list.  
Table 3 Semantic differential words 
 
These were based on words used by the participants at the German workshops and represented 
increasing intensity of emotions from happy/unhappy to able/overwhelmed. They were presented in 
random order and participants were asked to select all the words that described how they were feeling 
in each time period.  
The first thing to note is that in the first half an hour the number of negative and positive words was 
roughly equal. Over time the number of negative words used then steadily increased from time period 
to time period (Fig. 1). 
Calm Afraid Brave Distrustful Strong
Panicked Pleased Unprepared Relaxed Out of control
Scared Cool Puzzled Prepared Energized
Bored Patient Weak Peaceful In danger
Sure Anxious Composed Annoyed Unafraid
Trustful angry Able Unhappy Unexpected
Expected Impatient Happy Aggressive Incontrol




Figure 1 Number of positive and negative words used over time 
Plotting some of the most used words Fig. 2 shows how positive emotions remain fairly stable and 
declining only a little over time, for example by students reporting that they were feeling less calm and 
safe. Conversely, the number of negative words, reflecting negative emotions, for example feeling 
scared or overwhelmed, dramatically increase over time. 
 
 
Figure 2 Positive and negative words used over time (N=31 participants) 
There were some noticeable differences between the different groups (Fig. 3). Over half the students 
playing elderly people imagined that they would be scared after 24 h compared to less than a quarter of 
those playing parents and children and only 13% playing students. In contrast at 24 h the most energized 
group to take action, for example in searching for information or trying to get food and water, were 
again the students’ group: 88% of them felt energized to do something to remedy the situation. By 72 
h, however, their enthusiasm had slumped a little. The energy levels of those playing parents steadily 




Figure 3 Differences in emotion between groups 
3.2. Behaviour 
As one might expect, there are certain patterns of behaviour that are common to all four groups of 
participants and others that are specific. In the first 30-min period everyone wanted to get information 
about the cause and possible duration of the blackout. At 8-h over 80% of participants were still seeking 
information, the students in elderly roles were trying to contact people for help and those playing parents 
were beginning to anticipate a longer outage and to think about getting food and water. At 24-h those 
playing students were trying to find out how far the blackout extended to see if it made sense to evacuate. 
Those playing elderly were hoping to relocate to family or hospital. At 72-h people were getting 
increasingly concerned about security on the streets and some even appeared despairing. Interestingly, 
some stated their readiness to break into supermarkets to try to find food and water. 
One of the most serious actions an individual or family experiencing a blackout could take would be to 
evacuate and leave their home and flee the area. As one would expect an expressed intention to evacuate 
increased dramatically over the four time periods to two-thirds of participants in Germany after 72 h 
and about one-third of participants in France (Fig. 4). 
 
Figure 4 Proportion of participants expressing an intention to evacuate 
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This difference between the participants in the two countries is arresting. It is possible that, 
unintentionally, the workshop leader had behaved differently in the German workshops and given a 
harsher impression of the lack of help from the authorities. However, a detailed analysis of the 
worksheets did not support this idea. The principal driver for evacuation would seem to be the lack of 
information, advice and support from the authorities and the need to find reliable supplies of drinking 
water and food. The city of Karlsruhe, where the German workshops were held, is of course much 
smaller than Paris where the French workshops were run. It is also nearer to an international border. 
There are differences in evacuation behaviour between groups of people (Table 4). In both, Germany 
and France, a large proportion of “parents” and “students” begin to evacuate after 24 h. In Germany a 
very high proportion (80%) of “elderly” evacuate for health reasons when their family come from other 
cities in Germany by car to rescue them. In both France and Germany 72 h seems to be a critical time 
limit for the elderly beyond when they can no longer cope without medicine and health care and support. 
However, in all workshops, as the final decision to leave the region was made at a late stage and 
participants anticipated difficulties due to lack of fuel and traffic chaos. 
Table 4 Intention to evacuate 
 
3.3. People’s expectations and trust in the authorities 
Inaction by the authorities results in a loss of trust. Information plays a crucial role in an emergency 
and a failure in communication seems to be the most important reason for people losing trust in 
government. Everyone, no matter what age, gender, physical condition, or financial ability, needs to 
know what is happening in a crisis. A lack of information, which is very likely as reports of other major 
blackouts show, is a major problem for victims and dramatically increases uncertainty and anxiety. 
Uncertainty is an aversive state that people are motivated to reduce and is intensified by a lack of 
information [84]. The authorities often withheld information from the public in an effort to avoid panic 
[19]. Rather than helping the situation, communication failure can cause significant problems. 
Withholding information may delegitimize the government’s authority and communication failure is 
thought to be responsible for people ignoring evacuation orders and other directives [85]. 
Communication is dramatically improved with social media and instant messaging through smart 
phones. Nevertheless, communication may be difficult or impossible during extended blackouts [86]. 
In this scenario, the participants were told that authorities were doing their best to find the cause of the 
blackout and fix the problem but are unable to say how long it will last. In open discussions, participants 
said that even though they would have been scared if they had been told it was a cyber-attack, they 
would have preferred to know rather than not. After 24 h, over half the participants started to react in 
an angry way (“still no information – that can’t be true!“) and began to take things more and more into 
their own hands. 
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Apart from information about the cause of the event and about a probable duration, the participants 
expected advice from the authorities. The workshop participants initially trusted the authorities during 
the first two time periods, but with no guidance and information this trust dramatically dropped in the 
third time period. Fig. 5 illustrates the decline in trust compared to the express intention to evacuate. As 
a rule, people only evacuate when told to by the authorities, although the last 50 years there seems 
evidence that people’s trust in government is declining and people place as much faith in advice from 
friends and family, often through social media connections as they do in government [87–91]. The 
findings shown in Fig. 5 may be an artifact of the scenario, in that the participants had no information 
about the blackout and no advice from the authorities, or they may point to a decline in trust. 
 
Figure 5 Evolution of trust in authorities and propensity to evacuate 
The anticipated need for water increased strongly after 8 h and for food after 24 h for both, German and 
French participants. Both initially expected food and water to be provided by the authorities or by 
voluntary organizations. For the elderly, being cared for and being moved to a shelter after 24 h of 
blackout was considered the responsibility of the authorities. Content qualitative analysis of the 
mentors’ notes showed similar expectations of government. As becomes clear from Table 5, the 
participants expected the authorities to provide information and increasing levels of assistance as the 
blackout continued. Since neither information nor support was forthcoming, participant’s puzzlement 
turned to frustration, anger and finally fearful acceptance or action, first to selforganize and second to 
prepare for evacuation. 
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Table 5 Participants’ expectations of the 'authorities' at different time periods 
30 Mins 8 Hours 24 Hours 72 Hours 
- Information 
expected 
- The problem fixed 
soon 
- Short blackout 
-  Confirm with 
people that public 
service is still 
functioning 
- Traffic police 
manage the traffic 
- Information 
expected from 
police, Red Cross, 
government, city 
hall (Find the way to 
inform people 
considering people 
have no access to 
internet and TV) 
- Water distribution 
- Nursing care for 
elderly 
- Advice from 
government about 
how to behave and 
what to do if it 
continued  
- Provide water 
 
- Information and guidance 
- Government provide food and water 
and other initial needs  
- Shelter provision for people in need 
- Help from other regions or other 
countries 
- Evacuation 
- Government visit old people at home  
- Employers to not expect their 
employees to go to work 
- Security force (police, army) provide 
security 
- Local government officials in the area 
- Local and central government 
implement emergency measures  
- University provides information  
- Community organizations step in 
- Foreign authorities support foreigners 
- Provide portable toilets 
- Calm down people 
- All points from 
previous time period 
plus:  
- Government plans 
organized 
evacuation 




3.4. Volunteering and community cooperation 
In both countries the level of volunteering and cooperation increased with each time period (Table 5). 
Volunteerism refers to the activities of people who work outside of formal emergency and disaster 
management arrangements to help others who are at risk or are affected by emergencies and disasters 
[92]. In Germany, however, volunteers are highly organized through the Bundesanstalt Technisches 
Hilfswerk [93] and there are over a million volunteer fire fighters and many relief organizations and 
local NGOs. In France, volunteering, although almost as important in terms of people involved as a 
percentage of the workforce, is less professionally organized and more ad hoc than in Germany [94, 
95]. 
The most active group in the game, in terms of volunteering, were those playing the role of students. 
This phenomenon is similarly evident for other disasters in university cities and a common feature of 
altruistic behaviour in disaster situations [96]. For example, during the 2013 flood in Germany, Passau 
was one of the most badly affected cities with 13 m of flood followed by 4 days of blackout in some 
parts of city. The first author of this paper interviewed 30 flood victims about the situation after flood 
and all respondents emphasized the positive role of university students in helping and supporting the 
flood victims for a full week. Interestingly, in the blackout scenario exercise, the same pattern emerged. 
Participants playing students mentioned they would help others, including strangers, from 8 h until the 
end of the blackout.  
Participants playing the role of parents imagined helping and cooperating only with people they knew 
i.e. friends and neighbors. In general, neighbors were considered to be the primary and most reliable 
source of information and support. Some old people suggested community cooperation would happen 
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naturally, and that people would come together spontaneously with community leaders to plan and 
organize, for example to share food and support each other. Especially noteworthy is the spontaneous 
self-organization of family members and neighbors, which seem to build an autarkic “small-tie-society” 
on their own. 
4. Discussion 
In Europe, a blackout of 72 h is a very rare event. This makes studying and understanding an 
unprecedented crisis a challenge. Nevertheless, authorities and governments need to be prepared for 
such an event since the possibility of a blackout due to a cyber-attack, human error, or natural disaster 
is increasing and will eventually have huge negative effects on society. Authorities need to have an idea 
about people’s potential reactions, their perceptions of the situation and their expectations of the 
authorities. 
The participants in the workshops were a ‘convenience’ sample and none of the participants had 
experienced a long lasting blackout. The reported findings are the outcome of role-playing an imaginary 
situation by groups of young adults, mainly University Masters students, rather than the actual emotions 
and reactions of children, families and elderly people in a real blackout. Subjecting a real community 
to an actual 72 blackout to see what might happen would clearly have been unrealistic. This raises 
important questions of validity and reliability. The key questions are how valid and credible is the 
imagined communication blackout and how valid and reliable are the findings and specifically, what 
confidence can we have that the imagined behaviour approximates reality? 
In relation to the first question, an extended outage would impose severe strains on government and 
society as a whole [97,98]. Given our reliance on electricity to power our communications networks it 
is not unreasonable to assume that national and local government might have difficulty in informing 
citizens a few hours into the outage [99]. Government business would also be paralysed to an extent. It 
is possible to imagine a situation in which the authorities did not want to reveal the cause of the blackout 
for security reasons [100]. In this context scenario planning is a useful technique to anticipate events, 
which are mainly driven by people’s behaviour and beliefs. Using scenario planning in the way 
described in this paper is one of the ways one can begin to study, albeit hypothetically, people’s 
reactions and behaviour in order gauge societal resilience in such a disaster. Scenarios are descriptions 
of possible events that may occur in the future [101] and are a tool for exploring how new emerging 
risks could result in loss [102]. Gordon [103] in his review of futures research suggests that mark of 
excellence in a scenario is its internal self-consistency. 
In relation to the second question, all the students were adults; at least half of them were Masters 
students, some with families, and the rest were third-year undergraduates. They adopted a very mature 
and engaged attitude to their roles and their imagined reactions and opinions are relevant and useful. 
One of most interesting aspects of the scenario was seeing students totally immersed in their 
hypothetical roles and imaginary situation. All the students took the game and their roles seriously and 
none dropped out. Each developed their own individual story, which together provide a fairly coherent 
picture of how a community hit by a major blackout might react. Albeit fictitious, the evolution of 
emotions, perceptions and motivations together with the provided explanations were highly plausible. 
Nevertheless, the scenario gave rise to important insights both in terms of material welfare and, more 
importantly, individual mental wellbeing and societal preparedness. Previous research suggests that 
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even when people are aware of a natural or technological threat, this awareness does not necessarily 
translate into action [104]. 
Role-playing is a common technique used in studies of behaviour in which researchers assign research 
participants to particular roles and instruct those participants to act as if a set of conditions were true 
[105]. The technique capitalizes on people’s ability to engage in creative play, to implement certain 
rules of thought, feeling, and behaviour under certain assumed conditions. That students might be 
effective at playing arbitrarily assigned roles is bolstered by Goffman’s [106] ideas about all social 
behaviour being a form of dramatic performance. There is a considerable body of literature about using 
students as research subjects [107,108]. Two reasons are given for concern about using students: 
validity and generalisability and ethical issues relating to unfair coercion of students as subjects. 
Convenience was the underlying reason for using students as research subjects in this scenario exercises 
but the authors do not believe that there were any significant ethical issues as their presence was entirely 
voluntary and the research did not harm the people taking part nor intrude on their privacy nor threaten 
their beliefs [109]. Hanel and Vione [110] address the question of how far students can be representative 
of the general population. Using datasets of psychological variables the authors found that across 59 
countries students are as heterogeneous as the general population and that their attitudes are as varied. 
Peterson and Merunka [111] could find no convincing empirical evidence of the negative consequences 
of using students for research or of the benefits, other than cost and convenience. Besides psychology, 
experimental economic research is one of the disciplines that predominantly use students as test 
subjects. The representativeness of student participants is also a regular point of criticism here, 
especially in contexts in which job-specific decisions are involved (e.g. farmers, investors). Again, 
comparisons show surprisingly little difference between student participants and professional 
representatives [112,113]. However, it would be interesting to repeat the exercise with carefully 
constituted focus groups of citizens and also possibly to extend the approach to places that experience 
frequent blackouts where people have evolved strategies to deal with the inconvenience. 
Although the participants had the maximum of freedom to make their decisions it is interesting that the 
pattern of behaviour followed a rather stable sequence. During the first 8 h waiting for information is 
the predominant reaction and most participants do not immediately interrupt their daily routine. These 
8 h can be seen as a temporal buffer, which provides authorities the chance to fix the problem without 
drastic effects on an urban working day. However, if authorities cannot fix the problem and do not 
communicate with the population then people start taking matters into their own hands. In particular, 
the assumed lack of public communication was crucial. Although the situation was fictitious and the 
participants perceived the game as an entertaining role play most participants were genuinely upset to 
the government’s failure to communicate. They expected information about the root cause of the 
problem and about the probable duration of the blackout. The predominant reaction of the participants, 
in particular of those in the role of parents who need to make the decision for the family, was 
understandable. They got together with neighbors and started to self-organize the provision of the 
necessities such as food, water, security, and medical support for the elderly and calming distraction for 
the children. At this point of time, they clearly stated that it was no longer a question of complying with 
the law and as soon as you believe you are left to yourself, you no longer feel obliged to obey the law. 
This finding has important implications for the communication policies of the public authorities in such 
a situation [114]. Although disaster victims may be very concerned and frightened and panic flight 
behaviour can occur, it is quite rare and people usually behave rationally in weighing alternative course 
of action [115]. This behaviour was noted in the students, who at a rather late stage, began to objectively 
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and dispassionately discuss their options and only began to self-evacuate as a last resort. This behaviour 
was restricted to the students playing the role single young adults and only in organized groups. They 
were quite realistic about the difficulties they would face if many people make this decision at the same 
time in a situation where they could no longer rely upon critical infrastructure. 
It is interesting to speculate in what sense the psychological impact of an extended blackout might be 
different to that of other disasters, such as storm and flood? And would Europeans who had never 
previously experienced an extended blackout react differently to people living in countries like Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Iraq and Nigeria where blackouts are a common occurrence. Coping with crises is easier 
when you have the capacity to anticipate and cope with the resulting stress of an emergency such as a 
major power outage [116]. A study of electricity outages in Finland suggests two contrasting 
behavioural responses: on the one hand, the uncertainty imposed by a blackout can render people 
helpless while on the other uncertainty can be seen as a part of everyday life [117]. However, the study 
did not distinguish between different lengths of outage or whether information about its cause and 
duration was available or not. 
The findings of what mature university students imagined would happen revealed that over the 4 time 
periods the students’ emotional reactions went from frustration, frustration that their smart phones ran 
out of power or they couldn’t get a signal, to worry about family, to anger with the authorities and 
finally to genuine life-threatening fear. This escalating emotional response was not only a product of 
inconvenience but also, and perhaps to a greater extent, due to the uncertainty and lack of information. 
What caused participants the most distress was uncertainty about how long the outage would last and a 
lack of information about the cause of the outage, how extensive it was and what was being done to fix 
it. Not knowing why the blackout was happening or how long it would last was the worst aspect of the 
experience for most of the workshop participants. This is quite different to other types of natural and 
man-made disasters, such as earthquakes, which happen suddenly and leave a devastating effect, or 
bush fires where the cause is known and understood. They can also see what firefighters are doing to 
help. This is not to suggest of course that the severity of these disasters is comparable in terms of loss 
and damage, but the aspects of uncertainty and lack of information are important considerations in 
European blackouts. 
One way of assessing the reliability of these findings is by comparing them with the evidence reported 
in the literature. As reported earlier, after the New York blackout in 1965 people were initially annoyed 
and angry but later strangers were unusually helpful and friendly to each other [42]. And after the 
Ontario blackout in 2003 Murphy [44] reported that families had a variety of familial and social 
networks in their local area to call on for support. This is very similar to the behaviour imagined by 
students in the scenario exercises. The impacts of the Ontario blackout reported by Anderson et al. [46] 
are also very similar to the cascading events generated by the scenario exercises. In the role play game 
various students said they would break into supermarkets to steal water and food. Although looting is 
rare in disasters it did occur during the New York blackout in 1977 [21]. A telephone survey of 2,000 
German households [118] by Behrens GmbH Market Research in 2012 reported that 10% of 
respondents had experienced a long-lasting power failure. They found that in general people were 
largely unprepared for a major blackout; more than half the respondents has no information about power 
failures or felt a need to take precautionary measures. Perhaps, unsurprisingly, the more rural the 
respondents home area, the more self-sufficient they were in terms of food and water. The workshops 
reported here were conducted with people living in highly urbanized Karlsruhe and Paris and the 
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availability drinking water and food were seen as serious immediate issues. The survey also found that 
there was no statistical effect on the level of preparation of age, household size, income, education or 
occupation. However, having a family member with health or disability issues did mean families had 
taken precautions to maintain life support systems and medical supplies.  
5. Conclusion 
Blackouts can cause major disruption and incur huge costs but their rarity poses particular problems for 
research. The study reported here used students as research subjects in France and Germany to role-
play the scenario of a 3-day blackout. 
To return to the conceptual framework and the questions posed earlier. The students exhibited a clear 
understanding of how events might cascade after a major blackout and produce a chain of consequences, 
for example they imagined increased traffic jams and accidents as the result of traffic light failure, which 
expected would escalate if people could not contact the police because of mobile network or battery 
failure, they also imagined that hospitals might be overwhelmed because of an increase in accidents, 
such as setting fire to their home at night by dropping a candle or cooking on an open fire. How do 
people’s feelings change over the 72-h scenario? Are their signs of emergent groupings, coping 
strategies and adaptive behaviour? How might communication failure impact on individual and 
communities?  
The findings show that people’s emotions and perceptions change significantly over the 3 days from 
initial calm and an expectation that the blackout would be of short duration, through anger and 
frustration to desperation and genuine fear. A good proportion of the participants had, by the third period 
at 24 h duration, given up waiting for help from the authorities and were being to organize and look for 
solutions in terms of volunteering, cooperating with others, finding food and water and contemplating 
or initiating evacuation. Our findings suggest that people would move from frustration that their smart 
phones lost power or signal, through anger that the authorities were doing nothing to genuine anxiety 
and, in some cases, a fear for safety and life-support. 
A study of water supply in Kathmandu, Nepal after the 2015 Gorkha earthquake showed that the chronic 
stressors, such as supply-demand disparity, could improve the adaptive capacity of both agencies and 
the public to deal with disruptions in infrastructure [119]. In the blackout scenarios there were clear 
signs of emergent groups, coping strategies and adaptive behaviour, for example, people organizing 
into groups to take care of elderly, disabled and children, while other groups searched for food and 
information. 
The results suggest that the main cause of the escalation in emotional response was not so much the 
inconvenience caused by the energy blackout, but the much more serious effects of the communication 
blackout. Not knowing what was happening or how long it would last caused the main distress. This 
suggests that the authorities need contingency plans not only to keep critical services supplied with 
power, but also how to communicate with citizens in a major extended power outage. To assist in 
preparing for infrequent crises such as major blackouts many observers have advocated that 
communities and governments engage in pre-disaster planning and preparation [120] and the more 
issues can be thought through in advance, including by means of scenarios, the greater will be the quality 
of crisis decision-making and management [121]. 
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Although there are validity issues in using students as research subjects in role-play scenarios the 
findings from this research are plausible and have an inherent consistency and are indicative of how 
people would react in a real event that can inform policy. In particular authorities need to anticipate the 
anxiety occasioned by the information vacuum that would necessarily result from a major blackout. 
Two main messages are that people want to know what’s happening, even if the news is bad, and 
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Article 2: Risk behaviour and people’s attitude towards public 
authorities – A survey of 2007 UK and 2013 German floods 
Abstract 
This paper reports on people’s preparedness, perception and behaviour of flood risk as well as their 
trust and attitude towards public authorities in the flood context. Two areas were studied: Catcliffe, 
situated near Sheffield in the United Kingdom, which was severely flooded in 2007, and Passau in 
Bavaria, Germany, which was hit by an extreme flood in 2013. We conducted a survey in both study 
areas and collected data on risk perception, people’s perceptions of their own preparedness, their use of 
information, trust in the authorities and evacuation behaviour. We found that although there were few 
significant differences between the two case studies, risk perception and risk preparedness was 
significantly higher in Catcliffe than in Passau and during the flood emergency people in Catcliffe see 
themselves acting more self-protectively (78%) than in Passau (42%). In both places, people who had 
direct experience of floods had a higher level of risk perception and preparedness compared to those 
with no previous experience. In both Catcliffe and Passau, trust in government was fairly low. 
Nevertheless, when people were asked the hypothetical question how they would react to a public 
evacuation order, almost 70% in Catcliffe and 80% of respondents in Passau would take immediate 
action to evacuate. Interestingly, the answer was similar when we asked the conflicting question 
whether the respondents would follow a public evacuation order although their family recommended 
not doing so. 
1. Introduction 
In terms of frequency and amount of damage, floods and flood disasters are currently among the greatest 
global risks. As a result of climate change, the number of flood catastrophes is increasing. Over the last 
20 years, more than 120,000 people lost their lives in severe floods worldwide and also the economic 
damage nearly reached US-$ 600 bn. over the same period showing an upward trend [1,2]. As a 
consequence, national and international efforts to improve flood precautions and to react quickly in the 
event of a catastrophe have been stepped up considerably in the last 10–15 years in research, insurance 
and practical civil protection. In this context, improved flood protection of private households is seen 
as among the most important factors of flood resilience. People’s preparation for flood as well as 
people’s reaction to an impending flood disaster are thus essential factors to reducing flood risks. 
However, to positively influence the risk behaviour of the population in their own interest, e.g. through 
risk communication or concrete suggestions of protective measures, a thorough understanding of the 
complex link between risk perception on the one hand and risk prevention on the other hand is 
necessary. Among other mediating variables, the trust of the population in the state authorities is a 
determining factor. 
This empirical study reports risk attitudes, trust in government as well as the actual and hypothetical 
reactions of people in two communities affected by floods (river flooding), following events in the 
United Kingdom in 2007 and in Germany in 2013. The respondents live in two communities that were 
severely flooded: Catcliffe, a suburb of 2100 people (2011), between Sheffield and Rotherham in South 
Yorkshire, and the city of Passau, a town of 50,000 people (2011) near the Austrian border in Bavaria. 
Both places have been flooded numerous times in the past. Prior to 2007, Catcliffe was flooded in 1973, 
1991, 1998, whilst Passau had suffered nine major floods prior to 2013 since records began in the 16th 
Century. Most recently, Catcliffe, where homes are very close to the River Rother, was flooded in 2000 
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and 2007, whilst Passau, at the confluence of the rivers Inn, Ilz and Danube, was flooded in 2002 and 
2013. The two events were comparable in terms of impacts, levels of preparedness and government 
response and show similar patterns of recovery [3]. In both places, face-to-face surveys were conducted 
with local residents most of which were experienced with flooding. All the respondents were living 
and/or working in flood prone areas and, no matter if they had been personally flooded or not, were 
aware of flood risk. 
The focus of the study is twofold: The first part focusses on flood risk perception and its impact on 
flood preparedness. In this part we want to find out whether the usually established connection between 
flood risk perception and flood risk precaution is also confirmed in our case study regions. For of flood 
precautions we choose a formulation that avoids the problem of a confounding effect from already 
adopted mitigation measures [4]. The second part looks at the respondents’ attitude towards government 
agencies and its effect on preparation and evacuation behaviour. Public recommendations may refer to 
long-term, preparatory measures (e.g. construction of flood protection walls) or to very short-term, 
reactive measures, such as a call for immediate evacuation. Government advice directed at the 
population will only fall on fertile grounds if there is a sufficiently high level of acceptance among the 
population. Such advice are more likely to be ignored if citizens either don’t trust the state authorities 
or if they generally have a more critical attitude towards the state or public institutions, and hence show 
an expressed preference for independence and self-determination. Since we are using the case studies 
to examine trust and risk prevention in two different countries, a country-comparison of the effects of 
“trust in government” is also instructive. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we provide an overview on the state of 
the art and establish our research hypotheses. Section 3 provides a more detailed description of the two 
case study regions, of the respective flood events in terms of people affected and economic damage and 
of the applied data collection procedure. Section 4 presents the results of the study, which are discussed 
in section 5. 
2. Theoretical background: state of the art and research questions 
2.1. Risk perception and flood preparedness 
Research on risk perception began in the 1940s, with White [5] seminal contribution about how people’s 
past experience influences their behaviour under threat of flooding. Risk perception can be defined as 
a “perception of the likelihood and consequence of a future adverse event” [6] and is seen as an essential 
precursor of mitigation behaviour [7]. Perceptions of risk are a key component in vulnerability 
assessments, for example in the hazards-of-place model [8,9]. 
Preparedness is defined as the knowledge, capabilities and actions of governments, organisations, 
community groups, and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts 
of hazard events [10]. Grothmann and Reusswig [11] suggested that preparedness and preventative 
actions by residents could reduce flood damage by 80%. 
The most influential theoretical foundations, which establish a link between risk perception and risk 
mitigation were the psychometric paradigm and the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT). According 
to the psychometric paradigm advanced by Slovic [12] risk perception is a subjective judgment based 
on several qualitative characteristics including severity of the threat, controllability and personal impact.  
Similarly, PMT constitutes the theoretical basis for the relationship between risk perception and risk 
mitigation. Originally developed to understand how people cope with fear and threats, PMT views 
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behaviour as motivated by perception of the severity of the threat, the probability of its occurrence, the 
effectiveness of an action, and the person’s ability to implement this action [13]. Building upon this 
theoretical foundation, most of the in-depth, systematic research into the relationship between 
perception and preparedness has taken place over the last 20 years [14–17]. The general findings show 
that attitudes to risk and the degree of preparedness vary with topographical and geographical location 
and that each disastrous flood is different in timing and scale. 
2.1.1. Flood risk perception 
In the literature, there is consensus that flood risk perception is principally influenced by people’s 
experiences and demographic factors, followed by the risk attitudes of civil society and the actions of 
public institutions [18]. Lechowska [19] suggests that flood risk perception is determined by 
interrelations between awareness, worry and preparedness and that empirical studies unambiguously 
indicate that knowledge and personal experience are important factors. 
In our study, we therefore assume a strong link between prior flood experience, socio-demographic 
variables and risk perception (Fig. 1). In our first hypothesis (H1a), we assume that people with 
experience of flooding show a lower flood risk perception [4,11,20–22]. By the lower-letter “a” we 
indicate the effect of a variable on flood risk perception and by a lower-letter “b” we indicate the effect 
on flood risk preparation. For the item “Prior flood experience” we asked the question “Do you have 
personal experience with the following hazards?” and for risk perception we asked the question “What 
level of risk do you feel you are in from the following hazards?“. For both questions, respondents had 
to rate their answer using a five-point likert scale. 
There is also evidence from various studies that risk perception amongst people who have experienced 
a flood declines over time. It has been estimated that flood awareness diminishes significantly with a 
distance of at least 7 years after a flood event [4]; International Commission for the Protection of the 
Rhine [23]. In Catcliffe, the survey was conducted nearly 12 years after the flood event and in Passau 
6 years after the flood. Although we can’t control for all aspects in which the two cases differ (except 
the similarity of the events in terms of scope and damage), we expect a higher risk perception in Passau 
because it was a more recent event (H2), and expected higher risk perception to increase the 
preparedness level (H3) which is explained in more detailed later.  
Regarding sociodemographic variables and individual parameters we asked for age, gender and 
elicitated risk preference by the established risk-question “In general, are you a person who takes risk 
or do you try to avoid risks?“. We assumed that older people (H4a), women (H5a) and people with 
higher risk aversion (H6a) should state a higher risk perception [19,24]. 
2.1.2. Flood risk preparation 
Risk perception in the sense of being aware of risk is a necessary but by no means sufficient condition 
for people to actively prepare against risk. Other “activating factors” come into play as stated by PMT 
[4,18]. Similarly, Grothmann and Reusswig [11] built on this idea, arguing that decisions to take 
precautions, for example installing water barriers, are influenced by appraisals of the threat level, ability 
to cope, personal experience and administrative measures and that these perceptions interact in various 
ways. In other words, those activating factors don’t apply homogeneously to all people in the same 
manner. To answer the question of why some people take precautionary action while others do not 
Grothmann and Reusswig [11] set up a regression model based on PMT that related private flood 
precautions to previous flood experience, risk of future floods, reliability of public flood protection, the 
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efficacy and costs of self-protective behaviour and the perceived ability to take action. The validity of 
the model was tested by a telephone survey of residents in flood prone homes in Cologne. Results 
confirm the explanatory power of the model and the authors conclude that to motivate residents in flood-
prone areas to take action it is essential to communicate the effectiveness and cost of private 
precautionary measures. Since people who haven’t previously been affected by a flood show the least 
self-protection, they should be targeted by risk communication. Bradford et al. [25] also identify those 
who have not personally experienced floods as being in most need of information and suggest that since 
many people with no direct flood experience live in areas at risk, consideration must be given to how 
to raise their perception of risk in the absence of experiential learning. 
 
Figure 1 Influence factors and effect chain for people’s response on flood risk 
Several studies have, however, found only a weak correlation between personal flood experience and 
performance of precautionary measures [11,26–28]. Other studies even found no significant 
relationship [29]. Reporting on the results of sociological research in four communities exposed to flood 
risk in the Eastern Italian Alps, Scolobig et al. [30] found no statistically significant relationship 
between risk awareness and preparedness. Kienzler et al. [31] conducted interviews with German 
households that had suffered property damage from floods in 2005, 2006, 2010 or 2011 and found that 
previous flood experience did not necessarily result in precautionary measures. Overall flood-proofing 
and retrofitting measures were carried out by less than 15% of respondents and no constant 
improvement of private precaution could be identified over the course of the four events. Empirical 
studies from around the world suggest a number of factors may be important in influencing adaptive 
behaviour. In Lechowska [19]; “worry” is seen as necessary to move from awareness to action. The 
argument runs that individuals can be aware of flood risk but unless they are afraid, they will not take 
any action to mitigate the risk. Consequently, a higher level of worry is likely to result in a higher level 
of preparedness [15]. In contrast, Bradford et al. [25] found that worry does not play a major role in the 
relationship between awareness and preparedness. A study in Nagoya, Japan, found that preparedness 
for floods is determined by a complex relationship of socioeconomic factors including home ownership, 
fear of flooding and the amount of damage from previous floods rather than the individual’s previous 
experience [32]. Based on findings from a survey of risk perception in Germany with nearly 2000 
respondents, Gerhold et al. [33] identified 4 kinds of response: self-confident all-rounders (31%), unsure 
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non-prepared (27%), unconcerned optimists (24%) and risk-oriented independents (18%). Women and 
minority groups generally perceive themselves to be at greater risk than men and majority groups [34]. 
Religious belief, and fatalism especially, has been found to weaken preparedness [35–37]. It is not that 
women and minorities always act differently from men, but rather that they do in particular situations 
and what makes perceptions of hazard subject to race and gender effects are differences in financial 
resources, home ownership, car ownership etc [38]. In summary, implementation costs and 
effectiveness are the most important activating factors for reactive measures, but there are also many 
psychological effects at work. With regard to the latter, the findings are less clear. 
In our study, we did not ask the participants to name the measures they had implemented or which they 
plan to implement, but how well they felt prepared in the face of a flood: “How well are you and your 
family prepared for the following hazards?” (on a five-point likert scale, ranging from “not prepared at 
all” to “very well prepared”). We did not ask people what precautionary measures they had taken and 
relied on them using their own judgement to assess how well prepared they were. 
It follows from this that altogether four constellations of risk perception and risk preparation can be 
distinguished. In the first, both, perceived risk and perceived preparation, are low: People don’t perceive 
the risk as salient, which justifies low levels of preparation. In the second, the state of the perceived risk 
and perceived preparedness is high: People perceive the risk as a potential threat and are optimally 
adapted accordingly due to a good preparation. Note, that psychological factors, such as cognitive 
dissonance [39,40] can also cause such a response: If people perceive a threat but have to admit that 
they are not well prepared this can evoke a negative feeling of guilt because one did not live up to one’s 
own responsibility. If people perceive a high risk but they feel that there is not much what they can do 
about it on their own, the third constellation of high perception combined with low preparedness is also 
plausible. If the number of respondents in this category is high, public authorities not only bear (even) 
more responsibility for protection of the public, they also have the largest opportunity to improve the 
preparedness of the population through risk communication and recommending precautionary 
measures. Fourthly, low risk perception but good preparation corresponds to the seemingly paradoxical 
case of a negative correlation between risk perception and risk mitigation as described by Bubeck et al. 
[4]. This effect occurs when the measures (implied by the question) relate to the past and have already 
been taken and are effective, which in turn endogenously reduces the perceived risk “now”. Note that 
this effect should not be observed in our study because we ask for the perception of risk and 
preparedness at one point in time.  
Since a positive correlation between perception and preparation was found in several studies, we also 
assume a positive correlation between the two variables (H3). However, we also expect a significant 
proportion of the first constellation and interpret a high proportion of “high perception – low 
preparation” as a window of opportunity and a responsibility for public authorities to communicate and 
act. In addition, we have a second look at sociodemographic variables, risk preference and risk 
experience and compare the link to preparation with the results from the perception-analysis (lower-
case “b”-Hypotheses: H1b, H4b, H5b, andH6b). 
2.2. Attitude towards government and reaction to government advice 
As government and public authorities, such as first-response agencies, have a pivotal role in crisis 
management, the public’s attitude towards these institutions has an enormous influence on the 
effectiveness of state crisis management. The more positive the public’s attitude towards government 
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decision-makers, the effectiveness of their communication with the citizens will increase with respect 
to crisis preparation and reaction in at least two ways: 
• Higher effectiveness of government advice for flood risk communication and recommendation 
of preparedness-measures (risk and crisis preparation) 
• Higher effectiveness of government evacuation order (risk and crisis reaction) 
Two major factors influencing this “attitude” are perceived responsibility and trust. Trust in government 
is especially important in crisis situations such as floods and in the aftermath of major disasters. Lack 
of trust may hamper emergency response and recovery causing harm and damaging government’s 
capacity to act [41]. A lack of trust also makes risk communication more difficult. In an extensive 
survey of 11 ‘at flood risk’ locations in the four European countries Finland, Ireland, Italy and Scotland, 
O’Sullivan et al. [42] found low levels of understanding of flood risk and low levels of self-assessed 
preparedness amongst the general public. Hence trust is critical to the effectiveness of any policy for 
risk communication and public engagement [43]. Trust in government is influenced by demographic 
factors, such as age, education, and occupation but the most influential factor for trust in government is 
general satisfaction with democracy [44]. Across Europe, trust in political institutions has dropped since 
2009 and, in general, citizens that have benefited less from European integration show lower levels of 
trust in the government [45].  
The factor “perceived responsibility” refers to the values citizens hold in terms of their attitude towards 
individualism versus state interventionism [46]. The central question here is whether an individual 
believes that the state is responsible for certain tasks or not. To a certain extent, this determines the 
relevance of “trust in government”. If an individual is convinced that a particular task does not belong 
or should not belong to the domain of responsibility of the state, trust is of less importance. However, 
both variables can be positively correlated if a low trust level is the reason for taking more self-
responsibility. 
In our study we ask about trust in government, in family and in fellow citizens (“How much do you 
trust the following people or groups in the country you are living?“) and where respondents see 
responsibility for crisis management (“What are your views about flood preparation – People should 
take more responsibility for themselves or government should take more responsibility?“). While both 
questions are taken from the classic World Values Survey (WVS)-catalogue, the responsibility question 
has been slightly adapted to the context of crisis management. We assume that people who see the 
responsibility rather in the realm of the citizens (own responsibility) than in the realm of government 
(government responsibility) should see themselves as better prepared for flood (H8). With H7 we 
suggest that respondents with flood experience think individuals are responsible for flood protection 
rather than government.  
Since the two case studies refer to different countries, it is interesting to compare the answers to the 
question of responsibility (H9) as well as the levels of trust in government (H10). In the UK, an 
economically liberal country where state influence has traditionally been viewed critically [47], 
responsibility should be that of the citizen. For example, in the 5th wave of the World Values Survey, 
sampled between 2005 and 2009, people were asked whether government or the people should take 
more responsibility for their lives. The resulting self-reliance-index was higher in UK (5.93) than in 
Germany (4.5). The lower level of government regulation in the UK than in Germany is also likely to 
have an impact in this area. We expect therefore that more respondents would opt for self-reliance rather 
than government responsibility in the UK than in Germany. An indication of this is that compensation 
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for flood damage was paid by private insurance companies in the Catcliffe region, whereas state 
financial support was paid in Passau. However, there are also reasons that speak against the hypothesis 
of a lower level of trust in government by Catcliffe citizens (although not necessarily for a higher level 
of trust than in Passau). A critical attitude towards regulation might not transfer to crisis management 
because market regulation is different from state emergency aid. Second, even if the British government 
does not provide financial compensation for flood damage (or at least much less than in Germany), it is 
noticeably involved in risk communication. For example, in the UK, there have been regular round table 
dialogues between experts and members of the public on how flood risk agencies could communicate 
more effectively with the general public [48]. 
Apart from the overall attitude of people towards the government we were interested in how this attitude 
affects people’s willingness to evacuate in the case of a hypothetic flood. And we wanted to know how 
trust in government and friends and relatives would influence (hypothetical) evacuation behaviour 
during a disaster (H11–H13). Community engagement and sense of belonging has been found to 
positively affect behaviour and people adjust their behaviour when they see others in their community, 
especially informal community leaders, adopting mitigation strategies [49]. Ties to family and friends 
should therefore play an influential role with respect to the evacuation decision. Strengthening local 
preparedness is viewed as an essential element in effective response to flood risk and social networks 
have been identified as contributing significantly to resilience by fostering individual and community 
capacity to deal with emergency situations [50]. Recent research on flood risk perception highlighted 
the importance of understanding and trust in the efficacy of individual protective actions and collective 
intervention measures [18].  
Finally look at the effect of demographic (age, gender) and risk aversion variables on hypothetical 
evacuation behaviour (H14–H16). Altogether, 17 hypotheses were derived from the literature review 
reported in the preceding section. In the first part, hypotheses 1 to 6 focus on flood risk perception and 
perceived flood preparedness, and in part 2 hypotheses 7 to 17 focus on people’s attitude towards 




Table 1 Hypotheses generated from literature review 
Hypothesis Reference 
PART 1 Perception and flood preparedness 
H1a Perception of flood risk is higher amongst people with experience 
of flooding 
Barnett & Breakwell [20]; Kellens et al. [21]; Grothmann & 
Reusswig [11]; Terpstra [22]; Bubeck et al. [4]; Fuchs et al. 
[51] 
H1b People with flood experience see themselves better prepared for 
floods 
White [5]; Kuhlicke [52]; Thieken et al. [53]; Kreibich et al. 
[28]; Birkholz et al. [18]; Kienzler et al. [31]; Kreibich et 
al.[54]; Lechowska [19] 
H2 Perception of flood risk is higher in Passau-Germany than 
Catcliffe-UK because the flood was more recent. 
Bhattacharya-Mis & Lamond [55] 
H3 People with higher risk perception see themselves better prepared 
for flood 
Brown & Damery [17]; Pitt [16]; Raaijmakers [15]; Botzen 
et al. [14]; Bubeck [4]; Bradford [25] 
H4a Perception of flood risk is higher among older people than among 
younger people 
Lechowska [19]; Maidl & Buchecker [24] 
H4b Older people see themselves better prepared for flood than 
younger 
Lechowska [19]; Dzialek et al. [56]; Maidl & Buchecker 
[24]; Gerhold et al. [33] 
H5a Perception of flood risk is higher among women than among men 
Bustillos Ardaya et al. [7]; Lechowska [19]; Maidl and 
Buchecker [24] 
H5b Women see themselves better prepared for flood than men 
Bustillos Ardaya et al. [7]; Lechowska [19]; Maidl and 
Buchecker [24] 
H6a Perception of flood risk is higher among people with high risk 
aversion than among people with low risk aversion 
Haer et al. [57] ; Botzen & van den Bergh [58] 
H6b Risk averse people see themselves better prepared for flood Maidl & Buchecker [24] 
PART 2 Attitude toward government and reaction to government advice 
H7 Flood experienced people see themselves more responsible for 
preparedness 
Slovic et al. [59] ; Bubeck [4]; Mileti & Fitzpatrick [49] 
H8 People who see citizen more responsible for preparedness should 
also see themselves better prepared 
Based on authors best knowledge this hypothesis is not 
mentioned in published articles 
H9 Respondents in UK see citizens instead of government more 
responsible for flood preparedness compared to Germany respondents 
Based on authors best knowledge this hypothesis is not 
mentioned in published articles 
H10 Trust in government is higher among German respondents 
compared to UK respondents 
Based on authors best knowledge this hypothesis is not 
mentioned in published articles 
H11 People who see citizen more responsible for preparedness are less 
likely to follow government evacuation order 
Based on authors best knowledge this hypothesis is not 
mentioned in published articles 
H12 People with low trust in government are less likely to follow 
government order to evacuate 
Gerhold et al. [33]; OECD [41] 
H13 People with low trust in government chose to listen to family 
rather the government 
West and Orr, [38]; Levac et al. [50] 
H14 Older people are more likely to evacuate immediately than 
younger ones 
Bateman & Edwards [60]; Resnick [61]; Dash & Gladwin 
[62] 
H15 Women are more likely to evacuate immediately than men 
Bateman & Edwards [60]; Whitehead et al. [63]; Karanci & 
Aksit [34] 
H16 Risk averse people are more likely to evacuate immediately 
Based on authors best knowledge this hypothesis is not 
mentioned in published articles 




3. Floods in UK 2007 and Germany 2013 
Fig. 2 shows the extent of flooding in both countries during the referent events, and Tables 2 and 3 
show how the two floods were similar in relative extent and impact. In terms of the economic loss and 
the number of people displaced the German floods were approximately twice as severe [66,69]. Private 
insurers compensated the majority of victims in the UK, whereas in Germany where insurance 




Figure 2 Flooded areas UK 2007 and Germany 2013 
3.1. UK floods 2007 
In summer 2007, much of the UK was hit by destructive storms and average rainfall around the country 
reached more than doubled [71,72]. Apart from the economic cost, which was USD 3.3–4.9 billion [67], 
13 people died and hundreds had to be rescued in different cities and around 48,500 homes were 
flooded.  
Catcliffe, our UK study area, is a village suburb northeast of Sheffield. During the night of 25 June, the 
River Rother overtopped its banks, flooding around 100 homes in the lower parts of Catcliffe (about 
10% of homes in Catcliffe). Flood depths were so high that bungalows were almost completely 
submerged by the flood-water [73], and after cracks appeared in the dam at Ulley reservoir more than 
700 residents had to be evacuated [74]. In Sheffield the River Don burst its banks, flooding properties, 
including many commercial and industrial units [73]. The drainage systems could not cope, in part 
because of inadequate maintenance, and because flood defences were overtopped by the extreme river 
heights [75]. In Hull and East Riding 1 in 5 homes were flooded [72] and electricity and water supplies 
were affected for more than a fortnight [68]. In Yorkshire, power outages affected the supply to 130, 
000 people, including residents in Catcliffe. A survey of 2265 people in South Yorkshire showed a 
significantly high number of mental health issues among individuals who reported flood water in the 
home [76]. The evidence clearly shows that the UK was insufficiently prepared in terms awareness and 
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preparedness [16]. This degree of flood risk persists and it is estimated that 5.5 million homes are in 
flood prone areas in the UK [77]. 
3.2. German floods 2013 
In Germany, in May 2013, rainfall reached to three times the monthly average and most major 
catchments experienced flooding. Furthermore, in 16 federal states disaster alerts were declared 
between May and June [70]. The floods resulted in 14 fatalities, 600,000 people affected, 80,630 
evacuated in 8 states, and an economic loss of USD 6.7–9.1 billion. Passau, where this study was 
conducted, is located at the confluence of the three rivers, Danube, Inn and Ilz, experienced large scale 
inundations [78,79]. Germany had recent previous experience of major flooding. Floods in 2002 caused 
20 fatalities [80]. Although structural defences improved after this flood and most places faced less 
damage in 2013, in some areas, including Passau, the risk reduction measures and flood defences proved 
either ineffective or the flooding was more severe than in 2002 [3]. Three million people in Germany 
live in areas that are considered flood prone, life threatening and with high potential for economic 
damage [69,70,81]. The location, frequency and intensity of storms has shown considerable variability 
across Europe over the past century, however, most studies agree that the risk of severe storms will 
increase for northern and central Europe over this century in response to forecast global climate change 
[82,83]. 
3.3. Comparison 
Table 2 compares the UK 2007 and German 2013 floods and shows that the scale of the floods was 
comparable, with the German floods perhaps twice as severe in terms of people displaced and economic 
loss. In terms of response, the main difference was that Government aid in Germany was considerably 
higher than in the UK.  
Table 2 Comparison of the impact of flooding in UK and Germany [3]  
 UK 2007 Germany 2013 
Extent 6 out of 9 Regions 8 out of 16 States 
Fatalities 13 14 
People Displaced 38,000 80,000 
GDP, PPP (event year) USD 2.2 tn USD 3.6 tn 
Economic Loss USD 3.3 – 4.9 bn USD 6.7  9.1 bn 
Insurance Loss USD 2.6 bn USD 1.8 bn 
Average cost per house USD 32,000 USD 56,000 
Insurance Households 75% 32% 
Government Aid USD 180 mn USD 8.9 bn 
Flood risk homes 2018 5.5 mn 3 mn 
 
4. Case study area and methodology 
The survey was conducted in Catcliffe, UK and Passau, Germany. As mentioned earlier, both places 
were severely flooded and almost half of the interviewees had suffered flooding of their homes or 
businesses and two-thirds of all respondents lived within 1 km of the flooded river. To have a higher 
chance of interviewing flood affected people or people who are aware of the risk, the residential area 





Figure 3 Study areas in Catcliffe (left) and Dreiflüsse-Eck, Three Rivers Corner, Passau (right)- Google earth 
Although Catcliffe is a low-density commuter village and Dreiflüsse-Eck in Passau is in the historic 
centre of Passau, both areas are of similar size 30–37 ha. They also have a similar population size, 2100 
and 2990 and similar age profiles. In Catcliffe, 52% of properties were flooded and in Dreiflüsse-Eck 
approximately 70% were flooded (Table 3) [3]. 





Character  low density commuter village  high density, historic city 
centre 
Location 2.5 miles from Rotherham and 
4 miles from Sheffield city 
centre 
historic centre of Passau at 
confluence of Danube, Inn and 
Ilz 
Date flood 25-Jun-07 03-Jun-13 
Population 2011 2,108 2,990 
Population year of flood 1,971 2,981 
Population 18-64 64% 66%  
Area 30 ha 37 ha 
Flooded area 16 ha  26 ha  
Flooded area % 52% 70% 
Properties total/flooded 372/195 800/560  
Evacuation Forcible evacuation due to 
fear of dam failure 
Water supply failure meant 60 
inmates of Passau prison had to 
be transferred  
 
The survey design focused on the factors other researchers have identified as influencing flood 
resilience and included questions about the respondents perception and understanding of risk, trust in 
different addressees and in different sources of information, level of preparation, their detailed reactions 
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during the flood event and personal details that may have affected their ability to cope (Table 4). Two 
native German speakers independently translated the questionnaire into German. 
Regarding the flood risk aspects, the questionnaire was independently validated by three experts of 
flood risk management from the Institute for Risk & Disaster Reduction at UCL, Risk Centre at Judge 
Business School in Cambridge and a consultant from United Nations Disaster Assessment and 
Coordination (UNDAC). With respect to the methodological approach and survey design, the authors 
consulted the GESIS – Leibnitz-Institute for the Social Sciences in Mannheim. The surveys were piloted 
in September 2018 with students and experts and considerable effort was devoted to honing the 
questionnaire to ensure that it would be meaningful and understandable to interviewees.  
Table 4 Survey factors 
Dependent variables Independent variables 
Risk perception (5 point scale) Country (Germany, UK) 
Flood preparedness (5 point scale) Gender (male, female) 
Immediate evacuation (Binary) Flood experience (Binary) 
General trust (5 point scale) Responsibility (Binary) 
Trust in government, family, neighbors (5 point scale) Social activities (Categories) 
Attitude to risk (5 point scale) Knowledge of hazard maps and warning apps (Binary) 
Reactions during event Age (Categories) 
Flood preparedness  Employment (Categories) 
Attitude during flood emergency (5 point scale) Source of information (Categories) 
 
Maps of flooded areas were used to target households and businesses for interview and appointments 
were made to interview people working in local organisations affected by the flooding, including the 
library, church, cafes, supermarkets, bars, garages, and a cinema. Over 90% of the surveys were 
conducted face-to-face and the remaining interviews were conducted on the telephone. 32 people were 
surveyed in the UK and 74 in Germany (Table 5). The interviews in Catcliffe were conducted over four 
days in early November 2018 and in Passau over five days in February 2019. In both countries native 
language speakers who were familiar with the flood risk management supported the interviewer, a non-
native speaker, to make sure there were no misunderstandings.  
Table 5 Respondents in Dreiflüsse-Eck (Three Rivers Corner) and Catcliffe 










































SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was used to analyse the data. Mann–Whitney U, Chi-
square, Fisher’s exact test, Kendall’s-Tau and ordinal regression were used where relevant. 
5. Results 
The findings focus firstly on the factors affecting flood perception and preparedness and secondly on 
the issue of trust, attitude towards government and hypothetic evacuation decisions.  
5.1. Flood risk perception and flood preparedness 
As mentioned earlier, many authors stress that risk perception and preparedness are influenced by flood 
experience (Table 1). Respondents were therefore asked about their previous experience of floods, their 
level of flood risk perception and to rate how well prepared they imagined they were to cope with future 
floods. All interviewees were living or working in flood prone areas and about half had experienced 
previous floods (Passau 45%; Catcliffe 56%). It was expected that those previously affected by floods 
would have higher risk perception (Table 1: H1a). The mean risk perception in Passau was 2.8 among 
flood affected people and 2.3 amongst non-affected. In Catcliffe, the mean among flood affected people 
was 3.7 and among non-affected 3.0. The combined data for UK and Germany shows a statistically 
significant difference in risk perception between flood affected and non-affected people (Mann-
Whitney U test, p = 0.017) supporting the findings of others that personal disaster experience makes 
people aware of their vulnerability [11,20–22]. 
We asked whether personal experience also leads people to take action and thus enhances preparedness 
(Table 1: H1b). As described in section 2, there is strong evidence for a positive correlation between 
risk perception and flood preparedness [4,14–17,25]. In addition, it is highly plausible that the far-
reaching experience of the Elbe Flood in Germany in 2002 has led many residents and businesses to 
prepare themselves better [52,53]. We found that the perceived level of own preparedness was 
significantly higher for people with flood experience than for people without prior flood experience 
(Mann-Whitney U all respondents, p ≤ 0.0001; Passau p ≤ 0.005; Catcliffe p < 0.05). 
We then compared levels of risk perception and preparedness in Passau and Catcliffe. It is important to 
note that preparedness was selfreported, in other words own people’s perception of preparedness. We 
have no means to find out if their responses were entirely credible or if some people may have felt 
defensive and exaggerated. However, the interviewer’s subjective impression was that the majority of 
respondents gave accurate and truthful answers. Given the low levels of preparedness reported in both 
places this judgement seems reasonable. Based on the literature, we expected that risk perception would 
be higher in Germany as the flood in 2013 was more recent than the UK flood in 2007 and people’s 
appreciation of hazard and vulnerability drops with time [55] (Table 1: H2). We found a statistically 
significant difference in risk perception between the two areas, but, most interestingly the reverse of 
that expected with people in Catcliffe showing a higher level of risk perception (3.4) than did people in 
Passau (2.5) (Mann–Whitney U, p ≤ 0.005). Similarly, the perceived preparedness-level of the people 
in Passau was significantly lower than the preparedness-level of people in Catcliffe (Mean UK 2.8; 
Germany 2.1; Mann–Whitney U, p ≤ 0.025).  
The following table (Table 6) summarizes the test results of the hypotheses: 
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Table 6 Summary of results (in this table DE refers to Passau in Germany and UK refers to Catcliffe in UK. HC: 
hypothesis confirmed, HR: hypothesis rejected) 
Hypothesis Country Test P Value Significance 
PART 1 Perception and flood preparedness 
H1a DE+UK Mann-Whiteny U ≤ .05 HC 
H1b DE+UK Mann-Whiteny U ≤ .001 HC 
H2 DE vs UK Mann-Whiteny U ≤ .005 HC 
H3 DE+UK Kendall's tau ≤ .005 HC 
H4a DE+UK Kendall’s tau ≤ 1 HR 
H4b DE+UK Kendall’s tau ≤ .05 HC 
H5a DE+UK Mann-Whiteny U ≤ 1 HR 
H5b DE+UK Mann-Whiteny U ≤ 1 HR 
H6a DE+UK Kendall’s tau ≤ .5 HR 
H6b DE+UK Kendall’s tau ≤ .5 HR 
  UK Kendall’s tau ≤ .1 HR 
  DE Kendall’s tau ≤ .05 HC 
PART 2 Behaviour during the flood and trust in authority   
H7 DE vs UK Mann-Whiteny U ≤ .5 HR 
H8 DE+UK Kendall’s tau ≤ 1 HR 
H9 DE vs UK Mann-Whiteny U ≤ .5 HR 
H10 DE vs UK Mann-Whiteny U ≤ .001 HC 
H11 DE+UK Mann-Whiteny U ≤ .5 HR 
H12 DE+UK Mann-Whiteny U ≤ .05 HC 
H13 DE+UK Kendall’s tau ≤ 1 HR 
H14 DE+UK Mann-Whiteny U ≤ 1 HR 
H15 DE+UK Chi-sq ≤ .005 HC 
H16 DE+UK Mann-Whiteny U ≤ .5 HR 
H17 DE+UK Kendall’s tau ≤ .005 HC 
 
Fig. 4 shows that 46% of respondents in Passau had very low perceived flood preparedness compared 
to 22% in Catcliffe. Despite this difference, the perceived own flood preparedness is not very high in 
either Catcliffe or Passau, and the evidence from elsewhere suggests that people in risk prone areas 
rarely undertake mitigation measures voluntarily [4]. 
We tested if preparedness was related directly to risk perception and found a significant correlation 
when all the respondents from UK and Germany were considered together (H3: Kendalls Tau-b = 0.254, 
2 P = 0.002). There was also a significant correlation for respondents in Passau (Tau = 0.305, p = 0.002) 
yet in Catcliffe no correlation was found between these two variables and the hypothesis was therefore 
not supported. Accordingly, also other researchers have found no statistically significant relation or 
only a weak relation between perception of flood risk and preparedness [4,14,52,53]. 
                                                            




Figure 4 Flood preparedness in Passau and Catcliffe (Passau-Germany N=72, Catcliffe-UK N=32) 
With respect to the four constellations of perception and preparation discussed in section 2, we pooled 
the data for Catcliffe and Passau in Table 7. 
Table 7 Constellations of perception and preparedness 
 No flood experience (N=53) Flood experience (N=50) 
 Perception Perception  
Germany + UK Low 1, 2 Med 3 High 4, 5 Low 1, 2 Med 3 High 4, 5 
Preparedness 
 Low 1,2 40% 15% 17% 19% 2% 20% 
 Med. 3 9% 9% 2% 5% 8% 14% 
 High 4,5 2% 4% 2% 10% 8% 14% 
 
As can be seen in Table 7, among the respondents without flood experience the most frequent 
constellation is the combination of low perception and low preparedness (40%). This indicates that 
many people don’t perceive a high risk of flood and therefore don’t see any need for a high level of 
preparedness, either. A further 32% perceive themselves to be at medium or high risk but are still 
unprepared. 
This suggests that there may be an expectation-gap with respect to the government. Put differently, this 
can be seen as a window of opportunity for public authorities to support flood risk protection without 
the need for specific risk communication and awareness campaigns (as the respondents of this category 
already have medium-high risk perception). 
Amongst respondents with flood experience, a much greater proportion perceives themselves to have a 
high level of preparedness (32%) compared to 8% of those with no flood experience. Whether this 
finding is partly due to cognitive dissonance (implying that they merely hope to be better prepared) is 
an open question. Overall, we see that even among those without flood experience there is both a high 
potential for better protection and a high need for better governmental support.  
Other hypotheses about flood preparedness were tested, including the effect of age, gender and risk 
aversion. We expected older people to be better prepared (H4b) [19,24,33,56]. We found no significant 
correlation between age and risk perception (H4a, Tau = 0,046, p = 0.575) but older people, aged over 
45, are more likely to have a higher preparedness level (H5, Tau = 0,215**, p = 0.01, N = 104). It was 
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better prepared than men (H5b).  However, our study found no difference in neither perception nor 
preparedness between men and women. Therefore both hypotheses are rejected with a P-value equal to 
0,583 for H5a, and P equal to 0,644 for H5b. 
Preparedness is expected to increase with increasing anxiety [24,88] and we tested if risk aversion as a 
related concept was correlated with flood perception (H6a), and preparedness (H6b). Respondents 
ranked themselves on a 5-point scale from risk averse to risk taker.) There was no correlation between 
risk aversion and flood perception. There was, however, a significant correlation between risk aversion 
and flood preparedness in Passau (Tau = - 0.250, 3 p = 0.013) and a less strong relationship in Catcliffe 
(p = 0.09). 
5.2. Attitude towards government and reaction to government advice 
Bubeck et al. [4] argue that flood prevention will require private households to take more flood 
mitigation measures. Respondents were asked if they considered flood preparedness was a task of the 
government or the responsibility of individual households. Respondents answered on a scale between 
1 and 5 with 1 indicating full responsibility for individual households and 5 full responsibility on the 
side of the government. We expected flood experienced people would tend to be more independent and 




Figure 5 Preparation responsibility expectation among flood experienced and inexperienced 
Fig. 5 shows that about two-thirds of respondents in both Passau and Catcliffe expect the government, 
rather than individuals, to take responsibility for flood preparedness. We wondered if the remaining 
33% who think that individual families should be responsible rather than government would see 
themselves as better prepared (H8). Interestingly, there was no significant difference in preparedness 
between those who perceive a higher responsibility and those who think it is the job of government (P 
value = 0,726, N = 103). We also tested if there was a difference in flood preparedness between Passau 
and Catcliffe among those respondents who take responsibility for flood preparedness (H9), but we 
found no statistically significant correlation.   
                                                            























During emergencies, successful risk communication depends on public confidence in the authorities 
[89]. As data from the World Value Survey for 2006 show, both British and German citizens equally 
have low or very low trust in government (74% of citizens in Germany and 60% in UK). Due to 
differences in quality of governmental support in the study areas in each country, we anticipated that 
respondents in Passau would show higher trust in government than those in Catcliffe (H10). In the UK, 
respondents complained that the local authorities were slow to respond and there was little direct central 
government assistance, whereas in Germany volunteers organized by German Technical Relief Service 
reacted quickly and the Federal government provided generous financial aid [3]. As expected, we found 
a significant difference in trust in government between respondents in the two study areas (Passau mean 
= 3.1, Catcliffe mean = 2.0, Mann-Whitney p = 0.000). 
In the specific case of an evacuation, low confidence in government can be dangerous. We confronted 
the interviewees with a hypothetical flood disaster and asked them whether and how quickly they would 
comply with a government order to evacuate. In total, 49% of all respondents (N = 104) had direct 
experience of their property being flooded (46% in Passau and 58% in Catcliffe). The interviewees were 
offered three choices: take the warning seriously and evacuate as quickly as possible (selected by 76%); 
take the warning seriously, but NOT hurry as the authorities usually exaggerate (20%); or not believe 
in warning (4%). 
The relationship between the people’s attitude toward the responsibility of flood preparedness is 
analysed in relation to their perception of risk and level of preparedness (H8 and 9). Moreover, we 
expected that people who see flood preparedness more as the task of citizens than government, would 
also rely less on government in times of crisis and therefore not evacuate immediately following a 
government evacuation order (H11). However, we found that this was not the case and that the greater 
propensity for independence and self-reliance does not affect the willingness to follow a government 
evacuation order in a hypothetical context (Mann-Whitney p = 0.322). 
People with low trust in government have been found to be less likely to follow a government order to 
evacuate immediately (H12) [33]. Trust in government was measured on a 5-point scale from very low 
to very high. We found a significant relation between trust in government and immediate response to 
an evacuation order (Mann-Whitney p = 0.02) where 64% of people with low or very low trust in 
government would not evacuate immediately compared to the control group with higher trust in 
government. It is both interesting and important that low trust in government can spill-over to the 
willingness of people to immediately follow government advice in an emergency situation. Through 
hesitation and doubt valuable time can be lost. 
When public instructions in emergency situations meet with a lower level of acceptance: To whom do 
people respond instead? In a study of attitudes to volcano risk, Haynes et al. [90] found the public 
viewed friends and relatives as the most trusted source of information. To test this, we asked 
respondents, “Imagine there is a flood in your region and you get a government order to evacuate but a 
family member or a close friend/neighbour recommends you to stay at home and try to stop water 
entering the house. Whose advice would you follow?” It was expected that when people have higher 
trust in family than government (Fig. 6b), they should rather follow the advice of the family than of the 
government (H13). We found, however, that in both countries most people said they would prioritize 
government advice over family (Fig. 6c). The reason may be that the public assumes an informational 
advantage on the side of public authorities regarding the severeness of the flood risk [89,91]. Therefore, 
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despite the generally low trust in government, people in the UK and Germany are likely to follow the 
advice of the authorities. Fig. 6d summarizes the key findings on trust and the effects on evacuation for 
the two studied areas. Apart from the lower levels of trust in government in UK the results are similar 





Figure 6 (a) Trust in government (b) trust in family in normal time, (c) who do people follow in disaster time, 
(d) people who would immediately evacuate after being asked by government 
Looking at demographic variables, we find that older people see themselves as better prepared for floods 
than do younger people (H4b). However there was no difference in the risk perception with age (H4a). 
Finally we checked whether older people are more likely to evacuate immediately on being told to by 
government (H14), but found no relationship (Mann-Whitney p = 0,897). 
Various researchers [38,60] found that men are less likely to evacuate than women (H15). We also 
found a highly significant difference between women and men (Chi-square p = 0.003) where 64% of 
the people who said they would evacuate immediately were women and 36% were men. This is in line 
with other studies, which found women to be almost twice as likely to evacuate when given a mandatory 
order [63]. We also tested if risk averse people are more likely to evacuate immediately (H16), which 
was not confirmed.  
Finally, we tested for further age effects. Zhao and Hu [64] and Christensen and Lægreid [44] found 
trust in government increases with age, although Maidl and Buchecker [24] stress citizens’ trust in 
government varies with political and cultural circumstances rather than age. Using Kendall’s Tau we 
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tested if trust is correlated with age and found a significant relation (H17) for Germany and the UK 
combined (P = 0,005, correlation = - 0,232). 
6. Discussion 
Writing about seismic risk, Rossetto et al. [92] argue that “a large proportion of people the world over 
do nothing or very little to adjust to seismic hazards.” Rossetto, Joffe and Solberg [92] argue that seismic 
adjustment adoption rates relate to feelings of community, self-worth, trust and control. Understanding 
such motivations and constraints is a step in understanding how to encourage risk mitigation. The low 
risk awareness of the residents living in flood-prone areas is usually considered as a main cause of low 
preparedness and inadequate response to floods, yet few studies have evaluated how risk 
communication programs affect these risk perceptions. Terpstra et al. [93]; in a study of flood risk in 3 
Dutch provinces, found only weak support for the idea that risk communication programs can affect 
risk perceptions. Knocke and Kolivras [94] investigating flash floods in Virginia thought awareness of 
flash-flood risk could be improved through training, television campaigns fliers and the provision of 
better weather data. 
In this empirical study, we analysed people’s perception of flood risk, of their own preparedness and 
their attitude towards government advice in two cities, Catcliffe and Passau, which were both seriously 
affected by flooding. Although the sample sizes were relatively small (32 in Catcliffe and 74 in Three 
Rivers Corner) they are fairly representative of the populations living in both places. 
Perception of risk is integral to determining the response to flood warnings and flood risk management. 
Efforts to increase community preparedness have largely failed when the authorities overlooked the 
subjective nature of public perception [17]. During the UK 2007 summer floods, the poor public 
response to Environment Agency warnings was thought to depend on whether people were aware of 
their own personal risk [16]. This lack of understanding by the agencies involved in the public’s 
perception of risk can render warnings ineffective [33]. Modern theories of cognitive psychology 
suggest that perception and action are bi-directional and interdependent [95–97] and that cognitive 
function, i. e. understanding, resides in the interactions of perception and action [98]. This discrepancy 
between risk perception and preparedness was one key area we have explored and reported on. We 
found that although there were few significant differences between the two case studies, risk perception 
and risk preparedness was significantly higher in Catcliffe than in Passau and during the flood 
emergency people in Catcliffe see themselves acting more self-protectively (78%) than in Passau (42%). 
In both case studies, people who had direct experience of floods had a higher level of risk perception 
and preparedness compared to those with no previous experience, which is in line with findings from 
prior studies on risk perception. Although most respondents displayed low perception of flood risk and 
low level of their own perceived preparedness, the combination of high risk perception and low 
preparedness was the most frequent constellation among respondents with prior flood experience. Why 
do people with high risk perception don’t do more to protect themselves? The causal pathways are more 
complex than a direct link between experience and preparedness and intervening variables, such as 
perception of hazard cycles and the time since previous events can modify behaviour. In turn, 
responsiveness depends on the perception of one’s own agency to engage in effective protective actions 
and on the strength of belief that personal responsibility can be delegated to public emergency 
management. These issues need to be taken into account when developing communication and 
participative activities [99]. Interpreted this way, our findings indicate a window of opportunity for 
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governmental support as the scope for private protection is limited but the risk awareness is already 
high. 
A second prerequisite for effective public intervention is the citizens’ attitude towards government and 
their trust in particular. With respect to self-reliance and independency, a majority of all respondents 
holds the opinion that flood preparedness is a major task of government. However, even among those 
who think differently we did not find a significantly larger level of perceived own flood preparedness. 
In both Catcliffe and Passau, trust in government was fairly low. Nevertheless, when people were asked 
the hypothetical question how they would react to a public evacuation order, almost 70% in Catcliffe 
and 80% of respondents in Passau would take immediate action to evacuate. In spite of this finding, 
trust matters: People with low trust in government don’t follow government advice immediately 
whereas people with medium and high trust levels tend to follow government advice. Interestingly, the 
willingness to follow government order was more pronounced when we asked the conflicting question 
whether the respondents would follow a public evacuation order although their family recommended 
not doing so. This finding shows that only low levels of confidence have an impact on the context of 
the crisis. This is understandable, since the motives for distrust in state action are less relevant in the 
crisis context. Nevertheless, it is clear that too little trust in the state can lead to a hesitant, wait-and-see 
attitude and in extreme cases this can be dangerous. It is therefore important to understand where 
government measures are needed, where they encounter fertile ground and what conditions need to be 
created in parallel to achieve broad acceptance of measures.  
As mentioned earlier, the frequency and severity of floods events is increasing in Germany and the UK 
and an adaptive response is required to preparedness and mitigation that involves all parties including 
the state, the insurance sector, businesses and households [3,29,100,101]. These adaptive responses call 
for a new social contract between public and private sector actors to respond to the challenges to flood 
risk management posed by climate change [102–104]. 
7. Conclusions 
Summarising the results of the surveys in the UK and Germany, in both case studies, people who had 
direct experience of floods had a higher level of risk perception and preparedness compared to those 
who had no previous experience. We also found that older people had a higher level of risk perception 
and preparedness compared to younger people. Residents of both countries showed different 
perception-preparation patterns with respect to their prior flood experience. 35% of the people with no 
flood experience displayed medium or high risk perception but rated their own flood preparation low. 
As there is no need to convince this group (e.g. by costly awareness campaigns), policy makers can go 
ahead to support people’s flood risk preparation, either by technical recommendations or financial 
support. In both Catcliffe and Passau, trust in government was fairly low. Nevertheless, if the 
government asked people to evacuate immediately, almost 70% in Catcliffe and 80% of respondents in 
Passau would take immediate action to evacuate. Furthermore, no matter how much people trust their 
family, if the government asked them to evacuate and their family said it was unnecessary, nearly 70% 
of respondents in both areas would follow government advice.  
Meanwhile, it was interesting to see that low trust in government can spill-over to the willingness of 
people to follow government advice immediately in an emergency situation. Political decision makers 
should be well aware that a low level of public trust can translate in a significant loss of valuable time 
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during a crisis situation. The decision to evacuate is significantly higher amongst women than men. 
Although there were few significant differences between the two case studies, risk perception and risk 
preparedness was significantly higher in Catcliffe than in Passau and during the flood emergency, 
people in Catcliffe acted more selfprotectively (78%) than in Passau (42%). In both areas people living 
in a flood hazard zone cannot easily get flood insurance coverage, and in Germany, to date the 
government compensates most people. 
In general the people who had been directly affected by flood were dissatisfied with flood early warning. 
Many respondents in Passau complained about not receiving a flood warning in time and that the 
authorities had underestimated the severity of the situation. In the UK, people in Catcliffe also blamed 
government for not providing sufficient warning and were dissatisfied with the performance of the local 
authorities and Environment Agency. In each country respondents reported that the severity of the flood 
was under-estimated and the forecast of water levels was inaccurate and that the flood warning was not 
broadcasted early enough or sufficiently well enough to give them the opportunity to move their 
valuables or car to a safe place which meant they suffered higher economic damage to their business or 
home, and, in Passau, some people were even trapped on the upper floor of their apartment. According 
to respondents, the first source of information was word of mouth and personal observation of 
increasing water level, rather than siren or loud-speaker announcements. In Catcliffe, police officers 
evacuated people by knocking door by door at midnight and driving them out of flooding area. 
Extreme events can be catalysts for policy change [105]. In the UK the 2007 flood was called a ‘game 
changer’ in the Pitt [16] and in Germany Kreibich et al. [28] described the 2002 flood in Germany as a 
‘focusing event’ that concentrated minds on improving resilience. After both floods there were 
significant changes in flood awareness and preparedness amongst both residents and the authorities 
[106]. However, the findings of this study of floods in the UK 2007 and Germany 2013 suggest that 
few people in known flood hazard areas take personal responsibility to limit the damage from floods. 
Given the likely increased incidence of flooding in both the UK and Germany with climate change and 
given the possible withdrawal of state aid in Germany and the difficulty of getting insurance cover in 
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Article 3: Optimal Evacuation-Decisions Facing the Trade-Off 
between Early-Warning Precision, Evacuation-Cost and Trust – the 
Warning Compliance Model (WCM) 
Abstract 
In this article, we analyze the phenomenon of flood evacuation compliance from a both decision-
theoretic and game-theoretic perspective presenting the Warning Compliance Model (WCM). This 
discrete decision model incorporates a Bayesian information system, which formalizes the statistical 
effects of a warning forecast based on the harmonious structure of a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). 
The game-theoretical part of the model incorporates the evacuation order decision of a local government 
and the people’s compliance regarding their evacuation-decisions. The strengths of this novel approach 
lie in the joint consideration of probabilistic and communicative risk aspects of a dynamic setting, in 
the simultaneous consideration of escalation and de-escalation phases and of two differently exposed 
risk groups, which requires differential risk communication. For each scenario, we derive the explicit 
and generic solution of the model, which makes it possible to identify the scope for warning compliance 
and its effects independent from the parameter constellation. Applying empirical data from flood and 
risk studies yields plausible results for the escalation-scenario of the model and reveal the limits of 
compliance if people face a Black Swan flood event. 
1. Introduction 
Natural disasters cause severe damage worldwide, with an upward trend (Alfieri et al. 2016; Bruine de 
Bruin et al.). Whenever natural catastrophes may endanger human life and sufficient warning time 
precedes the occurrence of the event, the immediate evacuation of the population is required. 
Evacuation can be defined as “the process of alerting, warning, deciding, preparing, departing and 
(temporarily) holding people, animals, personal belongings and corporate stock and supplies from an 
unsafe location at a relatively safer location given the actual circumstances“ (Kolen & van Gelder, 
2018). In the context of an evacuation, the questions of whether, and – if answered with yes – when and 
to what extent are among the most difficult decisions to be made by responsible actors such as (local) 
government and civil protection agencies. The decision problem can be divided into three different 
elements or tasks. First, the occurrence of the potentially dangerous event that could make an evacuation 
necessary must be predicted as accurately as possible by a hazard forecast. In practice, this task is 
performed by Early Warning Systems (EWS), which are usually developed and operated by research 
institutes and commercial (early warning) services specialized in this field. Whether timely evacuation 
is possible at all depends on the scientific and technical performance of these systems on the one hand 
and the specific characteristics of the concrete natural hazard on the other. 
The second task comprises evacuation planning and the evacuation decision itself, which can be either 
a mandatory evacuation request (“order”) or a voluntary evacuation request (“recommendation”) but 
either way this decision is eventually based on a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of public decision-
makers, weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of an evacuation. While the potential lives to 
be saved play the primary role in this consideration, an evacuation can also involve securing critical 
assets and thus avoiding direct economic damage. However, the measures and operations, which have 
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to be put in place within a short period, require a systematic preparation and planning in combination 
with pre-disaster risk communication with the potentially affected population living in the risk-prone 
area. For example, one of the most frequently reported bottlenecks for an effective evacuation is 
unnecessary traffic congestion, i.e. congestion which could have been overcome by timely planning of 
escape-routes as well as pre-disaster planning and training to overcome problems of coordination during 
the evacuation. 
The third aspect, which constitutes a necessary precondition for a successful evacuation, concerns the 
acceptance and evacuation compliance of the population, which requires a good communication 
strategy but also a high credibility of the political decision makers. It should be understood that an 
evacuation, which usually involves leaving one's own home for up to several weeks, is a very 
consequential decision for those affected. There can be many reasons why potentially affected people 
do not comply with an evacuation order. The target group does not perceive the order or it does not take 
it seriously (enough) because it fails to understand the gravity of the situation and instead considers the 
measure to be exaggerated. On the other extreme, people may consider the order as too drastic an 
intervention in their private affairs and therefore give priority to their own crisis micro-management in 
the first instance (in particular to stay with vulnerable family members, pets or to protect their 
belongings), which can entail a dangerous loss of time. Further reasons are that people perceive their 
homes as a safe place, that they don’t know where to go or that they have distrust into the public decision 
makers’ “true objectives”. The last aspect is relevant if people think that e.g. tourists are more relevant 
to the local government’s decision or even in highly problematic contexts where the local government 
misuses an evacuation request in order to get rid of marginalized groups. Hence, evacuation compliance 
depends crucially on the population's trust and credibility in the official decision-makers.  
“Approaching evacuation as a process and not as an outcome is key to understanding why some 
evacuate and some do not, and more important, to determining what can be done to motivate more 
compliance.” (Dash & Gladwin, 2007). Following Dash & Gladwin, the objective of this contribution 
is a model-based analysis of an interaction of the three before mentioned tasks of evacuation: hazard 
forecast and early warning, strategic evacuation-decision making as well as evacuation compliance. At 
the center of the warning response model is the evacuation decision of a public decision maker (local 
government) and the evacuation compliance of the potentially affected population.  
The decision problem is as follows: A public decision maker (PDM), e.g. the local government of a 
hypothetical seaside town, receives a forecast or warning from a stylized EWS and has to decide 
whether to issue an non-mandatory evacuation order. We choose an approach from information 
economics and model the EWS as an information system (Bikhchandani et al. 2013). The sequence of 
events and the occurrence of informative signals (emissions or “warnings” in our context) can be 
depicted as a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). Both, the hazard and the evacuation decision, are scalable 
over two levels. The hazard, e.g. a flood, can have an severe impact affecting the residential area near 
the coast (this corresponds to state S1 where a proportion of 𝛾% of the population would be affected by 
flood) or an extreme impact affecting all residents of the whole town (this corresponds to state S2 
affecting the entirety of the local population). Figure 1 illustrates the two potential levels of impact 
taking the example of New Jersey (left picture), a state which was severely hit by hurricanes in the past 
(e.g. hurricane Sandy in 2012) and which led to the identification of flood-risk zones by FEMA. The 
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picture to the right in Figure 1 shows the zones of Southeast Louisiana as an example for three risk 
categories (indicated by the colors red, orange and yellow). Depending on the specificities of the 
locations and the local vulnerability profile of the population, there are very often up to five or more 
categories. Although we use the case of two zones for the sake of simplicity it is to note that a higher 
number of risk or evacuation zones increases operational complexity, in particular it becomes more 
difficult to communicate each citizen which risk zone it belongs to and what this means in terms of 
preparation and reaction. 
Accordingly, conditional on the received signal the authority can either issue a partial evacuation 
focusing at the residential area in the coastal (risk) zone or it can issue a full evacuation for the whole 
region. For the evacuation decision, the authority takes three types of cost into account: The potential 
damage to the population in the case of flooding in an non-evacuated region (either just the coastal 
region or the entire town), the cost of an evacuation incurred by the government and the burden for the 
population in the case of a false alarm. Further details are given in section 4. 
Although the model has a relatively simple structure, it makes it possible to depict two different levels 
of risk and to derive an optimal decision for every outcome based on the Markov chain structure. 
 
Figure 1 Examples of flood risk zones -left: New Jersey (FEMA 2012), right: Southeast Louisiana (State of 
Louisiana) 
The scalability of the decision is an important feature of the model as this often constitutes a major 
problem in practice. Closely related is also the consideration of different population groups 
(heterogeneity). This aspect is considered very important in the literature, as different groups act from 
very different motives and under different circumstances. In the literature, a distinction is made above 
all between groups in risk areas and those outside risk areas, between vulnerable and (less) vulnerable 
groups, and groups that are differentiated according to socio-demographic criteria (age, gender, 
ethnicity). In our model, we limit ourselves to the first point and distinguish between people living 
inside and outside risk areas. This criterion is usually highly relevant for high tide and hurricanes, since 
coastal inhabitants are exposed to a higher risk and usually are well aware of this (official classification 
into risk zones). We would like to stress that we have not integrated the other criteria into the model 
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primarily for reasons of complexity, and not because we consider these further group differentiations 
to be unimportant. On the contrary, our model approach can be extended to include these groups 
relatively easily, provided that data on hazard characteristics, local conditions and demographics are 
available. 
In addition, the model also allows to analyze the de-escalation-decisions (return to “normal”), which 
are absent in most evacuation models. While a situation where no flood yet occurred corresponds to the 
escalation-phase (just evacuation-decisions have to be made), situation S2 represents the de-escalation-
problem. Here, the whole town is already flooded and the people either evacuated the period before or 
they were “forced out of the region” by the flood itself which implied a high risk for life and health. 
Those who evacuated or were lucky to escape in time, now feel the urge to return as fast as possible. 
However, if the flood situation worsens again this can put these people at a new risk, which is a 
frequently overlooked issue in evacuation-modeling. As Sorensen & Sorensen state, „the time period 
for the span of withdrawal is elastic in that the evacuation may last for any amount of time, and may 
occur more than once or sequentially should there be secondary hazards or a reoccurrence or escalation 
of the original threat. For example, while the primary hazards form hurricanes are wind and storm surge 
flooding, secondary threats could include inland riverine flooding that might necessitate a second 
evacuation effort “(Sorensen & Sorensen, 2006). To protect the people from this kind of “second wave”, 
the government can decide whether to issue an order to remain outside the region. Note that an 
“evacuation-order” and a “remain-order” just differ with respect to the status quo (i.e. whether people 
are already out of the region or not) because in both cases the government aims to incite the population 
to be absent from home. In situation S1, just the coastal area is flooded. This situation represents a 
combination of escalation (relevant for the rest of the town, which is not yet flooded) and de-escalation 
(relevant for the inhabitants of the coastal area, who had to leave the region and are about to return). It 
is one central feature of this dynamic model that it comprises both escalation and de-escalation as well 
as the more intricate constellation in between. The challenge for the authority is to find an optimal 
policy – conditional on the current state and future prediction – which fits to both groups at the same 
time. 
One further important element of our model is trust of the potentially affected population in the 
government’s communication. Although theoretically the government can enforce an evacuation order, 
police coercion is for sure the “means of last resort” for public officials. In principle, large-scale 
enforcement in a stressful situation will most probably fail due to lack of time, lack of staff, increased 
opposition by the public and personal discomfort of the executive personnel. Therefore, we assume in 
our model that the government cannot force people to evacuate but it can just influence them in a direct 
and indirect way while both channels depend on trust.  
The first type of trust is the people’s trust in a competent impact assessment on the side of the 
government. While the (unconditional and conditional) event probabilities are common knowledge to 
all decision-makers of our setting, we assume an information asymmetry between the government and 
the public with respect to the impact of a potential flooding event. To put it plainly, people know how 
probable a flood event is but they do not know (as precisely as the regional government knows) how 
severely this flood could hit them. While probabilities and warnings are publicly issued by the weather 
forecasting service, the question how dangerous this event could be for a specific region is still a 
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different aspect. By contrast, the local government has access to more and deeper expertise, which 
makes competence-trust valuable at this point. We see a concrete example and further justification for 
this assumption in the first wave of the current Corona-pandemics. Although data about the spread of 
the virus and the upsurge of infections was publicly available at any time, in many countries people 
were skeptical about the drastic restrictions and did not believe in potential damaging impacts for 
themselves. However, in a country like Germany, where trust in government is comparatively high, 
people showed a high degree of acceptance accordingly. 
The second trust component is reliability-trust, which exerts an indirect effect on the public’s 
evacuation decision because it affects the chance for a smooth evacuation. Wilson (2018): “Issuing 
mandatory evacuation orders (…) prior to the landfall of hurricanes can be as or even more disruptive 
and dangerous than the storm itself. For example, 107 of the 120 deaths attributable to Hurricane Rita 
occurred because of extreme temperatures in jammed traffic during the Houston’s evacuation (…). 
More recently, Hurricane Irma in 2017 prompted the evacuation of up to 6.3 million Floridians, one of 
the largest such displacements in American history (…). The storm’s aftermath raised serious questions 
about overburdened infrastructure and the social vulnerability of communities that were unable to leave 
via their own means (…).” Before all events unfold (let’s say in an imaginary period zero) the 
government can invest in better evacuation conditions, such as improved evacuation planning and 
training, contracting for vehicle capacities (e.g. busses which can bring the people out of the affected 
region) or even the construction of additional roads. We assume that the government has a fixed budget 
for this investment but must decide about the allocation answering the question which region (coastal 
area versus rest of the city) should receive which share of it. As the public cannot directly observe all 
taken measures, it again has to trust that the government did the most to make a smooth evacuation 
possible. A low level of reliability trust leads to the conviction of the inhabitants of both regions that 
they have to cope with the congestion-problem on their own. This will eventually increase the expected 
degree of congestion and thus prevent a (possibly life-saving) evacuation. In the model we deal mainly 
with the first type of trust but treat congestion as an intensification of the evacuation problem. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. After a brief outline of the related literature in 
section 2, we present the early warning or information system in section 3 and the decision-model and 
communication-game in section 4. In section 5, we derive the model’s results, in particular the Nash-
Equilibrium of the compliance-game. In section 6 we give a brief summary and discuss the implications 
and possible extensions of our approach.  
2. Related literature and state of the art 
This section gives a brief overview on the relevant literature in this field. We start with some stylized 
facts about EWS and refer to selected case studies, which looked at specific challenges such as 
information processing, information aggregation, information communication as well as coordination 
between experts, such as services for flood control, who bear a large part of the responsibility for the 
public when making proficient use out of this information. The second part refers to literature on 
evacuation decision making and evacuation compliance. Although slightly dominated by social 
scientists this is a very interdisciplinary area of research, which comprise empirical studies, simulation 
models and guidelines.  
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Literature on EWS and in particular models, which aim at improved forecasts, abound. An EWS belongs 
to the so-called non-structural measures of hazard protection (as compared to structural measures, such 
as dams or levees in the case of flood, which constitute a physical barrier). According to Salit et al. 
(2013) and Mileti & Sorensen (1990), an EWS for flood risk comprises three basic components: “the 
detection system (collection and analysis of information, flood forecasting), the management system 
(composed of national and local emergency management officials) and the response system 
(transmission and reception of warnings to the population concerned)” (Salit et al. 2013). With respect 
to the last there is again a long list of requirements concerning the interface between sender and receiver 
of the message. These requirements refer to issuance and dissemination (outreach), perception, 
comprehension and interpretation, personalization (anticipating the receiver’s interpretation as people 
contextualize the information for themselves and ask questions such as: What does this message mean 
to me? Do I need further information?) and sender credibility. Warnings must be perceivable and clear 
(Sorensen 2000) and an EWS has to be adopted to the local conditions (Salit et al. (2013).  
Although floods and hurricanes are easier to predict than e.g. earthquakes, there are numerous examples 
of wrong forecasts also for these two types of events. The difficulty with hurricanes is that they can 
change their direction shortly before landfall. A well-known example is hurricane Rita in the Gulf of 
Mexico in the year 2005: “Although originally projected to hit the Houston/Galveston area, Rita took 
an easterly turn while still in the Gulf, a shift in direction that spared these metropolitan areas a direct 
hit” (Carpender et al. 2006, p. 777). There is a comparable level of uncertainty for floods as the 
movement of water masses, which break their path through inhabited districts, can be highly dynamic 
and therefore difficult to predict (Salit et al. 2013).  
With respect to the subtopic evacuation and evacuation decisions, research over the last two decades 
has constantly shifted towards a stronger focus on risk communication and people’s reactions to the 
combined events of an upcoming hazard and an evacuation order. From a practical perspective, there 
are guidelines such as the MEND-guide for humanitarian interventions who provide useful orientation 
for decision makers (Goldschmidt et al. 2014). In natural disasters all around the world the number of 
fatalities among those who did not evacuate in time is still remarkable. Therefore, research focused on 
the guiding question which group of people typically don’t evacuate in time, which are their 
characteristics and what can be done to influence their decision in an effective way. Basically, there are 
two main strands of literature: empirical case studies and evacuation simulation models. The former 
looks at specific events in a specific country and runs post-event surveys to understand people’s 
perceptions and motivations. Among the key insights is that personal risk perception plays an influential 
role in the evacuation decision (Dash & Gladwin 2007), that people tend to “hedge” their risk in the 
sense that they collect information from different sources, cross-check information and tend to wait for 
a clearer picture unless they are fully convinced. A special focus lies on vulnerable groups with 
restricted mobility but also those who are socially vulnerable, such as marginalized groups.  
With respect to government communication in general and evacuation orders in particular, the impact 
of the official nature of an evacuation order on people’s decisions seems to be quite differentiated. 
Basically, people trust public authorities, they trust local authorities more than central government, they 
show a higher willingness to follow government orders even if this is in conflict with family’s/peers 
recommendation and they closely screen the authority’s credibility.  
119 
 
For the context of evacuation decisions, evacuation compliance, acceptance and trust in public 
authorities and government agencies was subject to quite a number of contributions. The two main 
strands of literature focus on intention-based and credibility-based trust. People can doubt the intention 
of public officials if they feel that the government abuses the event as a pretext for the pursuit of other 
goals or that different groups of stakeholders (other than the directly affected population, such as 
tourists, investors, voters etc.) are the true addressees of a consequential measure. Although we do not 
focus on intention-based trust, we nevertheless take explicitly potential conflicts of interests into 
account. In our model, the government can pursue different objectives. While saving lives and 
protecting the population from injuries is the government’s primary objective, there are also secondary 
objectives, which can be “added to” the primary one by assigning weights and thus influencing the final 
decision. Secondary goals can also focus on the population to prevent nuisance or even deprivation 
caused by an evacuation. Alternatively, secondary goals can focus on the prevention of economic losses 
in the affected region. The Corona-crisis 2020 illustrates in a very evident way that the trade-off between 
impairments of the population and economic losses must not be ignored. 
With respect to credibility-based trust, the impact of false alarms is a frequently studied topic. The 
problem that people cease to take a warning seriously, if they experienced a false alarm is known as the 
Crying Wolf-phenomenon (Roulston & Smith 2004). Although it is difficult to empirically analyze the 
effects of sequential observations if the events at question are very rare, there were some occasions, 
which can shed some light into this issue. Studies find a rather modest effect of the Crying Wolf-
phenomenon indicating that false alarms don’t exert a crushing effect on the sender’s credibility but 
rather shift some weight moderately into the direction of other information sources. Hence, people learn 
that they should not trust entirely the public announcements although they are still willing to trust to a 
sufficient degree.  
To the best of our knowledge, competence trust and compliance as conceptualized in this paper have 
not yet been under study in the context of evacuation modelling. Regarding competence trust, the idea 
that people hold their own belief about the severity of a risk is close to approaches dealing with 
subjective risk perception (SRP). In SRP, the salience of communicated risk depends, among other 
factors, on the credibility of the source (e.g. media, government), which in turn leads to changes of 
subjective probabilities (Lindell & Prater 2002). However, our approach assumes objective risk 
perception, i.e. there are neither information asymmetries nor (preference-based) distortions of the event 
probabilities. In our model, we assume an information asymmetry between government and public 
regarding the impact of a potential flood. If people trust the government’s competence regarding the 
impact assessment, they interpret an evacuation-order (and equally a remain-order) as an indicator of 
the (partially) unknown future impact. 
The account of simulation models takes a formal approach and models evacuation decisions with a 
strong focus on congestion (Santos & Aguirre 2004). For example, Teo et al. (2015) present an agent-
based evacuation model; their model also incorporates government advice. However, the task of the 
government is to find the optimal assignment of people to avoid congestion. 
In our model, we deal with the problem of congestion in a rather different way. We neither focus on a 
routing model, nor do we solve a problem of pure coordination. Instead, congestion represents a further 
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bottleneck, which can be effectively influenced by the government as a third party and which can 
influence the public’s incentives for evacuation via the trust channel. With respect to cost-benefit-
analyses in the context of forecasting models, our approach is akin to the classic Quickest Change 
Detection (QCD) problem (Li 2012). A QCD-problem distinguishes between two states (“regimes”) of 
a system. These are two conditions of which one is harmless but the other is problematic and should 
therefore be avoided. For example, an economy can be on its way into a recession or just experience a 
random and transient decline in output. Or a patient can show symptoms which indicate an infection 
but which can also just be due to other factors. The first, problematic, reason requires a more 
comprehensive and also more painful therapy than the second. The decision maker’s task is then to 
detect the switch to the problematic regime as fast as possible. A QCD-problem is a dynamic setting 
where time approaches a fixed terminal date. In our approach, timing is not relevant for the decision 
but time rather structures the sequence of the events. In addition, our approach has the Markov chain-
properties. 
3. Problem structure and information system 
This section describes the statistical part of the model, the Information System (IS).  
3.1 The information (“warning”) system 
The basic structure of the problem, in particular the randomness and sequence of events, follows the 
properties of a Hidden-Markov-Model (HMM). Markov-models are stochastic automata, which share 
the property that future developments just depend on the current state and not from preceding states. A 
Markov-model is characterized by stochastic transitions between states, which are characterized by 
transition probabilities. In a HMM, the decision maker cannot directly observe the states but receives a 
signal (“omission”) which makes inferences about the true state possible (Zucchini & MacDonald 
2009). Figure 2 represents the three-state, first-order HHM for the decision problem described in the 
introduction. 
 
Figure 2 Hidden-Markov-Chain 
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There are nine possible transitions between the three states. The initial state is S0, which corresponds 
to the situation where either no or just a harmless flood occurs. The state S1 represents a severe flood, 
which affects just the coastal region (the “risk zone” A) and the state S2 stands for an extreme flood 
with extraordinary water-levels affecting the whole town (regions A and B). The transition from state i 
to state j is depicted by the variable ijs . Starting from S0, three transitions to the state in the next period 
are possible: Either we remain in S0 (this corresponds to transition 
00s ), which is the most probable 
transition, or we are hit by a flood event and end up in state S1 (
01s ) or even in state S2 ( 02s ). According 
to Figure 2, every state is reachable from any other state, which is a realistic model of natural disaster 
events. For example in the case of a tsunami or a hurricane, which can rapidly change its direction, the 
direct transition s02 would be highly relevant whereas for floods, which develop over time (depending 
on precipitation, the confluence of rivers etc.), also the other two sequences {s01 , s12} are plausible. In 
general, a probability of occurrence refers to 1 year and to a pre-defined area. It is usual that intensity 
and frequency are mapped on the same scale so that events of extraordinary intensity are also 
extraordinarily rare. This is why the frequency of a flood (e.g. a 100-year flood) is used as a proxy for 
severeness. Most risk-metrics for natural disasters are just restricted to the meteorological or 
geophysical factors and thus provide information about the occurrence of an extreme weather event or 
specific constellations thereof. However, in general these metrics do not include information about the 
vulnerability of the specific location. Recently so-called impact forecasts are increasingly coming into 
focus, which do not only answer the question “What is the weather?” but also “What is the weather 
doing?” (Merz et al. 2020). Our probabilities are best understood as joint event and impact forecasts. 
We term state S0 the escalation-state because the two transitions leaving S0 move towards the 
dangerous states S1 and S2. In the escalation-state S0, the decision-maker has to decide whether to 
order evacuation for (at least one of) the groups or not. State S2 represents the opposite case, the de-
escalation-state. As described above, in S2 just return-decisions have to be made. In the diagram, the 
arrows in the opposite direction, indicating the “way back to normal”, consider the de-escalation phases. 
Finally, we call state S1 the mixed state, because it comprises both escalation and de-escalation. All 
available transitions can alternatively depicted in a more efficient way as a Transition-Matrix S (Table 
1). If a Markov chain is ergodic, a property which will be fulfilled for the numerical applications of our 
model, it has a unique stationary distribution, which can be determined by solving the equation 
T =S , where ( )0 1 2, ,
T
   = . The resulting distribution *  tells us the “average” probability 
for each state (S0, S1 or S2), which remains unchanged when time progresses (Zucchini & MacDonald 
2009). 
We now turn to the main part of the information system as illustrated in Table 1. The grey variables in 
brackets indicate the warnings, which are available one period before the forecasted event occurs. The 
variable 
ik  reads as “the (warning) signal received in state i predicts state k as the state of the next 
period”. For flood, the time between two events could be between 12 and 24 hours; in the last case the 
warning represents a classic day-ahead forecast. 
The warning signal
ik is a discrete, trinary random variable  0,1,2ik  , which is sufficiently 
informative in a sense described below. The quality or precision of the information system is described 
by the conditional probability ( | )ik ijq s , which is the probability that a warning signal predicts the 
transition from the current state i to the future state k given that the true future state is j. The so-called 
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Likelihood-Matrix L (Table 1) summarizes all constellations for this conditional probability. It is 
straightforward that the rows of this matrix add up to 1.  
Table 1 Transition matrix and Likelihood-Matrix 
 
 
    
(1) 
For the information system to be sufficiently informative, it is required that the warning signals display 
a minimal degree of precision with respect to the state of nature they predict. In concrete terms, we 
impose the following Informativeness-Condition (IC) on the information system (expression (2)). 
Informativeness-Condition (IC):  ( | ) ( | )ij ij i j ijq s q s  −                  (2) 
Assume the transition ijs , i.e. the true future state is state j. Then the warning should have higher 
probability to signal state j than to signal any other state –j. If IC is fulfilled, the information-system is 
valuable or useful for the decision maker in the sense that it generates “better than random” results, 
which is an empirically correct assumption regarding the forecasting precision of EWS in practice. 
Both, the prior transition probabilities and the Likelihood-Matrix are common knowledge of all decision 
makers of our setting: the (local) government G and the populations of the two regions, which we term 
group A and group B. In each period, all actors know the current state, the issued warning signal with 
respect to the next state (both pieces of information are summarized in the variable 
ik ) and the 
Likelihood-Matrix. The warning signal is issued e.g. by a weather forecasting service and is therefore 
publicly observable. With this information, the DMs can calculate the up-dated posteriori-probability 
according to Bayes’ Theorem 
( | )
( | )
( | ) ( | )
ij ik ij
ij ik











. Formally, for a given 
state i, we combine S and L and thus derive the conditional Posterior-Matrix P according to expression 
(3).   
 
 (3) 
3.2 Rough calibration based on minimal assumptions  
Although this model serves mainly analytical purposes to understand the basic factors of interactive 
decision making on theoretical grounds, we nevertheless strive to achieve a rough calibration and put 
the model into an empirically plausible “frame”. Throughout this paper we use two types of calibration. 
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We use a set of simple and arbitrary numbers as parameter values if our main purpose is to show the 
main mechanism of the model, how it works and to illustrate a comprehensive range of potential 
solutions. We call these parameter values “arbitrary numbers”. With respect to model validation, we 
apply (and partly adjust) parameter values where we could find some reference or benchmark data. We 
call this set of numbers “hypothetical data” and apply it where we want to illustrate, for example, which 
of the derived solutions comes closest to a real world-setting.  
Now, what is the data availability with respect to the parameters of an information system as described 
in Section 3.1? First, it is needless to say that EWS are complex and specific tools with still a very low 
level of standardization for data generation and data sharing. Although many EWS use probabilistic 
forecasting and apply Bayesian tools, which makes them to a minimum degree compatible to our 
approach, unfortunately there are no databases existing which could be used for parametrization. 
However, at least for an escalation to scenario S1 of an extreme flood, i.e. for the transition 
01s , there 
are some insights from the European Flood Awareness System about the expected frequency of severe 
coastal inundation (Merz et al. 2020, p. 16). A flood, which heavily affects the coastal residents roughly 
corresponds to a frequency of 20 to 80 years, depending on geological and geographical factors of the 
built environment, the technical resilience of the region and the flood protection measures. As our model 
takes vulnerability as given, we take a 50-year-flood as a plausible case, which corresponds to an 
expected rate of occurrence of 2% per year and 0.0055% per day respectively. For the case of an extreme 
flood it is even more difficult to identify a good proxy for at least two reasons. First, there is less 
experience and data with extreme events and second, very extreme floods result from more complex 
hazard scenarios. Most frequently, they can be caused by meteorological compound events of severe 
convective storms, marine gusts and long periods of heavy precipitation. In addition, hurricanes can 
cause extreme floods and one of the most deterrent candidates are Tsunamis. EWS for Tsunamis 
determine the earliest arrivals, the time of arrival, the wave amplitude and the propagation of a tsunami 
(Chaturvedi et al. 2017, p. 84). For such very extreme events, the range lies between 200 and 1.000 
years but even reaches up to 10.000 years. The latter number refers to a flood protection exercise in the 
Netherlands, executed by the Task Force for Flood Event Management (FLOODsite, p. 115). We again 
take a medium value as an average guess and take a 500-year flood (daily event probability of 
0.00055%) as an appropriate proxy. Hence, the first row of the transition-matrix gets the entries 
0.99993950, 0.0000550 and 0.0000055 (see Figure 4). For transitions starting in state S1 and S2, it is 
not possible to extract benchmark numbers from literature or flood reports because the further 
worsening of an already bad situation (transition 
12s ) is usually not registered as a separate event. In 
addition, the warning process during a de-escalation is partly different from an escalation because a 
warning system has to fall below a certain threshold before the alarm is deactivated and the region is 
declared safe again. Hence, although it is important to understand the interactions and dynamics of the 
de-escalation events, too, evidence is scarce. For this reason we filled the rest of the Transition-Matrix 
together with two flood experts, taking the warning bias (threshold-deactivation of the EWS) into 
consideration. The left matrix in expression (4) shows the calibrated Transition-Matrix S. For these 
values, we get ( )0 1 2* 99.9797%, 0.0167861%, 0.00347298%   = = = =  as the stationary 





In the next step we look for empirical values of the Likelihood-Matrix, i.e. data which tells us something 
about the precision and effectiveness of flood-EWS, also called EWS-verification. In verification of 
weather warning, most approaches apply contingency tables and corresponding scores, as e.g. the 
equitable threat score (ETS) in UK and a combination of ETS, the probability of detection (POD), the 
false alarm ratio (FAR) together with the frequency bias is used in Austria (Wilson 2018, Wilson & 
Giles 2013). The most advantageous account was provided by Wilson & Giles (2013). The authors 
evaluated contingency-table data between 2009 and 2011 of a Canadian flood-EWS in order to arrive 
at an improved warning index. For a severe flood-event they derive a HIT-rate of 75% and a False-
Alarm (FA)-rate of 2%. For an extreme flood the EWS-precision is lower according to the literature. 
Although, for example, nearly all tsunamis can be detected by modern EWS, there is uncertainty about 
under- and overestimating the wave height and the exact localization. Here the uncertainty can be 
considerable with fluctuations between 30-50% (Lauterjung & Letz, 2017, p. 41). Therefore we 
consider this uncertainty and adjust for noise. We assume a HIT-rate of 60% and a FA-rate of 6% for 
S2. We use these values for our study but have to adjust the calculation because our setting considers 
three states (including warning states). Matrix L (matrix with letter-entries in the middle of expression 
(4)) represents a general Likelihood-Matrix which helps to understand the calculations. The HIT-rate 
for state S1 is calculated by taking the HITS (cells e + f + h + m) and divide them by HITS and misses 
(cells d + g). For state S2 we have the same procedure but different cells are relevant, here we have m 
divided by (m + g + h). The FA-rates are the ratio of the false alarms in the numerator and the false 
alarms together with the “correct negatives” in the denominator. This corresponds to the ratios (b + c)/(a 
+ b + c) for S1 and (c + f)/(a + b + c + d + e + f) for S2. We further have to consider the Informativeness-
Condition (IC), which requires a > b > c, m > h > g, e > d and e > f. The right part of expression (4) 
shows all entries of the matrix 0L , which fulfill the ensemble of the before mentioned conditions. The 
likelihood-matrices for the mixed-scenario (S1) and the de-escalation-scenario (S2) could not be 
derived in a similarly precise way. Here again we took 0L as anchor and consulted the two flood experts. 
The resulting matrices are shown in expression (5). 
 
(5) 
Expressions (4) and (5) comprise the “hypothetical dataset” for the IS-validation. By applying Bayes’ 
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Altogether, these numbers are oriented at real EWS-data reflecting current performance of an EWS for 
(coastal) flood risk without imposing too many restrictions, which otherwise bear the risk to be 
unjustified on empirical grounds. In the first place, this model provides the formal “infrastructure” for 
an analysis and if transferred to a concrete context, assumptions can be fine-tuned towards the specific 
forecasting technology and data basis as illustrated by the reference above. 
4. Decision Model 
In this section, we briefly describe the objective functions and strategies of the local government G and 
the citizens of the two regions A and B. For the ease of exposition, we talk about “group A” and “group 
B” and an objective function reflects the (dis)utility of one representative member of each group. As all 
objective functions are scenario-dependent, for each type of decision maker we have an objective 
function for the escalation-state (S0), the mixed-state (S1) and the de-escalation state (S2). In the model, 
we express all types of payoffs in disutility-units, such as damage, deprivation and economic loss. 
Therefore, the resulting objective functions are cost functions, where the term “cost” is just shorthand 
for disutility reflecting different forms of negative consequences for the individuals. In each state, the 
groups and the local government G observe the warning signal ꙍik, update the priors accordingly and 
make their respective decision. For the description of the model structure but even for the derivation of 
the equilibrium conditions it is not necessary to take the warning-levels explicitly into consideration. 
Therefore, for the most part of this section, we suppress the warning-level k in the notation and just use 
the short form ijp  to describe the conditional probabilities ( | )ij ij ikp p s   of a transition to state j 
given the current state i and “any” warning-level k. This way, the analysis is more general but also more 
comprehensible. Later, we evaluate the ijp -values for different warning-levels.  
4.1 Decision variables, payoff parameters and trust variables 
Decision variables 
The discrete, binary decision variable {0,1}Av  for group A (and Bv  for group B respectively) 
describes the decision of a representative member of group A. The choice , 1A Bv =  always represents 
the cautious option of the decision, which is “evacuation” in the escalation-state and “stay evacuated” 
in the de-escalation-state. Accordingly, , 0A Bv =  represents the risky option of a decision 
corresponding to “no evacuation” in the escalation-state and “return home” in the de-escalation-state. 
While both groups choose an action strategy, the government G chooses a communication strategy. In 
particular, G picks one out of three types of requests { }E E0,E1,E2 . The request E0 is equivalent to the 
message “no evacuation necessary in both regions” in the escalation-state and “return to both regions 
is possible” in the de-escalation-state. Although G has a trinary strategy set, each group receives a binary 
signal 
, {0,1}A BE  . For request E0, the received signals are identical ( 0, 0)A BE E= =  because the order 
is the same for both groups. Request E1 is equivalent to the message “evacuation in region A but no 
evacuation necessary in region B” in the escalation-state and to “stay evacuated in region A but return 
to region B is possible” in the de-escalation-state. Hence, request E1 generates the signals 
( 1, 0)A BE E= = . Finally, request E2 corresponds to the message “evacuation in both regions” in the 
escalation-state and “stay evacuated in both regions” in the de-escalation-state. By observing the request 
E2, each group receives the same signal ( 1, 1)A BE E= = . Note that there is no possibility for the 
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signal-combination ( 0, 1)A BE E= =  because this would imply a contradiction (if evacuation is ordered 
to the whole town, this automatically includes group A, too).   
The described communication strategies of the government include both active and passive 
communication. With respect to the request E1, the government has to take into consideration that the 
very same message has different content for each group, i.e. the signals vary. However, as the analysis 
in section 5 shows, even an identical signal (as in the case of the requests E0 and E2) can cause different 
reactions by the two groups because their risk situation is different. 
Payoffs 
With respect to the disutility of the citizens, we distinguish three types of cost. The most important cost 
component is D, which is relevant if a person is hit by a flood. It represents potential death and injury 
or strong deprivation (in the case of lack of food, water, medicine). The other two cost components refer 
to the cost of evacuation and capture the inconvenience, nuisance or deprivation with less relevance for 
health. The parameter mc  reflects the direct cost of the evacuation itself (“cost for moving”, therefore 
the index m) and dc  reflects the deprivation of one evacuated period. This cost term takes into account 
the fact that those affected by an evacuation are exposed to a particularly difficult and stressful situation 
together with the nuisance that the normal course of everyday life is disrupted. The superscript d 
therefore stands for either deprivation or disruption. We assume a clear-cut order of the cost-
components 0 m dc c D   . 
The government takes the before mentioned disutility-components into account, too. In addition, G 
cares for two types of economic losses. The loss-parameter 
L
 reflects the economic opportunity cost 
of an unjustified evacuation due to foregone business revenues in the region. The loss parameter 
H
 
captures the loss of human capital if people are hit by a flood. In addition to the direct physical damage 
D, affected people are either not available or not productive for a time span after the flood because they 
are in hospitals, suffer at home from injuries or psychical stress or they have to care for their peers. 
Note that all cost components refer to one period (the focal period of planning) except the human-
capital-loss, which reflects a medium-term future loss. To consider this difference, we add a discount 
factor 0 1   to the human capital-loss component. The superscripts L and H stand for “low” and 
“high”, which should help to order the cost components visually. We assume 0 L H D   . 
Direct evacuation cost are not included in the government’s decision because civil protection is the 
primary task of the local government. In addition, there are often soft budget constraints for disaster 
situations. Extra funds are made available by the central government because policy makers, and in 
particular their voters, will not tolerate a high death toll. However, budget issues always play a role and 
in the context of disasters, they most probably affect future decisions. As done in section 3, we also 
want to roughly calibrate these five cost components to get an approximate order of magnitude. The 





Table 2 Calibration of cost parameters 
Variabl
e 
Value [€] Description 
D  65 10     Value of Statistical Life (VSL); Viscusi & Aldy (2003) 
mc  21.6 10     Lost net value of production (day); Schröter et al. (2008) 
dc  32.5 10     Lost net value of production x deprivation factor 
L
 31.25 10     Lost net value of production (week); Schröter et al. (2008) 
H
 45 10   
  Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY); Cropper & Sahin 
(2009) 
 
Expected flood impact and competence trust in the government 
As already mentioned above, there is an information asymmetry between the government and the two 
groups with respect to the expected impact [0,1]  of a potential flood. Although there are event 
probabilities available, there can remain doubts whether and how severely even an extreme flood could 
harm and affect individuals (Dow & Cutter 2000). In the context of flood risk, people often wrongly 
estimate the speed and power of water flows, the effects of an impairment of critical infrastructure and 
the destabilizing impact of high water levels on buildings (which is why people often prefer sheltering 
in high buildings to evacuation). The expected impact of a flood as perceived by group A is given by 
ˆ(1 )c cA A A A AE   = + − ,  0,1A  . The variable [0,1]
c
A   reflects the competence trust in the 
government’s impact assessment and the variable {0,1}AE   is the received binary signal, which 
directly results from G’s request as described above. The variable ˆ ( )A   is the independent belief of 
group A about the potential impact of a flood, which the individuals infer from the warning-level  . 
The higher 
c
A , the higher the willingness of group A to take the government’s request into account, 
i.e. to interpret the government’s request as credible information about flood risk (Basolo et al. 2009). 
The lower the trust parameter, the more weight is placed on the independent guess ˆ ( )A  . In the 
special case of full trust ( 1
c
A = ), the expected impact equals the binary signal AE , i.e. A AE =  and 
 0,1A  . Note that a sufficiently high trust-level can either increase or reduce the motivation to 
evacuate (or to stay in the region if already evacuated), dependent on the type of request. In the opposite 
case of full distrust ( 0
c
A = ), the expected impact equals the independent belief ˆ( ( ))A A  = . As the 
independent belief ˆ ( )A   depends on the warning-level, we need further assumptions about this 
parameter. In the case of “no warning” ( 0 = ), the independent belief of both groups is zero
ˆ( ( 0)A  = = ˆ ( 0) 0)A  = = . In the case of a flood-warning for region A ( 1 = ) we assume an 
arbitrary value ˆ0 ( 1) 1A  =   for group A, which depends on prior flood experience and the risk 
expertise of the population. As we neither look at path dependent outcomes nor incorporate issues of 
risk experience and risk communication, we treat this variable as exogenous. From the perspective of 
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group B, the impact is expected to be very low, indicated by the variable 0 1  , which stands for 
a very low probability. Hence, ˆ0 ( 1) 1B   = =  . In the case of a level-2-warning ( 2 = ), group 
B expects an impact similar to the belief of group A for a level-1-warning, ˆ0 ( 2) 1B  =  , and group 
A expects a “near to certain” strike based on the belief ˆ0 ( 2) 1A   = = − . If not otherwise stated, 
we make the assumption 
c c
A B  , which implies that the parameters for competence-trust of both 
groups are either identical or the trust-level of group A is higher because the people in the risk-zone 
expect that the government has a special focus on this region. 
Expected congestion (1 –  ) and reliability trust in the government 
The second type of trust considered in ECM is the government’s reliability with respect to evacuation 
preparation and congestion management. Let [0,1]  be a measure of evacuation effectivity, which is 
equal to zero if the roads are fully congested (in this case evacuation is impossible) and equal to one if 
there is no congestion at all. The complement (1 –  ) is then a measure of congestion. Depending on 
whether one group or both groups leave the region at the same time, there is congestion to the extent of 
1 (1 )A Bv v  − = + − . The government has the possibility to mitigate the congestion problem by an 
investment [0,1]I  into improved evacuation planning and emergency logistics, 
1 [ (1 ) ] (1 )A Bv v I  − = + − − . These measures comprise e.g. very detailed scenario planning, 
evacuation training with employees, special contracts with bus companies or even rent contracts to have 
helicopters available. We assume that this investment, i.e. the complete package of measures, is not 
observable to the public. A full investment, 1I = , stands for a perfect preparation-level, which can 
reduce the congestion-problem completely. No investment, 0I = , as the other extreme, implies that G 
has done absolutely nothing to improve the situation. In this case, the groups turn in on themselves. The 
required budget for an investment-level I  is given by ( ) [1 ]B I Log I= − − . This function implies 
( 0) 0B I = =  and ( 1)B I = = , i.e. the perfect preparation-level comes at an infinitively high cost. 
As the public cannot observe the investment-level, both groups need to trust the government to have 
taken the necessary precautions (Hamm et al. 2019). The trust-parameter for reliability trust [0,1]
r   
is assumed identical for both groups. Hence, from the perspective of both groups, the expected 
evacuation effectivity is given by 1 [ (1 ) ] (1 )
r
A Bv v   = − + − − .  
4.2 Cost functions of group A and B 
Escalation-scenario S0 
The cost-functions for both strategies of group A and S0 are given by the expressions (7) and (8). 
( ) ( ) ( )( )0 00 01 02( 1) 2 (1 ) 1 (1 )S m d m dA A A A A AC v p c c p p c D c   = = + + + + − + − −   (7) 
( )0 01 02( 0)
S
A A AC v p p D= = +                       (8) 
If group A evacuates ( 1Av = ) although the evacuation is unnecessary (to be expected with probability 
00p ), the group incurs twice the moving-cost 
mc  (the group moves out of the region but returns when 
the false alarm is realized) and once the cost for evacuation-deprivation dc . These two cost-elements 
are not involved in the case of no evacuation ( 0Av = ). When the group evacuates and the region is hit 
by a flood (to be expected with probability 




AD , if evacuation fails due to congestion (determined by 1 A− ), or the evacuation-cost 
dc
if the evacuation can be executed without congestion (to be expected with probability 
A ). If the group 
does not evacuate but a flood occurs, the group suffers from the high damage cost. Note that the value 
of the damage cost depends on the expected impact because we look at the problem from the group’s 
perspective. The cost functions for group B in scenario S0 look nearly identical (9), the only difference 
is that group B is not affected by a flood in region A (expected with probability 
01p ), which implies a 
lower risk of damage but a higher risk of unnecessary evacuation.      




B B AC v p D= =          (10) 
Mixed-scenario S1 
In the de-escalation-state S1, region A is already flooded and the citizens are no longer there: Either 
they evacuated in a controlled manner (depending on their evacuation-strategy in S0) or the flood 
“forced” them out of the region. In this case, they had to hastily abandon their homes, had to be saved 
by rescue services or did not survive. The following cost functions, as depicted by (11) and (12), are 
therefore only relevant for those in group A who were able to leave the region unharmed and are now 
waiting to return. Remember that in a de-escalation-state the strategy 1v =  corresponds to “stay 
evacuated” and 0v =  means “return home”.  
1( 1)S dA AC v c= =           (11) 
( )1 01 02( 0)
S m
A A AC v c p p D= = + +         (12) 
If group A stays evacuated it suffers from evacuation-deprivation dc . If A returns, it incurs the cost for 
moving back, mc , and risks to be hit a second time by a returning flood (“second wave”). We don’t 
consider congestion for the way back because there is less rush and – what is more important – if people 
get stuck on their way back they are still in a safe area. The cost functions of group B are the same as 
in scenario S0 because also in S1 region B is not flooded. 
De-escalation-scenario S2 
In S2, both groups face a de-escalation scenario. The cost-functions for A are the same as in S1 and 
those for group B, expressions (13) and (14), are equivalent. 




B B AC v c p D= = +          (14) 
4.3 Social cost function of the government G 
In the ECM, the government has the role of a policy-maker who seeks to minimize the social cost. 
Basically, the “ingredients” to the social cost function are similar to the cost functions of both groups 
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with mainly three differences. First, the government cannot decide about evacuation due to the strict 
no-enforcement-assumption. However, G seeks to optimally influence the groups’ decisions by its 
communication-strategy E  and this requires that G needs to know the parameter constellations for 
which no, partial or full evacuation is socially optimal. Second, the government communicates E  to 
both groups at the same time; therefore the social cost function is an average of the outcomes in both 
regions, weighted by the population share  . Third, G puts weight [0,1]  on the population’s 
deprivation (caused by an evacuation) but also weight [0,1]   on the economic losses. Hence, for 
1 =  and 0 = , the groups objectives and the government’s objectives come closest (although they 
are still not identical due to the information asymmetries). The physical damage parameter D  has an 
explicit weight of 1, however the implicit weight of D of course depends on  and . Fourth, the 
government has full information on the trust-sensitive parameters   and   as G knows the expected 
impact ( 1 = ) and its own investment I  into congestion reduction. The last parameter, which is 
specific to G’s decision, refers to the de-escalation-scenario.  
Escalation-scenario S0 
( )( )0 00 (1 ) (2 ) ...S m d LG A BC p v v c c    = + − + + +   
( )01 02( ) (1 )( ) ( ) (1 )( ) ...H m m d HA Ap p v D c c c v D        + + − + + + + + − + +   
( )01(1 ) (2 ) ...m d LBp v c c   + − + + +   
 ( )02(1 ) (1 )( ) ( ) (1 )( )H m m d HB Bp v D c c c v D        + − − + + + + + − +     
(15) 
The first two summands refer to group A (weighted by  ), the last two summands refer to group B 
(weighted by 1 − ). In the case that an evacuation is unnecessary, the economic opportunity cost L
occurs as an additional factor and if a necessary evacuation has not taken place – either due to congestion 
or due to a wrong decision) the medium-term cost H come on top of D  (both loss parameters are 
weighted by   as explained above).  
Mixed-scenario S1 and De-escalation-scenario S2 
For the social cost-functions in S1 (but also for S2 below), there appears one further parameter in the 
de-escalation-scenario. Suppose that group A was already affected by a flood and now has to decide 
whether to return. The return-decision can just be made by those who successfully evacuated, hence by 




 percent of the population of group A. The time-index 1t −  indicates that the share of 
people who make the return-decision depends on both, the evacuation strategy and the evacuation-






 result endogenously from the equilibrium 
evacuation-strategies as well as from the equilibrium congestion-rate (see section 5). Apart from this 





( )1 110 ( ) (1 ) ...S t d L mG A A AC p v c v c    −= + + − +  
( )111 12( ) (1 )( ) ...t d H mA A Ap p v c v D c     −+ + + − + + +  
( )10 11( )(1 ) (2 ) ...m d LBp p v c c   + + − + + +   
 ( )12(1 ) (1 )( ) ( ) (1 )( )H m m d HB Bp v D c c c v D        + − − + + + + + − +    (16) 
( )2 120 ( ) (1 ) ...S t d L mG A A AC p v c v c    −= + + − +  
( )121 22( ) (1 )( ) ...t d H mA A Ap p v c v D c     −+ + + − + + +  
( )120 21( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ...t d L mB B Bp p v c v c    −+ + − + + − +  
 ( )122 (1 ) (1 )( )t d H mB B Bp v c v D c     −+ − + − + +               (17) 
5. Equilibrium analysis and game results 
In this section, we derive the Nash-Equilibria (NE) of the Stackelberg-game for the scenarios S0, S1 
and S2. We restrict the analysis on pure equilibria and solve the game by backward-induction, starting 
with the sub-equilibrium on stage 2 (group-interactions) and moving forward to stage 1 to identify the 
optimal evacuation-order of the government. The optimal government’s investment decision (stage 0) 
will be derived in section 6. 
In the escalation-scenario S0, both groups play a subgame on stage 2 because the groups influence each 
other via the evacuation-effectiveness parameter [0,1] , which is defined by expression (18). Note 
that although each group forms an ex ante belief about this parameter ( A and B  respectively), in 
equilibrium there results just one level of evacuation-effectiveness for the whole city.  
( ), 1 (1 ) (1 )A Bv v A Bv v y  = − + − −         (18) 
According to expression (18), for 0y =  evacuation-effectiveness is partially reduced to 1,0 if just 
group A decides to evacuate ( 1Av =  and 0Bv = ) and it is fully reduced to 1,1  if both groups evacuate 
( 1Av =  and 0Bv = ). As we assume 0 0.5  , there will be less people in the street if group A 
evacuates compared to group B. Hence, 1,1 0,1 1,00 1      . As already described above, by 
investing a share  0,1y  of a given budget in improving the traffic conditions, the government can 
reduce congestion. As the citizens cannot observe the investment they form a belief ,
r
A B  about it, which 
reflects the public’s trust in G’s reliability.  
In a first step we ignore the concrete warning-level and derive a general solution for each of the three 
situations S0, S1 and S2. The last requirements, 
0 1 20 , , 1i i ip p p   and 0 1 2 1i i ip p p+ + = , are both 
straightforward and were already prescribed by section 3. Without loss of generality, we henceforth 
substitute




Figure 3 Game structure and sequence of events 
5.1 Optimal strategies in the Escalation-Scenario S0 
Optimal group strategies 




A BT  , which constitute critical thresholds for the conditional 
probability 

















































         
(21) 




A B BT T T  . 
Proof: The order can be easily verified by taking into consideration the parameter assumptions made 
above: 1,1 0,1 1,00 1      , 010 1p  , ˆ ˆB A   and 
c c
A B  . 
We can then state the following Proposition 1a. 
Proposition 1a (Group-Equilibrium in S0) 
The group-equilibrium of the sub-game on stage 2 for scenario S0 is given by 




Ap T ;         (22) 




A BT p T  ;        (23) 
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BT p          (24) 
Proof: For ( 0, 0)A Bv v= =  to be a NE, two conditions (I) 
0 0( 0, 0) ( 1, 0)S SA A B A A BC v v C v v= =  = =  
and (II) 
0 0( 0, 0) ( 0, 1)S SB A B B A BC v v C v v= =  = = must be fulfilled. In words, both groups must 
strictly prefer not to evacuate provided that the other group sticks to the no-evacuation-strategy, too. 
For each condition, there is a critical threshold for 








Bp T . Hence, a NE 
where no group evacuates requires 
0 0
02 1 01 1[ , ]
S S

















but not vice versa). Hence, if group A does not evacuate, then group B certainly does not either. 
For ( 1, 0)A Bv v= =  to be a NE, two conditions (III) 
0 0( 1, 0) ( 0, 0)S SA A B A A BC v v C v v= =  = =  and 
(IV) 
0 0( 1, 0) ( 1, 1)S SB A B B A BC v v C v v= =  = = must be fulfilled. Under this condition, group A must 
strictly prefer to evacuate given that group B does not and group B should not prefer to evacuate given 
that group A does. Again there result two conditions, constituting a critical threshold for 
02p . The first 








A BT T  
is a necessary condition for the existence of a NE and according to Lemma 1a, this condition holds true. 
The strategy-combination ( 1, 1)A Bv v= =  is a NE if the conditions (V) 
0 0( 1, 1) ( 0, 1)S SA A B A A BC v v C v v= =  = =  and (VI) 
0 0( 1, 1) ( 1, 0)S SB A B B A BC v v C v v= =  = =  are 
fulfilled. Both groups prefer to evacuate, given that the other group does so, too. The second condition 




Ap T  
Hence, a NE for both groups evacuating requires 
0 0
1 2 02[ , ]
S S

















AT  anyway). 
Hence, if group B evacuates, then group A will certainly evacuate, too. This completes the proof of 
Proposition 1a.  
Optimal government strategies 
The optimal decisions of both groups on stage 2 are anticipated by G (the government), which tries to 
minimize the social cost by deciding about its communication-strategy E . The procedure comprises 
two steps: First, we derive the critical thresholds for which G prefers the outcomes “no evacuation”, 
“partial evacuation” and “full evacuation”. Second, once we know the government’s objectives, we 
derive the optimal communication-strategy of stage 1 of the Stackelberg-game. We first define two 
terms 





( ) ( )
m d L
S
G m d L H d
c c
T p
c c D c
 
    
+ +
 −
+ + + + −




( ) (1 ) (2 )
( ) (1 ) (2 )
H d m d L
S
G H d m d L
p D c c c
T
D c c c
       
       
   − + − + − + +   
   − + − + − + +   
   (26) 








G D c c
   








G GT T  applies. 
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Proof: See Appendix 1. 
Proposition 1b defines the socially optimal strategy-combinations as envisaged by the government. To 
distinguish socially optimal strategies from individually optimal (Nash-equilibrium) strategies, we use 
a small circle ( ) as superscript.  
Proposition 1b (Optimal Government-Strategies in S0) 




Gp T  ;        (27) 




G GT p T  ;        (28) 




GT p          (29) 
Proof: If “no evacuation” of both groups ( 0, 0)A Bv v= =  minimizes the social cost-function, the social 
cost must be lower than in the two alternatives, (I) 
0 0( 0, 0) ( 1, 0)S SG A B G A BC v v C v v= =  = =  and (II) 

















GT p−  is the upper 
bound for 
02p  in (21). The government prefers that just group A evacuates ( 1, 0)A Bv v= =  if the 
following two inequalities hold: (III) 
0 0( 1, 0) ( 0, 0)S SG A B G A BC v v C v v= =  = =  and (IV) 
0 0( 1, 0) ( 1, 1)S SG A B G A BC v v C v v= =  = = . Inequality (III) is the inverse constellation to (I) and 








G GT T , therefore 02p  




Gp T  , joint 








GT as the lower bound for 02p . This completes the proof.  
5.2 Optimal strategies in the Mixed-Scenario S1 
Optimal group strategies 




A BT  , which constitute critical thresholds for the conditional 
probability 


























         (31) 
In situation S1, congestion is no longer a strategic issue between the two groups and therefore their 
objective functions are not interdependent. Thus, we are left with just one critical threshold for each 
group. Note that the optimal group strategies in S1 and S2 do not constitute a Nash-equilibrium because 
these are independent optimal strategies. 
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Lemma 2a:  1 1 110 1 0,1
S S
A BT T p      . 
Proof: We just sketch the proof by contradiction. As 
1S









A BT p T=  , B must exceed 
a lower bound 
1S
B . However, it is straightforward to show  
1 10, : 0 1S SB A B B BT         . 
We then can state the following Proposition 2a. We skip the proof because it follows the same structure 
as for Proposition 1a. 
Proposition 2a (Group-strategies in S1) 
The optimal group-strategies for scenario S1 are given by 




Ap T          (32) 




A BT p T           (33) 




BT p          (34) 
Optimal government strategies 
For the government we get the following two critical thresholds 
10 1SGT   for situation S1, as given 
by (35) and (36). 
1
1 11



















G m d L H d
c c
T
c c D c
 
    
+ +

+ + + + −
      (36) 




G GT T . 




GT  does not depend on 11p , it is sufficient to 
show that 
1 1
1 11 2( 0)
S S
G GT p T=  . In order to get the opposite result 
1 1
1 11 2( 0)
S S
G GT p T=  , 11 must exceed 
a lower bound 
1
11
S . However, for our assumptions any, value 
1
11 11
S   will strictly exceed 1. We 
conclude   111 11 110,1 : 1
S      , which completes the proof. 
Proposition 2b defines the socially optimal strategy-combinations from the government’s perspective 
for situation S1. We skip the proof because it follows the same structure as for Proposition 1b. 
Proposition 2b (Optimal Government-Strategies in S1) 




Gp T  ;        (38) 
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G GT p T  ;        (39) 




GT p          (40) 
5.3 Optimal strategies in the De-Escalation-Scenario S2 




A BT   constitute the critical thresholds for the 
conditional probability 
22p  in the de-escalation-state. In S2, both groups already evacuated. For group 
A the expression is identical to situation S1 and group B also makes the decision whether to stay 





















            (42) 
Due to B A    it is straightforward that 
2 2S S
A BT T . This brings us directly to Proposition 3a. 
Proposition 3a (Group-strategies in S2) 
The optimal group-strategies for scenario S2 are given by 




Ap T          (43) 




A BT p T           (44) 




BT p          (45) 
Optimal government strategies 
For the government we get the following two critical thresholds 
20 1SGT   for situation S2, as given 
by (46) and (47). 
2 1
1 1 11
( )d m LS S









        (46) 
2
2










         (47) 
Proposition 3b defines the socially optimal strategy-combinations from the government’s perspective 
for situation S2.  
Proposition 3b (Optimal Government-Strategies in S2) 
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Gp T  ;        (48) 




G GT p T  ;        (49) 




GT p          (50) 
 
5.4 Zones of Compliance (ZoC) 
Illustration in a probability triangle 
In this section we analyze the scope for compliance in the government’s interaction with both groups. 
For the main part of this subsection, we refer to the escalation-scenario S0. The left diagram of Figure 
4 shows the critical thresholds of both groups in S0 graphically in a probability triangle. The edges and 
the corner points of the triangle are highlighted in black. Any constellation of the conditional posterior 
probabilities, i.e. the discrete, conditional probability distribution  | 0 1 2: , ,s i i ip p p , can be marked 
in this triangle as a probability-point   with coordinates 
1 2( , )i ip p . The higher one of these 
probabilities, the closer it is to “its corner”. Assume for example that we are in state S0 and we receive 
“no warning” (
00 ). In this case, the first column of the conditional posterior matrix 0P  (6) applies and 
gives back the probability-point 
00 01 02( , , ) (0.999975,0.000024,0.000001)p p p = = . As the 
probability 
00 01 021p p p − −  comes close to 1, this point would we drawn in the origin of ordinates.  
 
Figure 4 Probability triangle for optimal decisions, just groups (left) and with authority (right) 
We now just need to spot the conditional probability in the plane and can directly infer the decisions of 













BT , which corresponds to the area “A”, just group A evacuates but group B does 




BT  in the upper corner “AB”. In this case, both 
groups prefer to evacuate. 
In the right diagram of Figure 4 we added the critical thresholds of G as dotted lines. As both lines do 
not coincide with the groups‘ thresholds, there are constellations in which the groups and the 
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government’s preferences deviate from each other. These zones of conflicting interest are highlighted 
in the diagram. In zone 0[2] G prefers that group A evacuates, which is not the preferred strategy of 
group A. There is the exact opposite constellation in zone AB[1]:  Here, G does not want group B to 
evacuate, however group B prefers evacuation. The conflicting interest between authority and groups 
results from three causes: the two information asymmetries (related to flood impact and anti-congestion 
investment) and the weighting factors  and . With respect to the information asymmetries, people 
should be always better off to follow the government (whether they actually do depends on trust) but 
with respect to the preference parameters this is not necessarily the case. For example, it is possible that 
G puts highest weight on economic loss ( 1 = ) and lowest weight on citizens’ deprivation ( 0 = ). 
In such a case, G could act too cautiously not to endanger business activities too much and show less 
consideration for the affected population. However, in our model also economic losses have a short and 
long-term component and we assume that the long-term losses due to flood injuries exceed the short-
run losses. Therefore, the outcomes of the compliance-game show a very low sensitivity with respect 
to changes in  and .  
Government communication and compliance 
For its communication-decision in scenario S0, the government is guided by Proposition 1b. However, 
G’s communication must also be effective. The request of G is effective under two conditions. First, the 
respective addressee (group A, group B or both groups) of the request is impact-sensitive ( 2ip   
( , ,( 1)
Si
A B A BT  = ) and the level of competence-trust is high enough ( , ,
c
A B A B  ). The first condition 
refers to a situation where a group expects maximal impact (remember, impact is the subjective 
probability that “an event really hits me”) but does not evaluate the consequences high enough 
compared to the less precautious alternative. In such a situation, impact-communication is effectless, 
even with the highest level of trust. The second requirement, a sufficiently high trust-level, is 
straightforward. If a group is impact-sensitive, their decision can theoretically be influenced but whether 
this influence is successful depends on the group’s perception of the credibility and trustfulness of the 
sender. The lower the trust-level ,
c
A B , the more weight is put on the “autonomous” impact parameter 
,
ˆ0 1A B    (the groups judge the impact on their own). We define *|E   as the optimal strategy of 
G if the communication is effective and *|E  if communication is ineffective. Expression (51) 
summarizes the optimal strategies of the government.  
0 ( 0, 0)
*| 1 ( 1, 0)





E E v v
E v v
  = =

 =  = =
  = =
  *| 0, 1, 2E E E E E=      (51) 
If communication is effective, the government chooses the optimal strategy according to its objective. 
This strategy minimizes the social cost-function according to Proposition 1b. If, however, 
communication is ineffective, the chosen strategy is irrelevant and therefore the whole strategy-set 
applies. We use the symbol *|E  to indicate ineffective communication and E

 as a symbol for the 
universal set, which comprises the entire set of signals.  
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Before we present the equilibrium, we first illustrate graphically how to determine the government’s 




AT  as the decision-threshold, which 
determines whether just group A decides about evacuation. As known from expression (25), this 
threshold corresponds to a line with negative slope 1. To make the scope for communication visible, 
we express 
A  by its explicit term ˆ(1 )
c c
A A A A AE   = + − , which contains the binary signal 
{0,1}AE   (as presented in section 4.1). As long as there is a minimum-level of trust ( 0
c





AT  extends to a range or spectrum of threshold-lines with the lower and upper bound 
defined by 1AE =  and 0AE =  respectively. Diagram (a) of figure 5 gives an example of such a 




AT ), the spectrum is highlighted 








A AT E = . The dotted 
line in the middle of the spectrum indicates the autonomous impact-level ˆ A , which determines the 









Figure 5 Zones of Compliance (ZoC) for different constellations 
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If the probability-point   lies within this range, the government can directly influence the group’s 
decision with its request. Therefore, we call the threshold-spectrum “zone of compliance” (ZoC). 













GT , i.e. in this situation group A 
does not evacuate (regardless of any request) although G wants it to do so. Hence, in this case the trust-
level is not high enough and the authority cannot convince the group. Diagram (b) shows the same 
situation with the only difference that the trust-level is higher. The higher trust-level widens ZoC so that 




AZoC ). Although group A would be reluctant to evacuate 
in the case of an autonomous decision without trust (  lies below the dotted line), by sending the signal 
1AE =  (more precisely, G sends signal 1E , which is received as 1AE =  by group A), the government 
can realize the lower bound of ZoC (straight red line at the bottom of ZoC). 








GT with the consequence that now G prefers no 
evacuation of group A. By sending the signal 0AE =  (signal 0AE =  from group A’s perspective), the 
government can realize the upper bound of ZoC (red black line at the top of ZoC). To summarize, given 




AT , its trust-level 
c




GT  and a current 




AZoC , the authority has influence on the decision of group 








GT  (otherwise there is no conflict of interest, regardless of the scope for compliance). 
The diagrams (d) – (f) show the critical thresholds and ZoCs for both groups; the ZoC of group A is 
colored blue and ZoC of group B is colored green. The only difference between these three pictures is 
again the trust-level while the position of  remains unchanged. In diagram (d) the trust-level is too 
low and the probability point lies outside both ZoCs. The optimal group strategies are evacuation for 
group A (
* 1Av = ) and no evacuation for group B (
* 0Bv = ). These decisions are not influenced by G, 
which means that G’s optimal strategy is  *| 0, 1, 2E E E E E=  . In words: As G’s 
communication is ineffective, G can communicate anything; the signals do not matter. In diagram (e), 









Here G has influence on the decision of group A but not on the decision of B. In diagram (f), both ZoCs 
overlap. In this constellation, G has influence on the decisions of both groups. This overlapping 
constellation can easily occur for high levels of trust because in this case the groups are willing to adapt 
their impact-expectations mainly to the government’s judgement. Therefore, this represents the best 
possible constellation for G because it can directly influence both groups by one signal.  
5.5 Nash-Equilibrium (NE) of the Evacuation-Compliance-Game 
We can now combine the interim results as stated by Proposition 1a and Proposition 1b to derive the 
main result of the Evacuation-Compliance-Game. As the general structure of the solution is not altered 
by the scenarios, we state the result for all three scenarios (S0, S1 and S2) together. Assume that the 
current situation is state Si and the decision makers receive the warning ij . The Transition-Matrix S , 
the Likelihood-Matrix 
iL  and the conditional Posterior-Matrix iP  are defined as described above. The 
probability-point ( )| 1 2,i ijs i ip p =  respresents the ij -column of iP . Furthermore, the actors’ 







GT  and 2
Si
GT . Let 
*ˆ
Av  and 
*ˆ
Bv be the optimal group strategies under 
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autonomous conditions (according to Propositions 1a, 2a and 3a), i.e. without government or with zero 
trust in the government ( 0
c c




BZoC  represent the Zones of Compliance of both 
groups. The time-structure of the Compliance-Game is given by Figure 3.  
Result (NE of ECG) 
The following strategies represent a Nash-Equilibrium of the underlying subgame on stage 1 and stage 








| 1 1 2 2 1
* * *
2 1 1
2, 1, 1( )
( ) ( ) 1, 1, 0
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The equilibrium-conditions read as follows: Expression (52) considers the case where the probability-
points lies in an area where the two ZoCs overlap. In this case, the government can advise both groups 
according to its own preferences, which can be summarized by the relative position of   and the critical 
thresholds of G. Note that the groups’ preferences do not matter for this constellation: Even if there is 
no conflict of interest (i.e. the groups pursue the same goal as G) the government still needs to care 
about its communication because the groups follow the government with any order. In constellation 
(53),   lies in the ZoC of group A but not in the zone of B.  In this case the government just 
communicates to group A. Expression (54) represents the analogue constellation for group B; G’s 
communication just focusses on group B but group A cannot be reached. The final constellation, (55), 
represents the case where   lies outside both ZoCs. In this case, G has no communicative influence. 
Hence, in equilibrium the government communicates the universal set (signals are ignored by both 
groups) and the groups play their autonomous equilibrium strategies 
*ˆ
Av  and 
*ˆ
Bv .  
5.6 Equilibrium-analysis based on the empirical reference-data 
In this section we take a closer look at the derived equilibrium-conditions by applying the reference-
data introduced in sections 3.2 and 4.1. For the most part we focus on the escalation-scenario S0 with a 
warning-level 1 and 2 because we consider these two situations to be the most frequent and relevant 
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ones. For the standard parameters we chose the values ,ˆ.5, .5, .3, .5, .5A B I   = = = = =  and rather 
low trust-levels between , [0.2,0.4]
c
A B  . The situation 01  is depicted in Figure 6(a). It can be seen 
that G would strongly advise evacuation but group A would also evacuate anyway. At a minimum trust-
level of .3
c
A  , which is illustrated in the graph, the ZoC is wide enough to embrace the probability-
point. This means that – although group A would evacuate from alone – the government should advise 
evacuation to avoid misunderstandings: Compliant citizens could wrongly interpret a missing 
evacuation order as an all-clear signal. To summarize, for a warning-level 1 the risk-decision of group 
A and G are in line, but this needs an affirmation from the government if trust and compliance are 
sufficiently high. The critical threshold of group B is not shown in the graph because the (horizontal) 
ZoC of group B starts at a probability-value 
02 0.01p =  and is thus far above the probability-point. In 
other words, in the case of a level-1-warning in S0, group B is very far from evacuating.  
 
Figure 6 Variation of warning-level and preference-parameters for S0 
But how does this change if the coastal city receives a level-2-warning? This situation is illustrated in 
diagram (b). The probability-point slightly moves to the upper-left and the critical threshold of group 
A shrinks downwards because the autonomous impact-expectation is close to 1 ( 1
W
A = − ). This 
means that group A would try whatever possible to get out of the region. However, for the chosen 
parameters, group B would not evacuate and the probability-point still remains below the critical 
threshold of the government. Hence, in spite of a level-2-warning, region B would not evacuate. Is this 
decision too risky? Above all, this decision takes into account the trade-off between physical damage 
and potential death on the one hand but also the cost of evacuation, which comprise deprivation and 
economic losses, on the other hand. If we ignore this trade-off and just take injuries and fatalities into 
consideration, the decision would be different as shown by Figure 6(c). Here we changed the 
government’s preference parameters and eliminated any other factor ( 0, 0 = = ) so that physical 
damage alone determines the decision. We see that a government, which exclusively cares for lives, 
would order evacuation of region B. This, however, is without success because the probability-point is 
not covered by the ZoC of group B. Even maximal trust would not be sufficient to change this situation: 
Full trust ( 1
c
B = ) would expand the ZoC and thus move the lower bound downwards, but only up to 
the value 
02 0.0011p = , which is still above the probability-point. For the case of a level-2-warning we 
conclude that for the empirical reference data, which we took as a basis for our study, we find ourselves 
in the conflicting trade-off between “protection from damage” and “damage through protection” and 
the bad news is that this conflict cannot be overcome by trust and compliance. For the other two 
situations S1 and S2, we get quite clear results, which is mainly due to the high probability values of 
the (conditional) posterior probabilities. Once region A or region B is affected by a flood, the 
government and the groups decide to stay evacuated and not to return. These situations are so clear – in 
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the sense that the probability-point is largely out of sight – that there is no issue for compliance. 
However, there is one constellation where compliance matters and this is exactly due to the high 
exposure: For our parameter constellation in S1, group B is close to evacuate when a warning-1-level 
is received. However, even for low values of trust the zone of compliance covers the probability-point 
so that unnecessary evacuation should not occur.    
6. Summary and Discussion 
In this contribution we presented the Warning-Compliance-Model (WCM) as a novel and 
comprehensive approach to study probabilistic and communicative aspects of public risk management 
and compliance within one coherent framework. The random events were modeled using a Hidden 
Markov chain and depicted both the escalation and de-escalation phases of hypothetical severe flood 
events. At the same time, the performance of the EWS can be taken into account by determining the 
Likelihood-Matrix accordingly. Since approaches of the literature on EWS-verification usually work 
with contingency tables, the information system of the WCM can also be linked empirically.  
The second part of the model included the communication game between the government and the two 
population groups under consideration. First, the optimal strategies of the groups were determined for 
all states of the Hidden Markov chain, representing either the evacuation decision or the decision to 
return to the region. On the part of the government, the socially desired solutions were determined from 
the perspective of the policy maker. The model is kept as simple as possible from a technical point of 
view and allows the explicit derivation of the stationary solutions of the model in a generic form. The 
methodological core of the communication game is the compliance of the population with the (non-
enforceable) orders of the government. Compliance helps the two groups (A and B) to overcome their 
information asymmetry vis-à-vis the state, provided their trust in the authority is sufficiently high. The 
higher the trust in the state, the more willing the two groups are to follow the instructions for a given 
probability distribution (as depicted in a compact form by the probability point). 
First, it is clear that compliance is only necessary when the interests of the population and the state 
diverge. Nevertheless, it should be noted that even if interests are aligned and trust is sufficiently high 
(compliance without conflict of interest), the state must communicate affirmatively to avoid 
misunderstandings. Since in this model - but ultimately also in all real world communication - silence 
also represents a signal, it would be dangerous if the state did nothing, in the deceptive certainty that 
the population itself already knew best what to do. In this respect it is clear that not only compliance is 
needed for an effective communication strategy, but also an effective communication strategy is needed 
to give a compliant group orientation during a crisis. Second, if there is a conflict of interest, it is no 
longer the distance between the critical thresholds that determines the outcome of the communication 
game, but whether the probability-point lies in the Zone of Compliance. In other words: Not the interests 
or preferences of the state per se, but the credibility of its message together with the objective probability 
of the risk ultimately determine whether compliance can arise. 
The application of empirical data from flood and risk studies to the model provides plausible results for 
the escalation scenario. For the de-escalation phase, the assumptions made and the probabilities 
suggested by the experts led to the clear result that the population in region A would already evacuate 
on its own initiative, but that the state would also order this evacuation. Since the probability point in 
this constellation lies with the Zone of Compliance for already rather low trust values, this is a quite 
clear case for the necessity of affirmative communication as described above. 
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The results for an announced Black Swan flood show that the inhabitants of region B would not react 
to an S2 warning. Remarkably, however, the government would not issue an evacuation order either, 
taking into account economic follow-up costs and the particular burden on the people that an evacuation 
would entail. Only when the government considers the costs of an evacuation to be very low compared 
to the expected consequences for life and limb caused by an extreme flood the authority would order 
an evacuation. In this case, however, the critical threshold lines of state and population group B, which 
in the model indicate readiness to evacuate, fall far apart. In order for Group B to be persuaded to 
evacuate via compliance, it must have a very high level of trust, since otherwise the probability-point 
of a black swan event would no longer lie in the (from the citizens' point of view) impact-relevant area. 
What does all this imply for improved disaster management? The Warning-Compliance-Model 
illustrates the intricate interaction between objective event probabilities, the precision of forecasting 
technology, the authority’s and public’s preferences as well as the role of trust in a communication 
game. The model can be very helpful to determine the effects of e.g. a higher EWS-precision or a higher 
trust-level on the scope for compliance and hence on the outcome in the case of a severe or disastrous 
flood event. Furthermore, the model shows that many different and important problems in the context 
of flood evacuation, which are predominantly looked separately and from a purely empirical 
perspective, such as risk communication, the crying-wolf-phenomenon or conflicts of interest, can be 
better seen as elements of one comprehensive picture. The WCM is best understood as a first step to 
identify the interlinkages between these different areas. More concrete, policy makers could consider 
some implications of this study for the development or training application of Evacuation Maps (Wilson 
2018). As different geographic areas correspond to different risk profiles and this in turn will influence 
people’s expectations, it is possible to derive a rough and preliminary guess of people’s probable 
decisions and the corresponding level of (expected) compliance. One further implication of the results 
of this study relates to risk communication. Risk communication in advance increases the impact 
expectation, which in turn requires less compliance. However, since both, compliance and risk 
communication, will depend on the same type of trust (competence trust in the authorities), this will 
enable the government to better empower people to make independent decisions before a crisis. This 
strategy, however, is particularly dependent on public trust, because it also means that too little trust in 
competence destroys both options: The population will not be convinced, either in advance or in the 
event of an approaching crisis, that the flood could affect them.  
Finally, we also want to briefly discuss potentially problematic assumptions of the model as well as 
promising model extensions.  As already mentioned we admit that the assumption of a representative 
decision maker for each group simplifies away some interesting and important aspects. It is promising 
to take the heterogeneity of people into account because differences in preferences of stakeholders will 
have an impact on their willingness to evacuate (e.g. vulnerable people, such as assisted care 
individuals, or gender differences (Bateman & Edwards 2002). We also assume that the assignments of 
buildings and individuals to zones is clear-cut. However, this is far from straightforward: “A study 
before Hurricane Irene found that 83% of adults without a high-school education (e.g. 46% of East 
Harlem’s population in 2006) could not identify their evacuation zone.” (Wilson 2018, p.9). Similarly, 
special forms of evacuation such as long term resettlements and relocations (Sorensen & Sorensen, 
2006) are less well representable in the model, either. With respect to the preferences, we assume in our 
model that just the government takes economic losses into account. However, this will also be an 
important motive for small businesses. Finally, it could be very promising to apply more psychological 
145 
 
approaches like risk perception theory, prospect theory or protection motivation theory to this 
framework. One complicating challenge of such an extension is that this introduces path-dependence 
into the model so that the derived closed-form solutions are just relevant for the described stationary 
solutions. Nevertheless, risk perception is ultimately a history-dependent phenomenon and it should be 
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Article 4: Were the floods in the UK 2007 and Germany 2013 game-
changers? 
Abstract 
This paper examines recovery after major floods in the UK and Germany. It focuses on two areas that 
were badly hit by flooding: Catcliffe, near Sheffield in the United Kingdom and Passau in Bavaria, 
Germany. It reports on surveys of residents and businesses in each place and on surveys of national 
flood experts in both countries. The two events were comparable in terms of impacts, levels of 
preparedness and government response and show similar patterns of speed and quality of recovery. In 
Germany it took about 18 months for ≥90% of residents to get back to normal, while in the UK it took 
a year longer. This difference may be related to funding; in the UK, over 90% of funding came from 
household insurance while in Germany over 60% came from federal aid, which may have been quicker. 
In both countries the economy had recovered to near normal within 12-18 months. The majority of 
people surveyed in both countries (74% in Germany and 67% in the UK) believe that their homes and 
businesses are as just as vulnerable now as they were before the respective floods. However, in the UK, 
half of the respondents thought their neighbourhood was safer and better prepared compared to only 
11% in Germany. This may be because substantial progress has been made in improving protection in 
the UK in areas flooded in 2007.  
Both floods were considered to be "game-changers" and resulted in a heightened awareness of flood 
risk, increased investment in flood defences and an increasing emphasis on citizens taking more 
responsibility for flood preparedness. However, the Environment Agency in the UK lacks powers to 
prevent development in flood prone areas, in Germany there are issues of coordination across large 
catchments that cross state boundaries and the insurance sector could play a bigger role in 'building 
back better'. Many homes and businesses continue to be at risk from major floods and more progress 
needs to be made in making them more resilient. 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to report the speed and quality of recovery of communities affected by floods, 
following events in the UK in 2007 and in Germany in 2013. The study focuses on two places that were 
severely flooded: Sheffield and Rotherham in South Yorkshire, UK, and Passau, in Bavaria, near the 
Austrian border, Germany. Both places have been flooded numerous times. Sheffield was flooded most 
recently in 2000 and 2007, while Passau, at the confluence of the rivers Inn, Ilz and Danube, was flooded 
in 2002 and 2013. In both places, face-to-face surveys were conducted with local residents and business 
people who experienced flooding and online surveys were conducted with flood experts. 
Recovery is defined as ‘returning to a normal state after a period of difficulty’ and most (lay) people 
think about disaster recovery as a return to normality [1] and an attempt to bring the post disaster 
situation to some level of acceptability [2] and normal level of performance [3]. In this paper, since 
complete restoration may take a very long time, we argue that a concept of ‘close to normality’ is more 
meaningful and we therefore define recovery as being when 90% of displaced people have returned to 
their repaired homes, 90% of disrupted businesses are back in operation and 90% of the affected 
working population has returned to work. 
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However, a different question is whether getting back to normal conditions is at all a meaningful goal. 
Post-disaster ‘normal’ may not be a return to the same status as before the event; in fact, this may be 
undesirable if the quality of a system could be improved to enhance resilience. Recovery from disaster 
may be envisaged as a process of resilience building, whereby the capacity of a community to spring 
back after the initial shock of a disaster is increased [4]. Floods can act as catalysts for human adaptation 
[5] and there is a ‘window of opportunity’ in the early phase of recovery to improve resilience or ‘build 
back better’ [6]. A balance must be achieved between speed and enhanced resilience [7]. 
It has been suggested that the basic functions of a community should be restored within two years to 
ensure successful recovery [8]. Within this period, governments are required to manage a disaster and 
restore functionality of critical systems, and so issues relating to an event are pushed high up the policy 
agenda [9]. 
2. UK floods 2007 
During the summer of 2007, a series of destructive storms hit many parts of the UK [10]. Average 
rainfall across the country was more than double the seasonal average and some areas received a 
month’s precipitation in 24 h [11]. In the north of England, flooding was particularly severe along the 
Trent catchment in and around Hull, Sheffield and Doncaster. In the south, Gloucester, Tewkesbury, 
Cheltenham and Oxfordshire were flooded along the Severn–Avon catchment and the Upper Thames 
valley (table 1). The 2007 flood events cost the UK economy USD 3.3–4.9 billion [13]. Thirteen people 
died and hundreds had to be rescued. Around 48 500 homes were affected, each costing on average 
USD 32 000 to repair. The repair cost for flooded businesses averaged between USD 95 and 142 000. 
While almost every business was adequately covered by insurance, a quarter of affected homes were 
not fully insured [14]. 
Table 1 Flooding by region, UK [12] 
UK Region Households Businesses Cities Buildings 
Yorkshire/Humberside 23,479 3,718 Hull 6,500 
   Sheffield 5,800 
   Doncaster 5,171 
West Midlands 8,450 1,453 Gloucester 1,150 
South West 4,915 1,000 Tewkesbury 1,150 
   W. Oxfordshire 1,655 
East Midlands 4,581 290 Derby  
South East 5,896 129 Oxford  
London 1,108 302 London  
In Sheffield, the River Don burst its banks, flooding mainly commercial and industrial units. Catcliffe, 
our UK study area, is a village suburb northeast of Sheffield. During the night of 25 June, the River 
Rother overtopped its banks, flooding nearly 200 homes in Catcliffe (about 50% of total in Catcliffe). 
Flood depths were so high that about 100 bungalows were almost completely submerged the lowest 
parts of the village [12]. Over 700 residents were evacuated after cracks appeared in the dam at Ulley 
reservoir [15] and the M1 motorway was closed [16]. 
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In both Sheffield and Hull, the drainage systems were unable to cope, in part because of inadequate 
maintenance [17]. In Hull and the East Riding, 20% of homes were flooded [10]. In Yorkshire, four 
major and 55 secondary substations were flooded, disrupting the electricity supply to 130 000 people, 
including residents in Catcliffe, for more than a fortnight [18]. The flooding also had psychological 
impacts and long-term mental health effects [19–21]. A survey of 2265 people in South Yorkshire 
reported that mental health issues were significantly higher among flood victims [22]. 
In the UK, two million homes were at flood risk (in a 1 : 100 year flood hazard area) in 2005 [23]. By 
2018, largely because of continued construction on flood plains, that estimate had risen to 5.5 million 
homes [24]. In terms of awareness and preparedness, The Pitt Review [25] found clear evidence that 
the UK was inadequately prepared for the 2007 floods. In the UK, population growth has driven 
extensive building on flood plains despite scientific understanding of the associated hazard. The review 
also presented evidence that storm drains in new housing developments had not been checked and 
adopted by the appropriate water authorities, drains and rivers in urban areas were blocked, while 
culverts and ditches in rural areas had not been kept clear and maintained [26]. UK businesses at risk 
of flooding also showed a lack of preparedness that affected their rate of recovery [27]. A case study of 
businesses near Catcliffe concluded that in spite of some level of preparedness against direct impacts, 
there is considerable lack of preparatory measures for the indirect effects of flooding and business 
interruption [28]. 
3. German floods 2013 
In May 2013, total rainfall amounted to three times the monthly average throughout Germany and 
record river levels were recorded throughout the country. Most major catchments in Germany, apart 
from the Rhine, experienced some level of flooding. Flooding progressed along the Elbe catchment, a 
main artery flowing north through Germany to the North Sea, and along the Danube catchment, flowing 
east through southern Germany into Central and Eastern Europe. In Germany, disaster alerts were 
declared periodically between May and June in eight of Germany’s 16 federal states [29]. 
The 2013 floods affected 600 000 people, caused 14 fatalities and cost the German economy USD 6.7–
9.1 billion. In total, 80 630 residents in eight federal states were evacuated. In terms of financial loss, 
Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony and Bavaria were the three most affected German states (table 2). Private 
households incurred approximately 22% of all losses, with an average loss per household of USD 56 
000. In Passau, the location of this case study, flooding was particularly severe (over 1 in 100-year 
return period) where dyke breaches caused large-scale inundations [30]. Passau is situated at the 
confluence of the rivers Danube, Inn and Ilz, and the highest water level (12.85 m) since 1501 was 
recorded. Passau’s Old Town in the heart of the city was at the centre of the flood zone and water 
reached the second floor of some buildings [31]. The 2013 floods were not as severe, however, as the 
2002 floods, which caused 20 fatalities and the evacuation of 337 000 people [32]. Improvements in 
structural defences meant most places experienced less damage in 2013. However, some areas, 
including Passau, were not as fortunate. The German transport network was severely affected, and over 
700km of roads and 150 bridges were damaged and the German Railways Corporation was forced to 
close 60 routes. Psychological impacts were also significant and a survey of 710 residents affected by 
flooding across Germany in 2013 found that, in terms of recovery, the amount of damage was less 
important than psychological factors [33]. 
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Table 2 Flooding by State Germany [17] 
German State Houses Economic Loss 
USD million 
Evacuated 
Bavaria 13,000 1,805 13,600 
Saxony 13,000 2,654 23,300 
Saxony-Anhalt ND 3,725 40,000 
Baden -Wuerttemberg 3,697 102 200 + 
Brandenburg 1,100 127 3,500 
Thuringia ND 624 ND 




In Germany, three million people live in areas that are considered flood-prone, with a 1 in 10 year 
probability of experiencing potentially damaging and life-threatening river floods [34–36]. There were 
improvements in preparedness after the 2002 floods [37] and a survey of residents in Saxony found 
significant improvements in preparedness between 2002 and 2013 [38]. In 2013, 23% were very well 
prepared compared to only 3% in 2002 and 78% of respondents said they were completely unprepared 
in 2002, compared to only 19% in 2013. More significantly, there was major investment in flood 
protection. In the Elbe catchment area, dykes were rebuilt or reinforced, and mobile flood barriers were 
used to hold back water in the Elbe, Danube and Vltava [39]. 
Table 3 compares the UK 2007 and German 2013 floods and shows that the scale of the floods was 
comparable, with the German floods perhaps twice as severe in terms of people displaced and economic 
loss. The main difference was that Government aid in Germany was considerably higher than in the UK 
[41]. 
Table 3 Comparison of the impact of flooding in UK and Germany [33,34,40]. 
 UK 2007 Germany 2013 
Extent 6 out of 9 Regions 8 out of 16 States 
Fatalities 13 14 
People Displaced 38,000 80,000 
GDP, PPP (event year) USD 2.2 tn USD 3.6 tn 
Economic Loss USD 3.3 – 4.9 bn USD 6.7  9.1 bn 
Insurance Loss USD 2.6 bn USD 1.8 bn 
Average cost per house USD 32,000 USD 56,000 
Insurance Households 75% 32% 
Government Aid USD 180 mn USD 8.9 bn 
Flood risk homes 2018 5.5 mn 3 mn 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Surveys of households and businesses 
Interview surveys were conducted with people living or working in two places badly affected by the 
floods Sheffield in South Yorkshire, UK and Passau in Bavaria, Germany. Within these cities, 
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residential areas in the flooded zones near the river were chosen because people there were more likely 
to have experienced flooding or be aware of the risks. Nearly two-thirds of people surveyed lived within 
1km of the river that flooded (65% UK; 63% Germany) and about half had experienced being flooded 
(44% UK; 55% Germany). In Sheffield, Catcliffe, a village close to the River Rother between Sheffield 
and Rotherham was targeted. Although Sheffield city centre was flooded very few people still live there. 
Sheffield has undergone huge economic changes in the past 12 years and few people working in 
businesses in 2007 would have still been there at the time of the survey in 2018. By contrast, in Passau 
many people still live in the historic centre and Dreiflüsse-Eck, the ‘Three Rivers Corner’, was targeted. 
Although Catcliffe is a low density commuter village and Dreiflüsse-Eck is in the historic centre of 
Passau, both areas are of similar size, 30–37 ha. They also had similar populations, 2100 and 2990 and 
similar age profiles. In Catcliffe, 52% of properties were flooded and in Dreiflüsse-Eck approximately 
70% were flooded (table 4). 
Table 4 Comparison of floods in Catcliffe and Dreiflüsse-Eck (Three Rivers Corner). 
 Catcliffe, Sheffield/Rotherham Dreiflüsse-Eck (Altstadt), Passau 
Character  low density commuter village  high density, historic city centre 
Location 2.5 miles from Rotherham and 4 
miles from Sheffield city centre 
historic centre of Passau at 
confluence of Danube, Inn and Ilz 
Date flood 25-Jun-07 03-Jun-13 
Population 2011 2,108 2,990 
Population year of flood 1,971 2,981 
Population 18-64 (%) 64 66 [42] 
Area 30 ha 37 
Flooded area 16 ha [43] 26 ha [44] 
Flooded area % 52 70 
Properties total/flooded 372/195 800/560 [45] 
Evacuation Forcible evacuation due to fears 
dam failure 
Water supply failure meant 60 
inmates of Passau prison had to be 
transferred  
We used maps of flooded areas to identify households and businesses to target for interview in advance 
and we also made appointments by telephone to meet and interview people working in local 
organizations affected by the flooding, including the library, church, cafes, the supermarket, bars, 
garages and the cinema. Over 90% of the surveys were conducted face-to-face with residents and local 
business people who had experienced some level of flooding. The remaining interviews were conducted 
on the telephone. 
People living and/or working in the affected places were asked three simple questions. 
• When do you feel you got back to or almost to normal? How many months was this after the 
flood? If you are still recovering, how long do you think it will take? 
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• Do you feel your home is safer and better able to cope with another flood, less able or about 
the same? 
• Do you think the local area has been made safer and more resilient, or about the same or worse? 
The interviews in Catcliffe were conducted over 4 days in early November 2018 and in Dreiflüsse-Eck 
over 5 days in early April 2019. In both countries, native language speakers who were familiar with the 
flood risk management supported the interviewer, a non-native speaker, to make sure there were no 
misunderstandings. 
Although the sample sizes were relatively small (32 in Catcliffe and 74 in Dreiflüsse-Eck) they are 
fairly representative of the populations living in both places. In the Catcliffe, 44% of respondents were 
female compared to 62% in Passau. In the Sheffield, 51% of inhabitants were female and in Passau 
52%. In Catcliffe, 76% of respondents travelled to work by car compared to 37% in Germany. This 
corresponds roughly with the modal split in the two places; in 2018, 60% travelled to work by car in 
the Sheffield City Region and 51% travelled by car in Passau. The educational level of people surveyed 
in Catcliffe was also very similar to that of adults in Rotherham and Sheffield [46–50]. 
4.2 Surveys of flood experts 
Separate surveys, with more detailed questions, were also conducted with recognized flood experts in 
each country. These included environment agency personnel, insurance assessors, academics and flood 
risk management consultants. One hundred and fifty experts were contacted by email in the UK, 27 
responded, a response rate of 18% and in Germany 110 experts were contacted and 21 responded, a 
response rate of 19%. Participants were asked how long it took for different aspects of society, including 
permanent housing, the economy and critical infrastructure, to get back to normal, defined here as a 
90% return to the pre-disaster state or a new stable norm? Experts were asked specific questions about 
the speed and quality of recovery. 
1. How long did it take or will it take for the aforementioned sectors to recover 90% or more or 
to get to a new stable norm? 
2. How have the aforementioned sectors changed compared to before the disaster? (5-point scale, 
much worse to much better plus do not know). 
They were also asked questions about the impact of the disaster, the role and performance of the state, 
the impact of insurance sector on the speed of recovery, and finally about the amount and speed of 
funding. Statistical tests were used to measure the significance of the results. For ordinal data, for 
example, impact and vulnerability, the non-parametric Mann–Whitney U-test for two sample cases was 
used. The Kruskal–Wallis ANOVA was applied to multiple samples, for example, to compare quality 
of recovery in different sectors. For interval data, for example, speed of recovery, the T-test was used. 
5. Results 
5.1 Impact of the floods 
There is a growing understanding that speedy recovery and enhanced resilience is associated with a 
complex interaction of factors including the speed and adequacy of funding, governance, decision-
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making and preparedness [51]. Nevertheless, the severity of the flood impacts is also important [52–
54].  
 
Figure 1 Impact of the 2007 floods in the UK and the 2013 floods in Germany, experts’ opinion 
Experts in the UK and Germany were, therefore, asked about the impacts, in terms of damage and loss 
to different socio-economic sectors, of the UK 2007 and the German 2013 floods. Figure 1 shows that, 
in the opinion of experts, some sectors, for example, housing, suffered a greater impact than others 
(Kruskal–Wallis ANOVA p<0.001). Employment was not as severely affected and one might, 
therefore, expect it to recover more quickly. The pattern of damage across all sectors was remarkably 
similar in the two case studies (in all sectors Mann–Whitney U-test p>0.05). 
5.2 Speed of recovery 
A key measure of recovery is the time taken for a household or an area to return to normal after a flood. 
The survey of local residents showed that the speed of recovery was similar in the two case studies, but 
slightly faster in Germany, although the difference was not statistically significant (t-test p>0.1). In both 
countries, over half the respondents recovered within 1 year. In Germany, it took about 18months for 
90% or more of residents to get back to normal, while in the UK, it took a year longer (figure 2). This 
difference may be related to the funding mechanism. In the UK, over 90% of funding came from 
household insurance while in Germany over 60% came from federal aid, which may have been quicker. 
Of the surveyed residents, in the UK 89% had household insurance that covered flood damage, 
compared to only 21% of respondents in Germany. 
Figure 2 shows a close correlation between local residents’ memories of how long it took to get rehoused 
and experts’ impressions of the speed of housing recovery for both the UK and Germany (t-test UK and 
Germany p>0.05). Any small difference may result from a difference in the wording of the question to 
each group. Residents were asked to say exactly how long it took to get into their own home while 
experts were asked to say how long on average they thought it took people to be rehoused. It is 
interesting to see that experts tend to underestimate the rate of recovery of the first two years. However, 





Figure 2 Speed of recovery - Residents and Experts 
Experts were also asked about the rate of recovery in various socio-economic sectors for both countries. 
Figure 3 shows the pattern of recovery for the three key sectors of housing, the economy and 
infrastructure. In both the UK and Germany, experts considered that it took slightly longer for housing 
to recover than the economy and infrastructure, but any difference between sectors was not statistically 
significant (ANOVA UK p=0.2, Germany p=0.3). In both countries, the economy had recovered to near 
normal within 12–18 months.  
 
Figure 3 Speed of recovery by sector 
These findings are supported by other research. In the UK, at the end of May, 11–12 months after the 
floods, local authorities estimated that about 75% of households were back in their homes [25] and the 
economy of the Yorkshire and Humberside Region had returned to pre-disaster production levels within 
14 months [55]. In Germany, a survey of 752 flood-prone residents 18 months after the event revealed 
that 52% of respondents had almost fully repaired the damage to their buildings and 28% of respondents 
said they were back to normal [33]. Only 20% of respondents were some way from completion or 
indicated that the flood event still strongly affected them. 
5.3 Quality of recovery 
Residents were asked about their perception of changes (since the flood) to the flood safety of their 
home and neighbourhood on a five-point scale, from much safer and better prepared too much worse. 
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Most interesting, the reported pattern of vulnerability of the home is almost the same in the UK and 
Germany (Mann–Whitney U-Test p=0.94). Almost the same proportion of residents in the UK (29%) 
and Germany (26%) believe that their homes are now safer and better prepared than prior to the flood 
(figure 4). However, the majority of participants in both countries (74% in Germany and 67% in the 
UK) believe that they are as just as vulnerable now as they were before the flood. These results are 
supported by a survey of nearly 1000 residents in Saxony [37]. After the 2013 floods, 68% of residents 
said that their situation in terms of safety and amenity was the same. However, 30% said it was worse 
or much worse. Similar percentages were obtained for recovery after the 2002 floods (same 69%, worse 
or much worse 28%). 
There was a clear and significant difference in opinion between case studies (Mann–Whitney U-Test 
p<0.01) in terms of the vulnerability and preparedness of their neighbourhood (figure 4). In the UK half 
of the respondents thought their neighbourhood was safer and better prepared compared to only 11% in 
Germany, where 86% thought their neighbourhood was just as vulnerable. This difference in perception 
may be explained by differences in terms of flood protection and mitigation measures between the two 
case studies. 
 
Figure 4 Residents’ opinions about vulnerability of their home and neighbourhood 
Experts in the UK and Germany were asked detailed questions about how different aspects of society 
and the economy had changed compared to before the disaster. Figure 5 shows that experts in Germany 
believe that there has been a modest improvement in all sectors after the 2013 floods (Mean=3.2–3.5, 
Mann–Whitney U-test p= <0.05). However, in the UK, experts thought only housing and infrastructure 
had shown any improvement since the 2007 floods. 
Local people were also asked about their level of preparedness. In Catcliffe, 50% of respondents felt 
they were at high or very high risk of flooding compared to 27% in Passau. Yet only 28% of respondents 






Figure 5 Experts’ assessments about change in socio-economic sectors 2007 
5.4 Funding recovery: role of the state and the insurance sector 
There was a clear difference in funding between the UK and Germany; 63% of experts in the UK 
considered funding to be inadequate compared to only 6% in Germany. Only 19% of expert respondents 
in the UK and 5% in Germany thought funding was too slow (figure 6). The key difference between the 
two countries, however, was the source of funding. In Germany, flood insurance penetration was 
relatively low at 32% in 2013 compared to 75% in the UK in 2007, which meant recovery in Germany 
was more reliant on state aid and the Federal Government had to come to the aid of flood victims. These 
figures correspond closely to those in the case study areas. In Catcliffe, 79% of respondents were 
insured compared to only 21% in Passau. 
The total flood aid budget in Germany was 8 billion, of which 1.5 billion was earmarked to repair 
federal infrastructure and the rest was split evenly between the federal government and the states [56]. 
The UK 2007 floods were exceptional and insurers have said that because so many properties were 
flooded (55 000) it took time to both visit and repair them all, thereby delaying recovery [25]. 
Nevertheless, over half the experts in the UK (54%) and over a third in Germany (39%) thought that 
insurance reduced recovery time by 12 months or more (figure 7). 
Experts in Germany thought that the Federal and State authorities performed better than UK experts felt 
the UK local and national government performed. Figure 7 shows that 64% of experts in Germany 
thought the State performed well or very well compared to only 12% in the UK. Experts in the UK and 
Germany were also asked what they thought went particularly well or badly in managing the floods. 
What is striking is that their comments are remarkably similar (table 5). Experts in both countries 
highlighted an improvement in storm forecasts and warnings compared with previous floods, improved 
collaboration and coordination between agencies and emergency services, mutual support that meant 
communities were more resilient and recovered quicker and finally the initiation of flood resilience 
improvements. In terms of things that went badly experts in both the UK and Germany highlighted the 
overwhelming scale of the floods, coordination difficulties and long-term psychological issues. On the 
other hand, the states and task forces were unprepared and under resourced for the scale of the disasters; 
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flood defences were inadequate and critical infrastructure was vulnerable; and in both countries some 
flood victims suffered long-term psychological effects. 
The benefits of flood insurance are clear: insurance not only compensates for loss but also reduces risk 
by mapping flood hazard, declining cover and thus encouraging better practice [57]. The Association 
of British Insurers (ABI) estimate that the average payout for the UK 2007 floods was between £15 000 
and £45 000 against an average household insurance premium of £339 [14]. The impact on wellbeing 
is also significant. A study into the health impacts of flooding in 30 different locations in England and 
Wales concluded that having adequate insurance cover reduced stress, and incurring uninsured losses 
had negative health effects [19]. A health impacts survey for the Pitt Review found that being displaced 
for long periods had a significant effect on people’s wellbeing. 
  
Figure 6 Adequacy and speed of funding recovery 
 
 
Figure 7 Effect of insurance and role of the state 
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Table 5 Comments by experts on what went well and what went badly 
Germany (21 Experts) UK (27 Experts) 
Things that went well 
− Forecast and warning much better than in 2002 
− Cooperation among authorities, and authorities 
with rescue team 
− Long term volunteers support 
− Coordination between volunteers and the city 
− Better preparedness than 2002 
− Awareness and preparation have increased a lot 
since 2002 
− 2013 flood damage was 1/3 of 2002 due to 
better preparation 
− Tipping point in disaster preparedness and 
prevention in regard to flooding and storm 
surge 
− Warning and evacuation better than in 1953 
− Swift response of Fire service and Environment 
Agency  
− Improved management of communications, 
better collaboration, better reporting from 
media 
− Coordination private and public /charity sector 
− Local authority wardens worked to build 
community resilience 
− Community support and response via social 
media 
− Insurance company's initial response rapid 
− Home insurance helped no end 
− Floods set in motion a number of important 
improvements to warning and informing 
capabilities and more resilient infrastructure 
Things that went badly 
− Task forces unprepared for scale of flood 
− State aid for uninsured injured parties 
undermines incentive for personal provision 
− Wrong warning of flood height and flood 
characteristic surprised residents at night 
− Some coordination problem in the field due to 
differences in mentality 
− Better communication is needed with public, 
disaster financing and insurance 
− Getting flood help is too bureaucratic during 
disaster 
− Dike defence is not always successful 
− Slow dyke constructions along the Danube 
− Long term psychological effects 
− State not resourced to deal with severity of 
flooding across multiple river basins 
− Local authority almost invisible 
− Lack of infrastructure preparedness to floods 
and importance of recovery as an issue to be 
considered 
− Co-ordination and preparation poor, few had 
signed up to flood warnings, few understood 
division of responsibilities  
− Water infrastructure inadequate and response 
of the water company was defensive 
− Delay to visit and repair all flooded properties, 
meant people were displaced for a long time 
− Blocked drains caused flooding 
− Government grants poorly administered and 
few people benefitted from available money  
− Lack of understanding of resilient construction 
− Inappropriate responses to the recovery and 
repair of traditionally constructed buildings 
− Long term psychological issues  
In Germany, despite a comparatively lower level of insurance, insurance companies also played an 
important role in the recovery process, paying 1.8 billion in compensation [37]. Both countries have a 
private market approach to flood insurance. However, the continued availability of domestic flood 
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insurance at a reasonable cost has been under pressure for some years following an increase in the 
number and severity of flood events [58]. The increased incidence of flooding presented insurers with 
a dilemma. Insurers could either carry on facing repeated huge claims from a minority of claimants, or 
exclude hazardous areas with a high probability of flooding. FloodRe is the current UK approach to 
deal with the issue that some homes are at such a high risk of flood that they are uninsurable. FloodRe 
is a not-for-profit reinsurer run by the insurance industry and funding for the scheme comes from a levy 
on insurers according to their market share. It is only intended to cover those properties most at risk—
about 1–2% of domestic households [59,60]. It is still unclear how sustainable this approach is as the 
levy will taper off and cease by 2040 [61] and FloodRe does nothing to encourage property owners to 
take flood mitigation measures [62]. 
After the 2002 floods, the German Insurance Association (GDV) took an important step in flood risk 
assessment. Advances in geo-information sciences and data availability meant that more detailed 
probabilistic flood modelling became feasible which meant premiums could be more reliably priced 
and the risk could be transferred from the state to the private insurance and reinsurance sectors [63]. 
Insurance penetration although still low in Germany (41% nationwide in 2018) is set to rise substantially 
as the federal government will no longer offer compensation to the uninsured [64]. Bavaria has 
announced that, from 1 July 2019, it will no longer provide emergency financial aid following natural 
disasters to victims who could have purchased insurance [37]. Since 2013, federal states, insurance 
associations and the insurance industry have adopted numerous measures to increase risk awareness 
among homeowners and businesses in Germany. The GDV regularly updates and improves its flood 
mapping and state governments have launched extensive information campaigns. 
The insurance sector could play a bigger role in both countries in ‘building back better’. Risk reflective 
insurance premium pricing could encourage engagement with mitigation measures [65], for example 
through insurance discounts once the measures are installed. In Germany, insured households are more 
likely to undertake risk reduction measures than uninsured, suggesting that flood insurance does set an 
incentive for policyholders to take action. However, in Germany insurance companies do little to 
encourage precautionary measures [40] and in the UK only 55% of insurance brokers thought insurers 
should allow customers to pay towards more resilient repairs [66]. 
6. Flood resilience and management 
Flood risk is similar in the UK and Germany and the costliest natural hazard in both countries. Yet there 
are clear economic benefits of improving flood resilience. For example, the monetary benefit of 
measures designed to keep water out of those properties with an annual chance of flooding of 2% or 
above outweighs the investment cost by a factor of at least 5 [67]. Significant areas of both Germany 
and the UK remain reliant on flood protection measures that are at risk [68] and both countries now 
have broadly similar risk management approaches, namely ‘Making Space for Water’ in the UK [69] 
and ‘Room for Rivers’ in Germany [70], that primarily replace traditional engineered flood defences 
with a mix of natural flood management measures including regulating land use and promoting flood 
insurance as a risk transfer mechanism [71]. Both countries are improving their hazard mapping and 
beginning to tighten land use and planning controls to discourage or prevent development on flood 




Table 6 Comparison of post flood initiatives and reforms 
Germany UK 
− More effective flood warnings − Met Office and the Environment Agency joint 
provision of better flood warnings and mapping 
− Elimination of weak point in flood defences; 
dykes rebuilt or reinforced and mobile flood 
barriers 
− Sector Resilience Plans identify critical 
infrastructure at risk of flooding 
− Nationales Hochwasserschutzprogramm for flood 
protection 
− £2.3bn flood defence spending programme 2014 
− Increasing levels of household flood insurance − Flood Re. Insurance for homes as high risk. 
− Mitigation and preparedness measures within 
properties 
− Recommendations to improve property 
resilience. 
− Hazard mapping to control spatial planning and 
development 
− New policy of withdrawal and relocation  
6.1 UK flood resilience and management 
Progress is being made in improving flood resilience in the UK. Following the 2007 floods in the UK, 
the Environment Agency warned that the average annual cost of flood damage could rise by 60% by 
2035, unless funding for defences was doubled to £1bn a year [72]. The Pitt Review recommended 
putting communities at the heart of flood management through the strengthening of Regional Flood and 
Coastal Committees. It also recommended technological advances in managing flood risk [73], 
developing engagement processes with those exposed to flood risk [74] and recommended addressing 
the ‘recovery gap’, which sees residents having to negotiate a maze of agencies and companies involved 
in flood recovery [75]. In response to the near misses with infrastructure failure in 2007, the UK 
government initiated sector resilience plans that set out the resilience of critical infrastructure to hazards 
[76]. These plans are produced annually and assess the risk and vulnerability of each infrastructure 
sector, the desirable level of resilience, a programme of actions for achieving the desired resilience level 
and methods of reporting progress [18]. 
The Flood and Water Management Act 2010 implemented the Pitt Review’s recommendations and 
made unitary authorities and county councils (i.e. upper-tier authorities) the Lead Local Flood 
Authorities for developing a local flood risk management strategy, cooperating with other risk 
management authorities, investigating flooding in its area, maintaining a register of structures 
vulnerable to flood and carrying out works to manage flood risk. An evaluation of the response to the 
Act by DEFRA concluded that although these arrangements were proving effective their application in 
different authorities was patchy [77]. In December 2014, the Government announced a £2.3bn flood 
defence spending programme, meeting the Environment Agency’s predicted long-term investment need 
[78]. The Met Office and the Environment Agency have set up a ‘world class’ joint office to provide 
more accurate flood warnings and mapping and the Environment Agency has instigated a series of 
further developments including making flood warnings available on Facebook [79]. 
However, the picture is not entirely positive. The Pitt Review called for flood resilience to become the 
norm and the Bon field Report [80] recommended a package of measures to improve property resilience. 
But houses are still being built on flood plains and even the most detailed house survey only provides 
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basic information about flood risk and fails to indicate how badly a property could be affected in the 
event of a serious flood [81]. There is a growing impression that although the UK Environment Agency 
has made great strides, it does not have strong enough powers, for example it is unable to veto plans to 
build on a flood plain. Building regulations need tightening and there are concerns about the use of 
unrealistic hard edge flood mapping that ignores the risk outside perceived flood-prone areas. Most 
recently, the Environment Agency in the UK has launched a new long-term strategy for flood and 
coastal resilience that acknowledges that some communities pose such high flood risk that they may 
need relocating [80]. 
6.2 German flood resilience and management 
In Germany, after the 2002 floods, a number of weaknesses were identified, including deficient flood 
warnings, poor maintenance of flood protection and a lack of risk awareness. Efforts were made to 
develop an integrated system of flood management [82] and improvements were made to warnings and 
dissemination of information, which led to some households being better prepared for the event in 2013. 
Several legislative initiatives were launched, including the German Flood Protection Act of 2005 and 
the EU Floods Directive of 2007, that considered both structural and non-structural means of mitigating 
damage. An evaluation of these post-2002 improvements showed that there had been a greater 
consideration of flood hazards in spatial planning and urban development, comprehensive mitigation 
and preparedness measures within properties, more effective flood warnings, a more coordinated 
disaster response and more targeted maintenance of flood defence systems [34]. These led to better 
flood management in 2013 and, thus, reduced damage, estimated to be 6–8 billion compared with over 
11 billion in 2002. However, in many cases, buildings that were flooded in 2002 were flooded again in 
2013 because no improvements to flood resilience had been carried out. There was a lack of awareness 
about how structures could be made more flood-resistant and little incentive to inform building owners 
about how this might be done. There are also few rewards to rebuild in a better, more flood-resilient 
way [83]. 
After the 2013 floods, the federal government approved a national flood protection programme, the 
Nationales Hochwasserschutzprogramm, due for completion by the end of 2020. The programme 
includes dyke relocation, controlled flood retention and the elimination of weak points in existing flood 
protection [84]. The total budget for the programme is 5.4 billion. Similar to the UK, there is an 
increasing emphasis in Germany on citizens’ taking responsibility for their own flood preparedness and 
protection. A survey of 889 households affected by the 2013 floods explored ways of encouraging 
citizens to take responsibility and improve household resilience in partnership with the State [85]. There 
is evidence homeowners are willing to make investments in mitigation [86] and research suggests that 
to increase take-up communication in Germany should focus on the potential of flood mitigation 
measures to effectively reduce or avoid flood damage, as well as on information about how to 
implement such measures in practice [31]. 
7. Conclusion 
7.1 Speed of recovery 
Summarizing the results of the surveys of residents and experts in the UK and Germany, the impact of 
the floods across various sectors and the speed and quality of recovery was remarkably similar in both 
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case studies. In both case studies, over half the respondents recovered within 1 year. In Germany, it 
took about 18 months for 90% or more of residents to get back to normal, while in the UK it took a year 
longer. In Germany, 93% had returned to normal in under 2 years, while in the UK, 78% had recovered 
in the same time period. These differences may be related to funding; in the UK, over 90% of funding 
came from household insurance while in Germany over 60% came from federal aid, which may have 
been quicker. In both countries, the economy had recovered to near normal within 12–18 months.  
Comparing the speed of recovery in different sectors, experts in the UK and Germany consider that 
employment and infrastructure recovered more rapidly than housing, although the differences were not 
that pronounced. 
7.2 Changes in resilience 
Only a small proportion of residents in the UK (29%) and Germany (26%) believe that their homes are 
now safer and better prepared than prior to the flood. The majority of people surveyed in both countries 
(74% in Germany and 67% in the UK) believe that their homes and businesses are as just as vulnerable 
now as they were before the respective floods. This reflects the fact that most homes were repaired 
without the addition of any flood protection or damage alleviation measures. By contrast, half the 
respondents in the UK (50%) thought their neighbourhood was safer and better prepared compared to 
only 11% in Germany, where 86% thought their neighbourhood or town was just as vulnerable. In the 
UK, the survey was conducted in an area where the Environment Agency has installed major flood 
protection measures since 2007. 
7.3 Were the floods ‘gamechangers’ 
Extreme events can be catalysts for policy change and both floods provoked significant changes in flood 
awareness and preparedness [87,88]. In the UK, the 2007 flood was called a ‘game changer’ and in 
Germany the 2013 flood in Germany was described as a ‘focusing event’ [89]. It is fair to conclude that 
both floods may be considered as ‘game-changers’ and resulted in a heightened awareness of flood risk, 
increased investment in flood defences, clearer and more accurate flood warnings and an increasing 
emphasis on citizens taking more responsibility for flood preparedness [90]. In the UK, after a period 
of considerable investment in flood protection the Environment Agency is currently consulting on a 
new policy of strategic withdrawal. In Germany, flood insurance may soon become the norm as the 
federal government reconsiders its role in providing aid. 
In Catcliffe, substantial progress has been made in improving flood protection since 2007 [91] by raising 
the piling along the River Rother and by building a new slipway on the Ulley reservoir. Local volunteers 
have also helped clear debris from drains and culverts. In Dreiflüsse-Eck damage to historic buildings, 
including the theatre, the new town hall, museums and university, increased political pressure on the 
Federal government to increase spending on the Altstadt-Passau Flood Action Programme 2020 and the 
Danube Flood Protection Programme [92]. 
However, with several years’ hindsight, it is apparent that important aspects of flood management and 
risk reduction remain unclear and that much still needs to be done. In the UK, the Environment Agency 
lacks powers to prevent development in flood risk areas, householders with homes at risk are not 
installing mitigation measures and the FloodRe approach to uninsurable homes is unsustainable. In 
Germany, there are issues of coordination across large catchments that cross regional, state or national 
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borders and some of the risk reduction measures have proved to be ineffective [93]. Many homes and 
businesses continue to be at risk from major floods and more progress needs to be made in making them 
more resilient and in both countries the insurance sector could play a much bigger role in ‘building back 
better’. Homes and businesses will continue to be damaged in major floods. The speed of recovery will 
most probably remain the same and it will be difficult to reduce recovery time for badly flooded homes 
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Article 5: Tourism Recovery Scorecard (TOURS) – Benchmarking 
and monitoring progress on disaster recovery in tourism destinations 
Abstract 
After a disaster, tourism declines and tourist stakeholders suffer because tourists cancel their 
reservations and choose to go elsewhere. A key part of managing recovery of tourism destinations is 
restoring the destination image and reputation which can be affected by negative or inaccurate media 
coverage. This paper reports the results of surveys with tourism sector stakeholders aimed at measuring 
recovery in three tourism destinations affected by two back-to-back disasters: the Bohol earthquake and 
tropical cyclone Haiyan in 2013 in the Philippines. The authors developed a methodological framework 
for the Tourism Recovery Scorecard (TOURS), which can be used as a crisis communication tool for 
benchmarking and monitoring progress on post disaster recovery of a tourism destination. Three main 
dimensions of safety, physical recovery and business recovery are considered in the Scorecard, each 
containing key factors that are important to tourists and meaningful to tourism operators. 
1. Introduction 
Natural and man-made disasters, including the impacts of geological events, climatic disasters, 
terrorism and war, have the potential to severely affect the image of a tourism destination. How the 
tourism destination, prepares for and adjusts to disaster situations has not received a great deal of 
attention in tourism management research, even though most if not all destinations face the prospect of 
either a natural or human-induced disaster at some time in their history. Faulkner & Vikulov [23] report 
how after cyclonic flooding washed out Katherine Gorge in Northern Territory Australia, the tourism 
industry was faced with the huge challenge of restoring operations to normal. Despite the effectiveness 
of a “Katherine Back On-track” campaign, tourism operators incurred significant short-term financial 
losses because the perception of Katherine being washed-out lasted for some time beyond the reality. 
Following the Indian Ocean 2004 tsunami, widespread international media attention resulted in an 
immediate drop in tourist visits in the year following the tsunami (e.g. [26,49,39,52]). There was a 
rebound to near pre-tsunami tourism arrivals once resorts had been repaired or reconstructed [49]. In 
addition to natural disasters, terrorism attacks since the events of September 11th, 2001, which 
dramatically impacted the tourism industry, illustrate the need for better crisis communication and 
perception management of such incidents [41]. 
The impacts of disasters on the tourism market are often out of proportion with their actual disruptive 
effects because of exaggeration by the media [14,19,32]. The damage to businesses caused by the 
disaster escalates with negative media coverage and a ruined destination image [45]. As a result, the 
recovery of destinations usually takes longer than the time needed to restore services to normality [22]. 
The effectiveness with which the tourism industry in a disaster area handles a crisis in terms of a crisis 
communication strategy has a major bearing on how quickly the destination is restored to normal and 
businesses recover [5,7,21,40,9]. Media reports have the potential to have a devastating impact on 
disaster-affected destinations and present a severe challenge to the marketability of a destination and 
even result in a collateral marketing crisis in neighbouring destinations [10,11]. As a result, trusted 
government organisations such as the chamber of commerce or private sector operators, such as 
destination marketing organisations, tour operators, travel agencies, hotel associations and individual 
hotels must have targeted communication plans and strategies to address media reports and be able to 
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directly address tourists’ concerns in the aftermath of disasters. The efficacy of a crisis communication 
strategy in managing risk perception hinges to a large extent on the degree to which communication 
plans have been integrated within disaster risk management policies and strategies and the industry is 
able to communicate true positive messages to the market [22,16,6]. This explains why some models 
for tourism disaster plans (see, for example, [28,53]) tend to emphasise market communication 
considerations.  
Proactive policy-making, planning and implementation of disaster risk reduction (DRR) are likely to 
enhance the sector's ability to recover from crises and disasters. However, particularly for tourism 
destinations, disasters can have longer-term effects and recovering from a crisis goes beyond the task 
of repairing the physical damage and building back better. It has also a lot to do with managing the 
media and restoring the destination's image and encouraging visitors to return. Factual, up-to-date 
information about safety and the status of infrastructure, attractions, accommodation, restaurants and 
other facilities ensure tourists are aware of areas which are not affected so they have alternative 
destinations within the same area if they need to evaluate their travel plans. Providing access to objective 
and reliable information also helps to combat media sensationalism and ensures visitors can make an 
informed choice. This paper reports the development of a set of indicators, gathering data to measure 
these indicators, drawing recovery graphs and reporting this data in a ‘Tourism Recovery Scorecard’ to 
report the level of readiness of the destination to welcome tourists back. The main aim of the paper is 
to develop and test the methodology behind the assessment in a pilot study that was carried out in three 
tourism destinations in the Philippines.  
2. Measuring tourism destination recovery 
There are numerous sets of indicators on sustainable tourism destination management (e.g. [51], but 
most make little mention of tourism destination safety or disaster resilience, two concepts which would 
seem to be central to a sustainable tourist sector. Research into tourism crisis indicators in sustainable 
tourism has tended to focus on identifying those indicators that monitor the negative impacts of tourism 
on the destination rather than on indicators that measure recovery after disaster [20,29,42,47]. On the 
other hand, within the field of disaster risk reduction (DRR), various disaster recovery indicator 
frameworks with considerable variation in their structure, content and complexity have been proposed 
and applied for establishing baselines and benchmarking disaster recovery of communities and 
geographic regions in general (e.g. [13,15,17,30,37,38]). The indicator frameworks developed in these 
studies depend largely on the context to which disaster recovery applied and the disciplinary 
background of the authors. For the most part, disaster recovery is not confined to infrastructure systems 
alone, but encompasess also social entities: the city dwellers, decision makers, and political groups. 
Relatively fewer studies have focused on indicator frameworks for disaster recovery of tourism 
destinations. To develop a comprehensive indicator framework that conceptualises a tourist 
destination's recovery as a human-environment (or socio-ecological) system, the concept of resilience 
and recovery has been explored in several studies related to tourism. For example, in relation to the 
management of tourism protected areas [46] or community governance [43]. Organisational or business 
resilience has been another focus of tourism researchers. In the context of Indonesia, and as part of a 
longitudinal study, Dahles and Susilowati [18] established three different resilience attributes, namely 
survival, adaptation and innovation. The ability to innovate was also of particular importance in the 
recovery of businesses following the Christchurch (New Zealand) earthquake [35]. Taking a slightly 
different approach Biggs et al. [12] aimed to measure the resilience of tourism businesses, for example 
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by assessing financial and social capital, and self-reported lifestyle benefits. Various best practices were 
developed specifically targeted at the tourism industry with considerable variation in their structure and 
content were reviewed and for establishing baselines and comparing disaster recovery of different 
tourism destinations (Table 1). 
Table 1 Examples of selected best practices developed for disaster risk reduction in the tourism sector 
Tool Year Purpose Organisation/ Source 
Handbook on Natural 
Disaster Reduction in 
Tourist Areas. 
1998 Awareness raising, and provision of 
a range of useful templates, for 
example for disaster 
communication and press releases 
World Tourism 




Management for the 
Asia Pacific Region: 
An Authoritative 
Guide for Managing 
Crisis and Disasters 
2006 Targeted at government decision-
makers and tourism industry 
members in Asia and the Pacific. 
Offers a broad coverage of threats 
and hazards relevant to the tourism 
industry, and strategic ways to 
respond to them. 
APEC 
Bounce back: Tourism 
Risk, Crisis and 
Recovery Management 
Guide 
2011 Information on crisis/risk 
management and resources, 







Visitor Action Plan to 
prepare for natural 
disasters, a guide for 
tourism organisations 
2011 For regional tourism organisations 
and councils to achieve better 
integration of systems and 
structures 
Becken and Hughey [8] 
 
Utilizing the above studies and best practices a framework of targets and indicators for measuring 
recovery in tourism were identified for post disaster recovery of tourism destinations. This framework 
has been operationalized in the Philippines in a Scorecard approach that can be used in benchmarking 
the impacts of the event along key dimensions of tourism recovery and monitoring progress on the level 
of recovery of a tourism destination. The Scorecard approach provides a monitoring tool to identify the 
level of recovery by gathering and analysing data on the recovery of a destination and report this 
evidence in a form stakeholders can understand easily and use to recover tourism in the affected area. 
Thus, the Tourism Recovery Scorecard (TOURS) is designed to be used by tourism stakeholders, 
including tour operators, government and public sector and visitors to tourism destinations with two 
key aims: Firstly, devising an efficient and cost effective way of gathering reliable information at 
repeated time intervals; and secondly, reporting this data in a clear simple and highly visual way that 
tourist, tourist media and tour operators can immediately understand. 
Tourist destination recovery is defined here in terms of a return to a feeling of safety and normality, 
clearance and repair of physical infrastructure and the recovery of tourist numbers and hotel bookings. 
Disaster recovery can be considered for multiple time frames (i.e. immediate, short-term, mid-term, 
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long-term). In the implementation of TOURS, we considered the immediate aftermath of an event as 
well as periodic surveys within the short- to mid-term following an event as the most appropriate 
benchmarks for informing tourists of the post disaster situation, as this corresponds to the timelines that 
are most likely to coincide with media coverage of disaster impacts in a tourism destination. In addition, 
three dimensions of recovery are used in TOURS: safety, physical recovery and business recovery. This 
classification corresponds to various concepts of resilience into economic, physical and psychological 
dimensions (for example [37,38]). Of course there is no single ‘right’ way to classify indicators and 
other researchers have grouped indictors of resilience and recovery in various other ways. Paton [36] 
conceptualises resilience as the capacity community members, businesses and societal institutions to 
respond to crises. Cutter et al. [17] classify their ‘baseline resilience indicators’ into 5 groups: social 
economic, institutional, infrastructure resilience, and community capital. The UN Office of Disaster 
Risk Reduction [48], p. 25) defines disaster recovery in terms of livelihoods, health, economic, physical 
social, cultural and environmental assets, systems and activities. Platt et al. [37] grouped their 12 
indicators of recovery monitored using data from satellite imagery into 6 groups: transport, buildings, 
transitional shelter, services, environment and livelihoods. What is important though is that the 
categories of things or activities the groupings signify are intelligible and relevant to the intended 
audience. Our initial conception categorised indicators of recovery into 3 groups: perception of danger, 
visible damage and tourism economy. The names of these dimensions changed during the study to 
safety, physical recovery and business recovery. 
Trusted government agencies, such as the chamber of commerce or the department of tourism, as well 
as key private sector stakeholders, such as hotels and hotel associations, tour operators, and national 
and international travel agencies, are the imagined main ‘stakeholders’ for this information. These 
groups need trusted information and evidence to attract tourists back and to return the tourist sector to 
how it was before the event. It was also imagined that if this system were to be adopted in the 
Philippines, or elsewhere, the scorecard would be updated at regular intervals, possibly each month, 
and reported in a press release and on tourist agency websites. 
3. Pilot application in Philippines 
The study area is in the Central Visayas region of the Philippines (Fig. 1), specifically Bohol, Cebu and 
Bantayan islands, which are popular tourist destinations in the Philippines. The yearly high season of 
tourism in the study area ranges from December to April because of the cooler and pleasant weather, 
while the low season ranges from May to November due to the hot temperatures and high rainfall 
amounts, and even extreme weather such as torrential downpours and typhoons. 
The Philippines is one of the most disaster prone countries in the world. It ranks fifth in the world in 
terms of number of natural disaster events per year [25]; an average of 20 typhoons hit Philippines every 
year [31] and the World Bank Risk Index (2016) ranks the Philippines as the third most at risk-prone 





Figure 1 Study area. Central Visayas region in the Philippines 
The study area in the central Visayas region of the Philippines was devastated by a magnitude 7.2 
earthquake (Bohol earthquake) and a super typhoon (Haiyan) on 15 October 2013 and 8 November 
2013, respectively. The twin disasters led to extreme loss of life and widespread damage to the 
infrastructure and natural landscapes. While the Bohol earthquake earthquake affected the whole 
Central Visayas region, its impact was highest in Bohol, where the epicentre of the shallow earthquake 
was located, and in Cebu. According to official reports by the National Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Council (NDRRMC), 222 were reported dead, 8 were missing, and 976 people were 
injured. In all, more than 73,000 structures were damaged, of which more than 14,500 were totally 
destroyed [33,34]. On 7 November, just 3 weeks after the Bohol earthquake, Super Typhoon Haiyan 
struck the region. Although the storm's eye missed the area affected by the earthquake, it sent some 
40,000 Boholanos still living in temporary shelters back to evacuation centres and disrupted relief 
efforts in the province (Matus, 2013). Tropical Cyclone Haiyan (8 November 2013) caused catastrophic 
damage throughout much of the islands in the Visayas, reaching speeds more than 185 kph devastating 
cities on its paths as well as damaging tourism infrastructure such as coastal resorts. Haiyan is the 
strongest storm recorded at landfall, and the deadliest Philippine typhoon on record killing at least 6300 
people in that country alone. It destroyed 550,000 homes and caused damage losses of $2.9 billion 
(NDRRMC, 2014).  
According to a World Bank survey in 2013 [24] p XIV) the Central Visayas region suffered from major 
economic impact, and hundreds of tourists were left stranded by the storm for days. The impact of the 
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storm on tourism made for a week of international headlines, frightening away tourists across the central 
Philippines and triggering mass cancellations [44]. Resorts at major destinations such as Boracay, 
Palawan, Cebu and Bohol saw cancellation rates of 30–40%, according to Cesar Cruz, President of the 
Philippine Tour Operators Association in Manila.” [4] p1). Slow progress of government response to 
the postdisaster recovery was reported even after one year since the disasters [1,2]. Many tourists were 
hesitant to visit the Visayas islands, due to their perception that the islands were not ready for tourists 
(Philistar, 2016). Due to the major impact to the tourism industry by these events, this area is an ideal 
study area for us to monitor and assess its postdisaster tourism recovery.  
Despite the magnitude of the events tourist numbers actually increased in all of the Philippines by one-
third the following year (2014). As shown in Fig. 2 the trend in international tourist arrivals in the 
Philippines from 1996 to 2015 shows a fairly constant 8% increase. The twin disasters of 2013 appear 
to have resulted in only a minor dip in this trend to 3% increase (2013–2014). Interestingly, tourism 
receipts actually increased by 23% from 276 million USD in 2013 to 340 million USD in 2013 in the 
Philippines, indicating other non-affected destinations in the Philippines more than absorbed the 
temporary disruption to tourism in the Visayas as a result of the Bohol earthquake and Haiyan typhoon. 
At first sight this seems a surprising finding, however, there is evidence from other places that disasters 
have only a relatively small impact on the national economy. Nevertheless, the impact on the regional 
or local economy can be devastating. It is crucial, therefore, that reliable data is collected and tools are 
developed that measure recovery on the local and regional level, and only at the aggregate national 
level. In 2013 in the Philippines, after the twin disasters of earthquake and typhoon, it is important for 
the survivors, the residents and tourist industry, that the destination recovers swiftly and, just as 
importantly, that progress is reported effectively to convince tourists that it is safe and convenient to 
return. 
 
Figure 2 Philippines tourist arrivals (Source: FFCCCII, 2014) 
 
4. TOURS implementation in the Philippines 
A research team from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) conducted a stakeholder survey in 
August 2016, 2.5 years after the 2013 Bohol earthquake and Typhoon Haiyan. One of the difficulties 


































memories of the timing of recovery might unreliable and they might exaggerate or underestimate time 
intervals. In our survey we carefully selected respondents in the tourism industry who were present at 
the time of the event and we thought would be a reliable witness of the disaster recovery. 
Five indicators were used to measure each of the three dimensions of recovery: safety, physical recovery 
and business recovery, plus an overview indicator for each dimension resulting in a total of 18 indicators 
in the TOURS survey tool (see Table 2). During both workshops and key informant interviews in the 
Philippines, a total of 40 people, working in the tourism sector were surveyed (see Table 2). To help 
benchmark the survey and trigger the responders’ memories of the recovery following these events, we 
referred to two ‘snapshot’ timings. We have labelled these two timelines as: Right After (the event) and 
New Year. In terms of recovery timelines, Right After is the immediate response phase following the 
event, while New Year is the transition period between short- and medium-term recovery, which 
occurred 2.5 months after the event or around the time of New Year. These labels provided clear 
associations to the participants in our surveys for which we could establish specific timelines. For 
example, New was the first tourist season after the disaster and responders are likely to remember this 
time more clearly. Having a snapshot right after the disaster provided a measure of the severity of 
damage in the destination, against which we could assess the recovery after 2.5 months. 
Two rating scales were used– a binary scale where the respondent said whether the indicator had 
recovered or not and a 10 rating point in which respondents said by what percentage a particular 
indicator, for example electricity supply, had recovered. The binary scale was an attempt to get more 
reliable results and make it easier and quicker for interviewees to respond by devising questions 
demanding only Yes or No answers, where YES indicated a full recovery. For example, people were 
asked if electricity was fully restored by the first New Year after disaster or not. The first survey was 
conducted in a workshop in Bohol City with 17 participants. They reported that Bohol had experienced 
difficulties after the earthquake and faced severe economic problems when tourist numbers fell after 
the disaster. The result of the questionnaire was not as expected. The interviewees had great difficulty 
being forced to choose simple Yes or No answers. They wanted to be able to say by how much an 
indicator had recovered, since many aspects of the destination were not fully recovered by New Year, 
but had recovered sufficiently to welcome tourists. 
In the second workshop, held in Cebu city, we had another opportunity to evaluate the questionnaire by 
using it with people from public and private tourism sectors, including tour operators and hotel 
managers. One of the advantages of this gathering was although the workshop was held in Cebu city; 
participants also came from Bantayan, Bohol and Manila. In this workshop in Cebu, as well as binary 
yes-no questions, interviewees were asked to score the level of recovery on a scale of 0–10, in which 
10 meant fully recovered. In total the field trip collected 40 interview responses, 20 for binary scale and 




Table 2 Indicators used in the survey in the Philippines 
Safety To what extent: 
Reputation 
was he destination was reported as safe on: TV, Radio, Print Media; Social Media; 
Word of Mouth 
Hazard did you feel safe in relation to future natural hazards? 
Health was health and spread of disease controlled? 
Security was the destination safe in terms of crime/ terrorism? 
Stability was the destination politically stable? 
Overview did the destination feel safe for tourists? 
Physical recovery To what extent: 
Roads was debris cleared where tourists go?  
Electricity was electricity restored? 
Water was drinking water restored? 
Attractions have attractions been restored? 
Transport 
have transport systems been restored for: Flights; Ferries; Public Transport; Private 
Car? 
Housing have people been rehoused? 
Overview does the destination look recovered? 
Business recovery To what extent: 
Foreign has foreign tourism recovered? 
Local has local tourism recovered? 
Occupancy have hotel bookings recovered? 
Services have restaurants, shopping, tourism agencies/services; ATM recovered 
Telecoms have mobile phone networks recovered 
Overview has tourism recovered?  
 
Table 3 shows the breakdown of informants by role, which workshop they attended and which form of 
questionnaire; rating or binary scale was applied. It should be emphasised that this sample is too small 
to provide an adequate assessment of recovery in the three destinations in the pilot. A much larger 
sample would have been needed to provide valid and reliable data. This however, was not the purpose 
of the study. The main aim was methodological – to develop a set of indicators to measure recovery 
and a scorecard reporting system. 
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Table 3 Key informants interviewed and answering questionnaire 
International Tourism Experts 3 




Tour Operators and 
Others 
National  7 












Cebu 12 3 
Bohol 6 11 
Bantayan 2 6 




Fig. 3 shows the comparison of rating and binary scale in Cebu city, each color represent one dimension 
of recovery and each dot is related to one of the sub-indicators of each dimension. Fig. 3 compares 
overall recovery in the three cities, Cebu, Bohol and Bantayan for Right After the disaster and New 
Year. Comparing average recovery right after the disaster using the two scales in Cebu, it is clear that 
the 10-point rating scale provides much more credible and consistent results than the binary scale. The 
rating scale scoring was consistent between different respondents whereas the binary scale gave widely 
divergent scoring (See Fig. 3). It would appear that the over simplification required of the respondents 
in using the binary scale gave unreliable and inaccurate readings of recovery. The following results, 
therefore, only used rating scale data. 
 
 
Figure 3 Comparison of rating and binary scales in all three cities 
Table 4 shows summary results for the three cities. Cebu was the least damaged of the three cities 
according to the respondents interviewed (48% physical and 41% business) and felt the safest of the 
three. Bohol and Banatayan were assessed as having a fairly similar level of damage right after the 
disaster. By New Year all three cities had recovered dramatically with Bantayan showing the biggest 
improvement on all three dimensions.  
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Table 4 Summary recovery for 3 cities and 3 dimensions 
Undamaged Right After disaster  Recovery by New Year 
 Safety Physical Business   Safety Physical Business 
Cebu 57% 48% 42%  Cebu 75% 72% 70% 
Bohol 30% 23% 29%  Bohol 67% 67% 70% 
Bantayan 36% 25% 25%  Bantayan 87% 79% 79% 
 
Fig. 4 compares the recovery in the three cities for the two time snapshots – the percentage undamaged 
right after the disaster and at New Year, 2.5 months after the disaster. In Fig. 4 each of the corners of 
the triangles represents one of the three dimensions of recovery (safety, physical recovery and business 
recovery) and the outer black triangle represents full or 100% recovery. The smaller dotted triangle in 
the centre, showing the situation right after the disaster shows, Cebu had the least damage compared to 
the other two cities and Bohol and Bantayan are very similar on all three dimensions. By New Year, 
after 2.5 months, Bohol had recovered to the same level as Cebu but Bantayan is less recovered and 
less ready to welcome tourists.  
  
 
Figure 4 Comparison of recovery Right After disaster with New Year 
Each recovery dimension has five indicators (See Table 1). For example, physical recovery includes 
road, electricity and water, attractions, transport, and housing recovery. There is also an ‘overview’ 
indicator for each of the three dimensions in which the interviewees are asked, for example, about 
“Overall Physical Recovery”. The results of physical recovery are shown in Fig. 5 as an example. 
Fig. 5 shows the breakdown of different components of physical recovery from right after the event to 
New Year. The slope of the lines indicate the speed of recovery with steeper slopes showing a faster 
recovery rate. It can be seen that across all three cities electricity was restored most quickly by New 
Year (30% in Cebu, 63% in Bohol and 80% in Bantayan). In Cebu with the exception of electricity, all 
of the physical recovery indicators recovered at almost the same speed, whereas in Bohol the recovery 
rates are much more variable from right after the event to New Year. Electricity and water show the 
fastest recovery rate to over 80% by New Year, whereas as other indicators such as housing recover at 
a much slower rate, in this case short of 40% by New Year. This is due to the earthquake in Bohol that 
impacted the physical infrastructure and the rate at which infrastructure was restored and people were 
rehoused was slower than in Cebu. Bantayan, which was most heavily impacted by Typhoon Haiyan, 
also indicates the slowest recovery. In Bantayan as was also evident from our site visit, housing recovery 




Figure 5 Comparison of speed of recovery after disaster for physical recovery sub-indicators in three cities. 
The recovery across the three different destinations is shown in Fig. 6. It can be seen that across all 
destinations business recovery had the highest speed of recovery by New Year followed by physical 
recovery with safety having the slowest recovery.  
 










The focus of recovery seems to have been mainly on business recovery and reinstating services for 
foreign and local tourists including shopping centres, telecommunications and banking facilities, 
because the economy of the area is dependent on tourism. Physical recovery also needed to be improved, 
in terms of removing debris and repairing roads and bridges and reinstating public transportation. 
However, changing people's perception of safety according to the respondents interviewed needs more 
time. It is apparent though that news reports via social media, word of mouth, TV and radio have a large 
role both nationally and internationally in improving people's perceptions.  
5.1. Safety 
The feeling of safety in relation to future natural hazards was equally bad in Bohol and Bantayan 
immediately after the disaster (10%) whereas it was five times as high in Cebu (51%), but by New Year, 
the feeling of safety in Bohol and Banatayan had improved to the same levels in Cebu (between 70–
80%). The difference seems to be the positive effect of the media promoting the perception of safety in 
all these destinations in the period following the event. 
5.2. Physical recovery 
Bantayan seems to have made the fastest physical recovery. However, the sample in Bantayan is much 
too small to have confidence in this finding. Nevertheless, despite the initial heavy damage, water and 
electricity supply and the town centre and tourist attractions were recovered quickly in both 
destinations. However, debris still needed to be cleared in places tourists visit in both destinations 
(Bohol 60% recovered and Banatayan 58% recovered). Cebu was less damaged than the other two 
destinations and most indicators had recovered to 75% or more of the pre-disaster level by New Year. 
Yet the overall impression on physical recovery was only 68%. Cebu is a large city and the north part 
was seriously damaged while others parts were relatively undamaged. Some of the respondents were 
unhappy with progress in the entire city and maybe this affected their overall impression of recovery. 
Another factor was progress on rehousing displaced families was relatively slow and was only at 61% 
by New Year. 
5.3. Business recovery 
Local tourism recovered equally fast in all 3 destinations, and by New Year all three were welcoming 
Philipinos from all around the country. But booking rates for hotels in Bohol increased by 44% (from 
18% to 62%) compared to 31% in Bantayan (15–47%). Nevertheless international tourist numbers, 
although still only half pre-disaster rates, increased a similar amount in Bohol and Banatayan (from 
15% to 47% or 48%). 
One of the most interesting findings was that when people are asked to think about recovery of the 
detailed indicators one by one, they are happier answering, have better recall and give more accurate 
answers about the speed of the recovery process than when they are asked summary questions about 
whole areas of recovery. To illustrate this, the average recovery for the sum of the detailed is compared 




Figure 7 Overall impression compared to average of individual indicators. 
6. Discussion 
The discussion is organised in terms of a series of questions.  
6.1. Did key informant interviews with stakeholders provide valid and reliable data?  
As described earlier the methodology used was a survey with a small group of 40 carefully chosen 
'expert' stakeholders from the tourism sector. They represented a wide range of organisations: 6 were 
from the national government tourism department, 7 were tour operators, 24 were local hoteliers or tour 
operators and 3 were international tourism experts, all of whom had experienced the disaster and been 
involved in the recovery in different capacities. The question is; did they provide valid, accurate and 
reliable data or were their answers biased and either overly positive of negative? 
Key informant interview is a technique that is widely used to gather people's perceptions of a 
phenomenon. For example Platt et al. [37] used key informants to measure recovery and resilience over 
9 sectors after the Indian Ocean tsunami 2004 and the Pakistan earthquake 2005. The key informants 
were 10–12 community leaders in each of the local towns that suffered major losses. Although the key 
informants' assessments were subjective and relied on memory, the data was extremely accurate and 
corresponded closely to that obtained from detailed satellite imagery analysis.  
In any reporting of this kind there is a trade-off between simplicity and detail. Our initial instinct was 
that the indicators used to measure and the scorecard used to report should be as simple as possible. We 
therefore developed a binary set of indicators and a simple traffic light type scorecard. In the event, the 
pilot study in the Philippines suggests that one can over simplify. The two key methodological findings 
were that the tourist professionals we interviewed were uncomfortable being asked to give simple binary 
answers and that their overall perceptions of recovery were more pessimistic than their more detailed 
assessments of each indicator would suggest. Firstly, they much preferred to be able to give graduated 
answers, for example roads were 70% cleared. Secondly they were significantly more pessimistic when 
asked to assess overall recovery on each of the three dimensions – safety, physical and business 
recovery, than the average of individual indicators would suggest. Typically their overall assessment of 
recovery was 10% less than the average of the detailed dimensions. We concluded that a detailed survey 
instrument allowing graduated assessments of 15 indicators gives a more valid and reliable measure of 
recovery than a simple binary assessment of three summary dimensions. 
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6.2. Was the speed of recovery different in the three cities? 
By New Year Cebu had recovered the most followed by Bohol and then Banatayan (see Table 4). But 
according to official damage reports, and confirmed by the interview data, Cebu was significantly less 
damaged than the other two destinations. So the scale of damage goes some way to explaining why 
Cebu had recovered so well by New Year. The combined effects of the two disasters almost equally 
damaged Bohol and Bantayan, from the evidence of the interviews. However, we know from news 
reports that although Bohol was badly hit by the earthquake, some parts of the city were undamaged by 
typhoon. In contrast Banatayan was much more heavily affected being nearer to the storm track [24]. 
But scale of damage is not the only issue; a secondary factor may be size of settlement. Cebu and Bohol 
are much larger than Bantayan; the respective population of the three cities in 2015 was Bohol 1.3 
million; Cebu 866,000 and Banatayan 125,000. Larger cities can mobilise more resources in terms of 
expertise and finance to aid recovery and this is likely be an important factor in speeding recovery. 
6.3. How consistent was the scoring between respondents? 
There was most agreement between respondents in Bantayan and least in Cebu. Nevertheless, the level 
of agreement between the respondents overall was fairly high, with the following exceptions. In Cebu 
the respondents disagreed most about the speed of business recovery. They also disagreed about a 
number of safety indicators. In Bohol respondents disagreed both about the level of damage and of 
recovery for transportation and telecommunication networks. They agreed about the overall level of 
safety right after the disaster. In Bantayan there was disagreement in the “right after” disaster timeframe 
about the role of social media as well as local tourist business recovery by New Year. 
6.4. At what scale should recovery be reported? 
A key issue in developing a system to monitor and report recovery is the question of scale. Much of the 
current reporting of disaster recovery in the international press is at the countrywide scale. For most 
disasters this is too coarse. For example, in the Philippines the impact of the two disasters was centred 
on the island of Bohol and on Central Visayas [24]. The Philippines comprises over 7000 islands, only 
one of which, Bohol, was impacted by the earthquake and relatively few were seriously affected by 
Typhoon Haiyan. The way many visitors think about tourist places, and the way the tourism industry 
packages holidays, is in terms of destinations. This, therefore, is the scale adopted here. However, we 
need to acknowledge that the level of damage and recovery is not even over the whole of a destination. 
Bohol is a large island and Cebu a large city and some parts were more damaged than others. 
6.5. How should the results be communicated to tourism operators, the media and to potential 
tourists? 
It is imagined that in a tourist destination that had suffered a major natural disaster the recovery 
assessment described in this paper, using key informants to assess a range of 15–18 indicators, be 
conducted at regular monthly intervals. Based on our field study experience selection of key informants 
for the survey is of critical importance to the validity and credibility of results. Careful stakeholder 
mapping must be carried out beforehand to select a diverse, well-informed, reliable and representative 
group of stakeholders so that the survey results are trust worthy and are used. Statistical analysis should 
be carried out with outliers removed from the responses. As part of the communication strategy the 
visual representation of possible scorecards must be investigated. Initially we had thought that these 
might be in the form of a ‘traffic light’ red to green scale rather like the energy rating scale. This format 





Figure 8 Examples of disaster scorecards (USGS 2016; [3]) 
7. Conclusion 
The main aim of this study was to develop a method of monitoring tourism recovery after natural 
disasters using key informant surveys. Accurate, timely and ‘user-friendly’ reporting of recovery is a 
crucial part of supporting the perception of recovery in a tourist destination with fact-based information. 
The main conclusion is that key informant interviews with a relatively small group of stakeholders, can 
give reliable and accurate data that would support a simple cost effective means of providing regular 
recovery progress reports. The main advantage of key informant survey as a method is that it is 
extremely efficient, quick and cheap in terms of data gathering and analysis. This is important, since 
what is being proposed is a simple cost effective technique that can be repeated in frequent regular 
intervals, for example once a month, during the first couple of years of recovery. 
8. Recommendations 
The approach developed in this pilot study has wide applicability to other tourist destinations in other 
countries and other types of natural disaster. 
8.1. Method of assessment 
Since it is envisaged that the main audience for this recovery reporting is people working in the tourism 
sector, for example hoteliers, tour operators and tourist agencies, reporting using 15 indicators in spider 
graph is preferred to the simple traffic light system of reporting. However, further work needs to be 
done to establish which method of reporting might work best for tourists planning to visit places recently 
affected by disasters and it may prove that a simple traffic light system is preferable. 
8.2. Responsible authority 
The key issue for communicating this sort of information is 'can it be trusted?' People will quickly get 
a feel for this, and if it is not considered useful and trustworthy it will be ignored. It is recommended 
therefore recommended that the government tourist board in the disaster affected country, in this case 
the Philippines, set up a system of regular systematic data collection and reporting based on a carefully 
chosen set of key informants in each of the main tourist resorts. It is further recommended that the 
number of informants need only be in the region of 10–12 in each place to provide reliable data. Over 
time this agency, if it provides accessible, transparent information that corresponds to people's own 
individual perceptions, will gain in authority and credibility.  
8.3. Communicating to end-user tourists 
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It is recommended that further work be conducted to establish the best way of communicating recovery 
to tourists contemplating a holiday in a resort recovering from a disaster. In particular, a simple traffic 
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